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~~NATO SECRET~~
SUMMARY RECORD
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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on
Monday, 16th December, 1963 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

President : The Hon. Dean Rusk
Chairman and Secretary General : Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.H. Spaak : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.W. Segers : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin : Secretary of State for
External Affairs
The Hon. Paul Hellyer : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram : Minister for Defence
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer : Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux : Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs
H.E. Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel : Federal Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe : Permanent Representative

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GREECE

H.E. Mr. M.S. Venizelos : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. M.G. Mavros : Minister for Economic
Co-ordination
H.E. Mr. M.D. Papanicopoloulos : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. Ch. X. Palamas : Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Gudmundur
I. Gudmundsson : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Petur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative

ITALY

The Hon. Giuseppe Saragat : Minister for Foreign Affairs
The Hon. Giulio Andreotti : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Defence
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter : Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Jens Boyesen : Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. General M. Gomes de
Araujo : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha : Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Vefik Pirinçcioğlu : Minister of State
H.E. Mr. İlhami Sancar : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. R.A. Butler : Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
 The Rt. Hon. Peter Thorneycroft : Minister of Defence
 H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh : Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State (President of the Council)
 The Hon. Robert S. McNamara : Secretary of Defence
 The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. G. Colonna : Deputy Secretary General
 Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
 Mr. R.W.J. Hooper : Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
 Mr. Johnson Garrett : Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
 Dr. W.P. Allis : Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs
 The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

General A. Heusinger : Chairman, Military Committee
 Admiral Max Douguet : Chairman, Standing Group
 General L.L. Lemnitzer : Supreme Allied Commander Europe
 Admiral Harold P. Smith : Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
 Admiral Sir Wilfrid J.W. Woods : Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel
 Général de Corps d'Armée J.M. Guérin : Standing Group Representative

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I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Continued)

1. Mr. ERKIN (Turkey) associated himself with the statements of previous speakers in honour of the late President Kennedy, whose tragic death had aroused a profound sorrow among governments and peoples throughout the world. No better tribute could be paid to his memory than a wholehearted endeavour to consolidate the Alliance and it was gratifying that President Johnson was determined to pursue the policy of his predecessor.

2. He expressed satisfaction with the comments of preceding speakers on the implications of current Soviet policy on East-West relations. Developments in this field since the last Ministerial Meeting had been of such significance that the task then undertaken to investigate the motives behind Mr. Khrushchev's new approach in his dealings with the West had been facilitated in that preliminary conclusions could now be reached regarding his attitude on problems of general security; but the task had also been complicated by the fact that the theme of peaceful co-existence, much emphasised by Mr. Khrushchev after the Cuban crisis, was now taking on considerable proportions. This matter warranted thorough consultation within the Alliance to determine the basis for a position with regard to the urgent need for coexistence with the Soviet Union.

3. The partial Test Ban Treaty constituted the most positive aspect of progress towards a détente. Other trends in this direction included the agreement on the non-installation of atomic warfare devices on space vehicles, the restrained conduct of the Soviet Delegation during the present session of the United Nations and the conspicuous eagerness of the Soviet bloc to increase economic, commercial and cultural dealings with the West. Apart from the recent Berlin Autobahn incidents and the absurd espionage case, which demonstrated the rôle of arbitrary influences in Soviet tactics and administration, a marked easing in East-West contacts had been occasioned by the endeavour of the Soviet Union to diminish the cold war. But to enable a proper evaluation of this trend, it was also necessary to examine the negative tactics of the Soviet Union. Their hard bargaining did not facilitate co-operation on the fundamental aspects of disarmament and they had evidently shelved the question of inspection regarding underground nuclear tests. They considered the installation of observation posts on both sides of the Iron Curtain to be inseparable from the denuclearisation of Federal Germany and viewed the issue of disarmament as a means of achieving the maintenance and perhaps the strengthening in their favour of the status quo in Central Europe. This was also confirmed by their repeated proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This attitude of the Soviet Union should be carefully studied with a view to determining the best way to conduct future disarmament negotiations. It was increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was striving not to commit itself to any negotiating position on fundamental security issues.

4. In the context of the recent efforts of some Western Allies to achieve closer relations with Eastern European countries, he pointed out that no improvement had been shown in the international relations of Bulgaria, which continued to maintain a negative attitude towards Turkey and Greece. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria, subjected to arbitrary treatment in violation of agreements between the two countries and of the basic principles of international law, had recently suffered intensified pressure by the Bulgarian Authorities. During his meeting at the United Nations with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, the latter had professed complete ignorance of such maltreatment and promised to carry out immediate investigations. After a subsequent short period of relaxation of tension, the Bulgarian Authorities had recently resumed their pressure on the Turkish minority. However, the Bulgarian Government still sought on the surface to improve its relations with Turkey and Greece. Nonetheless, he felt that the present conduct of Bulgaria did not deserve any special treatment by members of the Alliance.

5. Summing up his remarks on East-West relations, he said that the current standstill in overall Soviet positions seemed to be due principally to a shortcoming in her nuclear strike capacity. But the Soviet Union might place new hopes on the possible successful conclusion of her dispute with China without recourse to substantial concessions; and the possible emergence of new governments from elections imminent in several NATO countries provided the Soviets with ground for favourable speculation on the future approach of these governments to East-West relations. The divergent views of the Western Allies on new defence arrangements such as the Multilateral Nuclear Force, and the tendency towards diminishing mutual aid, which would affect the defensive preparedness of the Allies, might also motivate the Soviet Union's present static policy. The likelihood that the Soviet Union would pursue her current attitude on fundamental issues in the immediate future, while benefiting from new circumstances to overcome her present difficulties, compelled the Western Allies to combine a willingness to continue talks with the Soviet leaders with a manifestation of solidarity and strength in time of crisis. Past experiences showed that any negotiation with the Soviet Union should be initiated from a position of strength, which required continuous attention to military preparedness and elimination of deficiencies in the common defence system, especially in the areas having common boundaries with the Soviet Union.

6. Turning to the Middle East, he said that the general situation was at present unstable and more complex than at the time of the last Ministerial Meeting. The situation in Iraq was worthy of close attention in view of its relation to the stability and security of the Middle East. Positive developments towards stability in the Middle East and improvement in

inter-Arab relations had been limited to the settlement of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. Recent events in Iraq had transformed the existing instability into open crisis and their effects on the future policy of Iraq, on the internal situation in Syria and on relations between Syria, Iraq and the UAR would be important in determining the trend of the immediate future. The situation could be further deteriorated by the expected increase in Arab-Israeli tension as a result of Israeli use of the waters of the River Jordan at the beginning of 1964.

7. In Iraq, the Ba'ath Party had shown itself strongly anti-communist since assuming power and until recently had tried to rule by coercion refusing to associate other parties with its activities. Although having succeeded in securing relative internal stability, it had not been universally popular and its efforts to solve economic problems had so far been unsuccessful. Difficulties had been met on account of the subversive activities of Egypt, the Kurdish question and the ill-defined relations between the Party and the Executive. Internal dissensions on the subject of Arab Union had become critical and, supported by the Army, President Aref had assumed power in November 1963. The new administration, mainly composed of nationalist elements, would probably attempt to establish friendly relations with the UAR.

8. In Northern Iraq the establishment of an administration eventually tending towards independence would greatly endanger the security of the Middle East and encourage the consolidation of Soviet interference. During the military operations tending so far to favour the Government forces, Turkey had taken certain security measures within her borders and had co-operated with the Iraqi Government, especially with regard to refugees.

9. In Syria, the Ba'ath Party, on assuming power, had eliminated all pro-Nasser and Unionist elements from the army and government, but external provocations had prevented it from subduing hostile activities. It had attempted to establish a régime by coercion but, because of internal and inter-Arab disputes, it had not been able to prevent a deterioration of the social and economic situation. The presence of Ba'athist elements in the new Iraqi Government would probably mitigate the negative Syrian attitude to President Aref's assumption of power, although it seemed that the Ba'athists could at present influence neither the internal and external policy of Iraq nor its attitude towards the Arab Union.

10. The subversive activities of the Ba'athist administrations in Iraq and Syria to overthrow the régime in Jordan had been significant in inclining King Hussein to seek a means of improving relations between Jordan and Egypt. The situation of Jordan would again become critical in the event of the hostility of the new Iraqi régime and of possible changes in Syria's inter-Arab policy. The recent decision of Jordan

to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union should not alter her relations with the West, despite alleged inadequate support by the West for Jordan. The latter still constituted an important element in the balance of power in the Middle East.

11. In the Yemen, Sallal had not yet established his authority and the disengagement agreed on by Saudi Arabia and the UAR had not yet been effected. On account of the uncertain situation, Turkey would continue to maintain an attitude of reserve towards the Yemen but insisted that an equitable and permanent solution of the conflict was desirable in order to achieve peace and to prevent Soviet penetration in the Middle East.

12. He recalled that the Turkish Government had recognised de jure the Government of Kuwait. After the admission of Kuwait to the United Nations, Iraq had recognised Kuwait as an independent sovereign state and had formally renounced her claims over Kuwait, thus ending a conflict which had threatened peace in the Middle East.

13. In spite of the exploitation by the Arab countries of the question of the diversion by Israel of the river Jordan, an armed conflict with Israel was not anticipated, although increased tension and border incidents were likely between Israel and the Arabs. It would be wise for Israel to follow a moderate policy in order to prevent an excessive increase of tension, which might only strengthen Nasser's position in the area.

14. In Iran, satisfactory developments were being observed following the successful internal reforms of the Shah. The recent official visits of Western statesmen had demonstrated Iran's continuing desire for close relations with members of CENTO and the Western World.

15. Among Pakistan's international relations, those with India were still the most important. Western military aid offered to India in view of the Sino-Indian conflict had greatly alarmed Pakistan, who believed that her security and territorial integrity would be greatly exposed to Indian threats. In this light should be viewed the moves of Pakistan in establishing border agreements and commercial and technical relations with Communist China, together with cultural and economic relations with some neutralist Afro-Asian countries. As regards arms deliveries to India, he recalled that the motives and objectives of the Western initiative had been frequently explained to Pakistani leaders by the Western governments concerned. Turkey believed that the Pakistani Government would be ready to admit the overriding objectives of the West in supplying arms to India, provided they were not sent to the common border area with Pakistan. Soundings of the Pakistani attitude on this

matter could lead to Pakistan viewing Western military aid to India with less alarm. He suggested that both countries should be sounded and the Indian Government be approached by the Western supplier nations, with a view to inviting India to give a formal assurance, guaranteed by some form of inspection procedure, that arms received would not be sent to the border area with Pakistan.

16. In Afghanistan, the new Government, understanding the danger of a policy of exclusive co-operation with the Soviet Union, had accepted the necessity for improved relations with the West. Close support of Afghanistan from the West would be welcomed and would encourage favourable developments.

17. In conclusion, the unstable situation in the Middle East complicated a satisfactory assessment of the trend of future events, but the main development was concentrated in Iraq and Syria, where a confrontation of ideas had led to precipitated actions which rendered precarious the ruling régimes. In view of this situation, he suggested that a study could be made in NATO to determine the possibilities for NATO nations to activate further their relations with Iraq and Syria. The experience of Turkey and, he thought, the United Kingdom in relations with Iraq had brought satisfactory results and other Western nations might consider the possibility of economic and technical assistance.

18. Commenting on East-West trade relations, he said that the problem set out in C-M(65)129 was to decide whether member countries should adopt a common trading policy or a reasonably harmonised attitude towards the Communist bloc. He drew attention to the inevitable consequences of an extension of guaranteed credits to the Soviet bloc, whereby an increase in the volume of credits granted would necessarily augment the volume of exchanges. The Turkish Government did not object to existing commercial relations with the Soviet bloc. However, the maintenance of these relations should not necessitate their increase, since expansion of trade in one direction normally caused an increased flow in the opposite direction and orientation of trade towards one region usually developed at the expense of other regions. In discussing the conditions to govern the extension of credits to the Soviet bloc, it should not be forgotten that if the export potential of a country enabled it to increase its exportable surplus, the imports, especially of foodstuffs, were limited by their consumption capacity.

19. Although the Western countries did not at present intend to grant unlimited credits, they would eventually be compelled to increase their imports from the Soviet bloc at the expense of their traditional allied suppliers, since, aggregate imports being governed by consumption capacity, goods purchased

from the Soviet bloc would replace those supplied by the NATO nations. Because the economy of developing countries, like that of Turkey, largely depended on increased exports, any reduction of these exports to Turkey's allies would be to the detriment of the solidarity and mutual aid within the Atlantic Community. It would be expedient to envisage appropriate preventive measures without delay.

20. Mr. RUSK (United States) thanked the members of the Council for the tributes paid to the memory of the late President Kennedy.

21. He said that he was aware of the widespread curiosity which existed regarding the background to the assassination and the possible motives of the murderer. He informed the Council that on the basis of the evidence available after the fullest possible investigation, the United States Authorities were persuaded that the assassin had been an unstable and irresponsible individual acting on his own, and not connected with any group or foreign power.

22. He dismissed suggestions that President Johnson might be a President who would concentrate on the domestic affairs and be relatively indifferent to foreign affairs, pointing out that domestic affairs could no longer be separated from foreign policy, and that no chief of government in NATO, and more especially no chief of government of the United States, could be negligent of foreign policy. He added that President Johnson had had many years of direct and official responsibility in foreign policy matters, and that during six years as majority leader under the Eisenhower administration, he had worked on the vast legislative programme which was necessary for United States foreign policy. He assured the Council that the new President would give foreign relations his fullest personal attention and would do so against a considerable background of experience in these questions.

23. Turning to more general matters, he said that the West had left an impression before the world that it was in disarray, and that differences existed within the Alliance and the Atlantic Community which affected its unity. It was true that the West had its problems: for example, it was not clear when, how or whether Western Europe would proceed to making additional political arrangements; within NATO itself there were different moves on strategy and force goals, though these differences might upon further examination prove to be more theoretical than real; in 1964, highly complex and difficult trade negotiations would be undertaken, and it was possible that these might lead to tension and disagreement.

24. It was one source of regret that, during 1963, when the Communist World was faced with far-reaching problems of its own, the West had not found it possible to move on strongly.

with a sense of unified effort and so present a striking contrast between the Free World and the Communist World. In this connection, the United States was examining its own attitudes to ensure that in the New Year these were in line with the total perspective of world affairs and with the responsibilities of a NATO nation in the Free World. He was satisfied that differences, past or to come, did not affect Western solidarity in the face of any external threat, and the truth of this had been borne out during the Cuban missile crisis and the recent stoppages on the Autobahn to Berlin. He therefore hoped that in 1964 the Western nations could develop their sense of unity and the élan so needed by the Free World in the highly dangerous tasks which lay ahead of them.

25. The overriding question before the West was to interpret and evaluate recent events in the Communist World. The NATO Council in Permanent Session should discuss these questions and attempt to arrive at some common attitude on them. It was too soon yet to know in which direction the changes which had been observed would move, but the situation was obviously in a state of flux and would give rise to new dangers and to new opportunities.

26. In the opinion of the United States Authorities, the division between Moscow and Peiping went very deep but it was recognised from the outset that the two Communist giants could reconcile their differences if it should become vital for them to do so. With this reservation, the breach seemed to be fundamental, embracing ideology, state relationships, border conflicts, economic interests, a struggle for influence in other parts of the world and a deep personal enmity between the two leaders.

27. The Western interest in the Moscow-Peiping dispute was initially that there should not be any reconciliation between the two Communist systems, since this would probably present the world with a massive monolith, committed to a more active and progressive policy. In the ideological quarrel between militancy and peaceful coexistence, it would also be in the interest of the West that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence should prevail.

28. This did not mean that Moscow's interpretation of peaceful coexistence was satisfactory to the West. However, notwithstanding the Soviet-produced crises over Berlin and Cuba, referred to by Dr. Schröder, there was reason to believe that in Moscow at least there was understanding of what a thermonuclear war would do to the Soviet Union. It might also well be that the attitude of Moscow's Eastern European Allies had created a certain inertia within the Warsaw Pact. It was possible that with increased demands by the Soviet public for

peace and for more consumer goods and that with the development of education, technology, science and management a middle-aged slackening of revolutionary ardour was taking place in the Soviet Union. In any event, the West ought not to allow Peiping to reap rewards from militancy or give other Communist nations observing the Moscow-Peiping debate any reason to suppose that militancy would pay dividends.

29. In this connection, the fact that Peiping still insisted upon surrender of Formosa as the sine qua non of any improvement in relations with the United States, and the fact that Peiping had attacked India and could do so again, were causes of concern. Peiping had not supported the Geneva accords on Laos; there was reason to think that Peiping was helping to stimulate Mr. Sukarno to adopt a hostile attitude to Malaysia; it was known that Peiping was intervening in Latin American and African affairs. Taken as a whole, there was much reason to be concerned about the militancy of Peiping.

30. At the same time, Moscow should not be allowed to think that the Western Powers were not interested in a realistic approach to peaceful coexistence. This meant that none of the vital Western interests should be conceded to the Soviet Union but that neither should the West make concessions to Peiping in order to put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, because the Soviet Union could play that game more effectively than could the West.

31. There were some important trends within the Soviet Union to be considered. The United States had been surprised by the extent and depth of their present economic problems and it seemed significant that out of an estimated reserve of some \$2½ billions of gold and foreign exchange they planned to expend \$1 billion in 1963 for foodstuffs. Although it had originally been thought that their difficulties were temporary, more recent information indicated that Soviet Russia might need several years to recover her position. Industrial growth had dropped sharply and estimates of the rate of growth of the GNP showed a drop to 2.2% in 1962 and 1963 - i.e., Soviet Russia was facing both an agricultural and an industrial setback. Unquestionably the Soviet Union was facing difficulties in the allocation of resources and whether this would affect the security of the West it was too early to say. Probably Soviet security requirements would still be given the highest priority, especially in the missile field and in sophisticated armaments.

32. A recent comment by Mr. Khrushchev during the Nuclear Test Ban signing in Moscow and elaborated in a later public speech, indicated that Soviet defence budgets would level off or drop somewhat in 1964. This revealed some concern about available resources and might suggest some Soviet interest in disarmament if appropriate measures could be devised.

33. There were also interesting trends in the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pact. In a variety of small ways these countries seemed to be trying to improve their bilateral relations with the West. Moreover, there were signs that they were moving towards a slightly greater independence of spirit, and the extent to which this became true was an important matter of interest to the West. For example, last week Roumania had voted in the United Nations against the rest of the Soviet bloc on the question of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, despite the fullest consultations among the Communist countries.

34. In view of these facts, he proposed that each member nation of NATO should keep the Chairman and the International Staff informed of these small developments observed with respect to the Eastern European countries so that they could be compared in detail and serve as a ready point of reference as to what the total attitude of a particular country might be.

35. On broader questions of relations between the Soviet Union and the West it should be noted that agreements reached were still somewhat limited, except in the trade field. The "hot line" had been established; the Test Ban for three environments had been achieved and was now signed by 107 nations; it had been possible to join in the United Nations declaration against the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction and in another declaration on broad principles of law for outer space. But these and trade relations did not add up to a détente and the situation should not be over-estimated. Neither Soviet Russia nor Peiping had abandoned the idea of world revolution. The dangerous questions still remained - Berlin and Germany, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba and new dangers could arise with unpredictable rapidity. There seemed little possibility of significant progress towards control of armaments without effective inspection. One could, however, continue to work towards the possibility of a détente, without illusion but equally without being blind to real opportunities, and with this in mind NATO nations should intensify their consultation as to what possible next steps might be.

36. A non-aggression pact did not appear to be promising at this stage because it should be connected with genuine improvement on a problem of substantial interest and danger. A bare declaration could lead to a false sense of security without reducing the danger of war or Western defence requirements. President Kennedy had said that any such pact must be connected as a minimum with reliable guarantees on Berlin or with improvements in the Berlin situation. The declaration on Berlin suggested by Mr. Gromyko was too vague; it did not improve the de facto situation and could be used by the Soviets to inhibit allied rights. The West ought, however, to keep the matter before them, because a time might come when the idea of a non-aggression pact might be worthy of consideration in connection with other matters.

37. The United States would be willing to look carefully at the question of observation posts if it were disentangled from the idea of a nuclear-free zone or the unacceptable thinning-out of troops in Germany.

38. He then referred to Soviet resistance to any agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, this resistance being based on opposition to the multilateral force. It was necessary to be clear as to the nature of the Soviet objection to this force. If their opposition was based on the fact that it might involve dissemination of weapons to national military establishments, it would be dispelled as soon as the Soviets became aware of the actual arrangements envisaged by the Western Powers. However, it was possible that they had other objections to a multilateral force and were using the non-dissemination agreement as maximum leverage to prevent its creation, quite apart from the issue of dissemination. In any event, the United States did not believe that the idea of a multilateral force could be abandoned merely to accommodate the Soviet Union on the issue of non-dissemination.

39. The United States interest in an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons was mainly centred on China but as there seemed no prospect that China would be party to such an agreement there could be little optimism about an early formal agreement. However, he believed that no Communist or non-Communist government now possessing nuclear weapons intended distributing these to other nations. It might therefore be that this coincidence of policy was as important as the absence of an agreement.

40. He reiterated the United States conviction that a free and united Germany was important to the achievement of a stable peace in Europe and stated that the United States would support the efforts of the Federal Republic to improve conditions which arose from the division of Germany. The United States wished to see success in the efforts to overcome some of the harsh consequences of the Berlin wall. Although the reason for Soviet detention of certain Berlin convoys in October and November remained a mystery, it was clear that the unified Allied response to their action had been an important element in their rapid cessation. The Western Powers must remain prepared for difficulties of that type.

41. While the United States saw little prospect for early progress on a Berlin settlement in view of the continued Soviet insistence that the Allied position in West Berlin be either eliminated or drastically diluted, occasional contact with the Soviet Union on the matter might be of some importance.

42. In preparation for the resumption of the Conference on disarmament in Geneva in late January, the United States was reviewing its position and would bring any new ideas which arose to the attention of the North Atlantic Council. It was thought that although progress might be made on separate and limited points, which might themselves foster a certain degree of confidence, the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement was unlikely in the near future. The possibility of a comprehensive test ban agreement for the elimination of underground testing also seemed remote.

43. There was one point on which a response might be obtained from the USSR - namely, the destruction of certain types of weapons. The United States had proposed the mutual destruction of certain medium bombers, the B 47s and the Badgers. These were obsolescent in the sophisticated East/West confrontation but would become weapons of considerable sophistication when turning up in other danger areas such as Indonesia, Iraq or Egypt. The proposal had been rejected by the Soviet Union but not without some interest being shown and it was possible that the USSR might have some suggestions to make at a later date.

44. It seemed therefore that on multilateral matters such as disarmament, the non-dissemination of weapons and the non-aggression pact, more time and patience would be needed to discover possibilities for further agreement. Meanwhile, attempts had been made by the United States to explore the possibilities offered by bilateral agreements, e.g., a consular convention was being negotiated between the United States and the USSR which should be helpful in the protection of citizens; and in Spring 1964 a civil air arrangement for the exchange of one or two flights per week between New York and Moscow might be undertaken. The United States wheat market had also been opened for Soviet purchases under the terms which it was possible for the United States to offer but it was not known whether discussions between the Soviets and United States grain dealers would come to a successful conclusion.

45. The United States saw some advantage in increased Soviet/Western trade in non-strategic goods; it would be reviewing its own practice on the matter and might possibly adopt some of the more open attitude of other NATO nations. There were, however, considerable reservations in the United States about the terms of credit to be offered to the Soviet Union, since it was believed that some of their economic stringencies were moderating influences on their policy. It was important that credit should not, by imperceptible stages, become aid and thus enable the Soviet Union to serve several appetites at once.

46. Commenting on the situation in Vietnam, he stated that progress made in the past month had not been favourable. During the changeover of Government in Saigon the Viet Cong had greatly increased its activity, intent on taking advantage of the confusion which had developed. This activity had since decreased a little but the new Government was not yet fully in control of the situation and the problem remained serious. He informed the Council that Mr. McNamara would be visiting Saigon on his return journey to the United States and would make a full report to Washington on the disturbing situation.

47. Following on the expulsion of the United States from Cambodia, Western interests there must now be protected by other Western allies.

48. Recent developments in Cuba were a matter of concern to all nations in the Western hemisphere and at moments of crisis could affect members of the NATO Alliance also. While some Soviet troops had been withdrawn, an estimated five to seven thousand military personnel still remained, chiefly technical personnel connected with the SAM sites and for training Cuban armed elements. However, there seemed to be no real change in the Soviet commitment to Cuba and there had been an evident increase in Cuban subversive efforts in the Western hemisphere. There would be a meeting of the countries concerned to consider additional measures which might be taken to reduce that kind of penetration and aggression. Castro's control apparently remained effective, and, although there seemed to be some points of disagreement between him and the USSR, these did not appear to have weakened in any significant way the assistance rendered to Castro by the Soviet Union.

49. He stressed that any effort made by Cuba to interfere with the affairs of other countries in the Western hemisphere must be taken with the utmost seriousness by other countries in that hemisphere. He called on European members of NATO to look upon the Cuban problem as partly their own and to consider whether there was anything they could do to increase pressures to make it clear to Castro that the course upon which he had embarked could have no possible future.

50. He concluded by saying that, although there had been minor differences among the members of the Alliance, there had been a formidable increase in the strength and prosperity of the NATO community. The partners of this community should therefore look ahead with confidence, though with the realisation that much unfinished business still remained to be done.

51. Mr. SARAGAT (Italy) opened his remarks by expressing, on behalf of the new Italian Government as well as himself, the deep emotion caused by the tragic loss which had shaken the American people, the Alliance and the whole world.

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52. He emphasised the importance of the rôle which the Alliance had played in the past and was still playing in maintaining peace in the world. Italy believed peace with security to be the priority aim of international political action.

53. There was no denying that the political scene was changing in certain respects and that the type of problem which NATO had to face was becoming more complex. Some changes seemed therefore desirable in the organization of the Alliance, both civil and military. The vitality of the Alliance in a changing world could only be fostered by flexibility together with strength in its structure. In this connection, he emphasised how desirable he considered exchanges of views conducted as frequently as possible on the broadest and frankest lines. If certain member countries had different approaches to the question of the best ways of defending and promoting the ideals on which the Alliance was based, it was necessary for these points of view to be examined in common in the most open-minded manner, with a view to laying down the broad lines of a common policy.

54. Today, the Council must consider the problem of East-West relations. The point at issue was no longer, as at the time of the Cuban crisis, the desirability of an East-West dialogue, which was now a fact even if it was only making slow progress; but rather the definition of aims, priorities and preliminary conditions.

55. He briefly described his Government's position on the question of East-West relations. In the first place, he drew attention to the fact that the coalition of parties which had formed the new parliamentary majority in Italy had reaffirmed the loyalty of the new Government to the Atlantic Alliance and its acceptance of all the attendant political and military commitments. The chief significance of this fact was that one of the parties which had in the past opposed Italy's adherence to the Atlantic Treaty had now accepted the fait accompli and was proclaiming its intention to co-operate loyally in the fulfilment of the military and political commitments undertaken by the preceding governments. It could therefore be said that, not only would Italy continue to pursue her "Atlantic" policy but that she would be able to do so with an increased parliamentary majority.

56. Furthermore, while Italy was pursuing her policy of European solidarity, she was also increasing her efforts to ensure greater stability in international relations. She thought that this stability could be gradually achieved by taking measures to promote balanced and controlled disarmament, by conducting negotiations with a view to banning surprise attacks and by seeking peaceful and co-ordinated solutions to the most serious problems of the day.

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57. Moreover, Italy's position seemed to be not only the most realistic in view of the present international situation but also the most acceptable to Italian public opinion which, in this field, was following the same trends as public opinion in most of the NATO member countries.

58. The dialogue with Moscow would naturally have its ups and downs and the Soviet Union would probably resort from time to time to the means of pressure at its disposal, particularly in Berlin. However, the recent incidents on the Berlin Autobahn seemed to indicate that the Soviet Authorities intended to keep such pressure within the limits dictated by caution. Developments in this area during the coming months as well as the course of the future discussions at the Geneva Conference, might throw light on Mr. Khrushchev's real intentions. Moreover, there was general agreement in the Alliance on the limits to be set to this dialogue, namely, those which were the direct corollary of NATO's vital political and strategic interests.

59. He went on to draw the Council's attention to two new factors which might gradually take on considerable importance: firstly, the growing desire of the satellites for greater freedom, and, secondly, the participation of the uncommitted world in the East-West dialogue, which had become evident during the Geneva conversations on disarmament. The unaligned countries were gaining considerable moral and political influence, which Moscow had to reckon with: it was even possible that the unprecedented flexibility of Soviet policy could be partially attributed to these considerations. The Soviet Union's need to be regarded by the uncommitted world as a champion of peace counter-balanced any dangerous potentialities of Sino-Soviet rivalry and it was precisely this need which Italy considered as one of the motives which was impelling the USSR to seek to establish more reasonable relations with the West.

60. It should be borne in mind that the theory of "peaceful coexistence" was designed primarily to impress the uncommitted world and the Atlantic Alliance, for its part, would be well-advised to weigh up its actions and reactions in the same highly sensitive scales of the public opinion of the unaligned countries.

61. There were many signs that the Soviet Union saw the dialogue with the West from a long-term standpoint. It might even go as far as to regard it as a new form of diplomatic coexistence with the West for an indefinite period of history. This prospect was an incentive to careful political planning in all possible areas and particularly in regard to the latest propaganda methods employed by Moscow in the uncommitted world.

62. He was in full agreement with the ideas expressed by Mr. Rusk on this subject. He therefore thought that the Alliance should strengthen its machinery for consultation, primarily with a view to working out a common policy capable of ensuring Western cohesion in preparation for a prolonged dialogue. In this connection he considered the Multilateral Nuclear Force primarily as a means of increasing military and political cohesion; like European politico-economic integration, this proposal should strengthen the solidarity of the Free World and thereby facilitate the common definition of a global policy and strategy for the West.

63. The transition from the phase of the tacit but armed confrontation, to the present phase of Moscow's public admission that war must be avoided and that an attempt must therefore be made to find peaceful solutions to international problems, afforded evidence of definite progress. The fact that the Soviet Union had been induced to enter into a dialogue with the West must be regarded as a great diplomatic victory.

64. The West must now strengthen its hold over the ground gained, because this was the only way of fulfilling the hope for a lasting peace while at the same time preserving and enriching the heritage of Western civilisation. To this end, the most urgent but also the most delicate task was the political organization of the West between the United States and Europe, as defined by President Kennedy.

65. A true "partnership" could only be the end-product of a long political evolution, particularly in Europe. This evolution had only just started but the most important thing was to decide to what goal the efforts of the allies should now be directed. He reminded the Council that it was in this spirit that his predecessors had repeatedly laid stress on the need for a more comprehensive and systematic procedure for prior political consultation within the Alliance. Last December, Mr. Piccioni had made the recommendation that four Ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council should be held every year instead of two. He, Mr. Saragat, was gratified to see that owing to the sessions of 20th March and 10th April, 1963, this wish had been virtually fulfilled. Today he desired to renew this proposal, suggesting that a third ordinary Ministerial session should be held, on the understanding that others could be convened whenever circumstances so required.

66. In conclusion, he expressed the view that the Atlantic Alliance had not sufficiently impressed world opinion with the fact that NATO's aims were purely peaceful and that the organization was ready at any time to co-operate in a serious endeavour to achieve an international détente. He considered this to be a top priority today and that the costly task of strengthening and modernising Western defence might be seriously jeopardised by failure in this field.

67. Mr. VENIZELOS (Greece) said he wished to associate himself with the expressions of deep regret and sympathy for the American people following the tragic loss of President Kennedy.

68. From the time of the Cuban crisis up to the death of President Kennedy events of extreme importance had occurred; these would have significant repercussions on the development of the international situation and on the future of the world, and it was for the Council to gauge their true significance and to map out accordingly the course to be taken.

69. Generally speaking, he thought that the policy followed by President Kennedy during and immediately after the Cuban crisis was a clear indication of the principles which must govern the future course of the Alliance: unshakeable determination to defend, if necessary by recourse to arms, the freedom and security of the Free World but at the same time preservation of peace by means calculated to reduce international tension and to establish a climate of stability and mutual tolerance in East-West relations.

70. The Cuban crisis had demonstrated, if this were necessary, that in the event of danger the Alliance as a whole could display exemplary solidarity and cohesion. Nevertheless, in the period of détente which had followed the crisis, there had been some slackening of Atlantic cohesion. That there were differences of opinion, that disagreements were aired, even on such important points as nuclear strategy or the sharing of the common defence burden, was normal and understandable within a democratic institution but it would be dangerous to disregard these differences. It would be disastrous to allow the enemy to believe that although threats consolidated the Alliance smiles could divide it. The détente initiated by the Soviet Union could, of course, be due, as the experts had pointed out, to internal economic difficulties, to the Sino-Soviet dispute or even to a genuine desire for improvement in East-West relations; but it should not be forgotten that increased vigilance was called for, in an effort to discern in each instance what were the real aims of the USSR. Insofar as the member countries of the Alliance were in favour of a détente and of peaceful coexistence, they must reconcile their views, arrive at solutions acceptable to all and unite not only to win a war which, it was to be hoped, would never take place, but to win the peace. It was therefore becoming a matter of increasing urgency that the problems which divided the Alliance internally be solved. He thought these problems should be tackled at a high political, by means of direct contact between the responsible leaders of the Alliance. Likewise, a meeting of the NATO Council at Heads of Government level at the appropriate time would crown the efforts towards closer co-operation between all members of the Alliance, both in the military and political fields. This would, of course, presuppose scrupulously careful preparation.

71. In short, the Greek Government considered that the Alliance needed a common strategy not only for war but also for peace to be attained within the framework of a radical reassessment of its strategic and political concepts.

72. The Greek Government was at present very seriously concerned at the situation in the Southern sector of the Alliance and in particular at its defences along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. It was, in fact, along this frontier that the USSR was bringing the greatest pressure to bear; as SACEUR had repeatedly confirmed, the Bulgarian Army, substantially reinforced by Soviet military forces and technicians, had been recently converted from the instrument of defence which it had previously been into a powerful offensive instrument. The least that could be said was that the Soviet Union was at present in a position to launch an attack by indirect action (by one of its satellites) against the Northern frontier of Greece. Such an attack might in the beginning have limited objectives and, more precisely, that of making a fait accompli of the entry of Communist forces into the Eastern Mediterranean area. The Soviet bloc, taking an advantage of this, could subsequently destroy all the defences of the Southern flank of the Alliance, combining the effects which such action might have both within Greece and on the morale of the other countries of the Alliance.

73. It must be admitted that this situation represented a very serious potential threat. He drew the attention of the Council to the fact that Khrushchev himself, on more than one occasion and through official statements, had referred to the possibility of taking action against allies of the United States who were near at hand, should the United States intervene in Cuba.

74. Greece's fears concerning the defence of this sector were further increased by the fact that the strategic concepts of the Alliance, on which the security of Greece was based, were at present being revised to allow for greater flexibility, which entailed greater risks for Greece. In view of its extremely vulnerable geographical position, he did not think Greece could agree to such risks being taken.

75. Greece was doing its utmost to cope with this situation. Nevertheless, at a time when it was involved, out of necessity, in implementing a vital economic development plan, its defence effort greatly exceeded its resources and what Greece was able to do was very little in comparison with what Soviet Russia was actually doing all along the Greek-Bulgarian border. He emphasised that the Soviet challenge went far beyond Greece. It was directed to the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

76. More than two years ago, the Alliance had been informed that it was impossible for Greece by its own unaided efforts to guarantee the security of the left flank of the the Allied defences. The NATO Military Authorities had established a minimum level of security concerning this part of the Atlantic front and each year repeated that, between this "minimum" and the national resources which Greece could make available to the Alliance, there was a considerable gap which was put at more than 50 million dollars per year. And yet, this very gap was the result of too rigid an assessment which dangerously reduced the level of minimum security.

77. It was for this reason that in the Spring of last year the Council had decided to adopt two resolutions (C-M(62)57 and C-M(62)58) with a view to providing Greece with assistance both in its economic development effort and in its military effort. The Greek Delegation would deal with this question in detail under the special item on the Agenda reserved for it. For the moment, he merely wished to point out that the programme of economic assistance to Greece for defence covered the years 1963 and 1964.

78. For the reasons just given, the Greek Government was of the opinion that henceforth the problem of the defence of the Southern flank of the Alliance should be considered and studied from a new angle. This problem also affected Turkey, since the two countries were jointly responsible for the defence of the Southern European sector of the Alliance.

79. It must therefore be recognised that it was no longer a question of the Alliance helping Greece to guard against the Bulgarian danger. It was the Alliance itself which must meet the Soviet threat. It was becoming imperative that action be taken to prevent the possibility of aggression in the South. Without in any way wishing to detract from the vital importance of the Central sector of the Alliance, it must be realised that the two flanks of the Allied front and particularly the Southern flank should, in their turn, be strengthened. The Greek people, as a whole, were determined to contribute to the utmost to the common defence (within the framework of a balanced economic and social effort) but they could not, alone, cope with a situation which was beyond their control.

80. He recalled in this connection that during the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting, at which he had had the honour of representing Greece, the Council had recognised as fundamental the principle that defence must be based on a firm economic and social structure and that no country should be obliged to bear a military burden which exceeded its capabilities. It was from this angle that the present problem must be examined. There were complex military and economic aspects to the problem. It should therefore be studied jointly by economic and military experts, perhaps within the framework of the force planning exercise, which also provided for application of the principle of an equitable sharing of the burden.

81. However, since this was an urgent matter, and the force planning exercise was a long-term project, he considered it highly desirable that this study be given priority in the coming months, so that a preliminary report might be prepared and submitted to the Council as soon as possible. If the Council agreed on this point, the Permanent Council might be instructed to take the necessary action. He announced his intention of submitting a very brief document on this subject for the approval of the Council.

82. Mr. ERKIN (Turkey) said that the problems and dangers which had just been described by Mr. Venizelos were very real and as alarming for Turkey as for Greece. He therefore warmly supported the motion to be proposed by Mr. Venizelos.

83. Mr. GUDMUNDSSON (Iceland) associated himself with his colleagues in paying warm tribute to the late President Kennedy. He informed the Council that a new Icelandic Cabinet had been formed in November last. The Government remained a coalition of the Independence Party and Social Democratic Party and fully maintained its support for NATO. It also strongly supported the presence of the defence force in Iceland under the auspices of NATO in accordance with the defence agreement between Iceland and the United States. Opposition pressure against this policy continued, however, and the conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty in the early part of the year had been cited as an additional argument rendering NATO infrastructure installations and the presence of the defence forces unnecessary. This propaganda had been met with appropriate countermeasures by the Icelandic Government.

84. As a result of Soviet pressure, the Icelandic Government had granted a few landing permits for Soviet aircraft on their way to the United States to land at Keflavik airbase, where the defence forces were stationed, although a request for an aviation agreement between Iceland and the Soviet Union had been refused. Soviet abuse of these concessions, which had given rise to the impression that the requests were made in view of increasing Soviet interest in the activity at the defence installations in Iceland, had led to the withdrawal of landing permits, and none had been granted for a considerable time in spite of continued pressure.

85. He stressed the importance of economic co-operation within NATO to the smaller member countries, and especially to Iceland, which was to such a great extent dependent upon free and non-discriminatory trade with other NATO countries. He hoped his colleagues would give this matter some thought.

86. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) paid tribute to the memory of the late President Kennedy whose great leadership, foresight and ideals were so sorely needed at the present time. He

reaffirmed his Government's full confidence in President Johnson and was certain that those aims and ideals would continue to be energetically pursued.

87. He recalled that fifteen years ago, when Europe was prostrate both economically and militarily and facing an uncertain future, a common destiny had led the countries of the West to pool their resources in a united defence against a common danger. He detected, at the present time, a tendency to forget that the survival of Western ideals since those difficult days had been due above all to the solidarity of the Western Alliance. It should not be ignored that the recent easement in the cold war would not have been possible, in spite of the contributory factor of economic difficulties within the USSR, had not the Western countries taken a firm and united stand. The Alliance must preserve its guarantees of survival by avoiding any appearance of disunity which could only be expected to encourage the USSR in its hostile ambitions.

88. With this in mind, further avenues of possible agreement with the Eastern bloc, and notably additional measures for the prevention of war by accident, might usefully be explored. Above all, the West should be selective in weighing the merits and disadvantages of its various plans for diplomatic rapprochement, seizing opportunities as they arose and avoiding the rejection of Soviet proposals out of hand. The study of a system of observation posts was a good example of the sort of contingency planning, without any commitment by governments, which might cover a whole range of potential areas for negotiations and which might result in the discovery of new areas for Western initiative. Although at some critical junctures (e.g. the Cuba crisis) the discussion between East and West tended to become a dialogue between the leaders of the two great Powers, the other allies of the Western Alliance should not resign themselves to a passive rôle. The meetings of Khrushchev and other Eastern leaders with Mr. Lange, Mr. Spaak and Mr. Haekkerup had shown that statesmen from the smaller countries could make a valuable contribution to the picture which the Soviet leaders had of the West.

89. He mentioned the recent release of two Dutch nationals condemned in the Soviet Union in 1961 to a thirteen-year sentence for alleged espionage, as an indication of Soviet preparedness, albeit under strong pressure, to seek improved relations with the Netherlands. Such contacts should clearly take place within the NATO political framework, but individual contributions could be of great value in formulating within the Alliance an effective policy and common evaluation of the preoccupations of Soviet policy.

90. He was of the opinion that the machinery for daily consultation between the allies which had been evolved within the NATO organization, supported by the expert international advice which was constantly available, constituted a more efficient means

of gaining an insight into world events upon which policy should be based than could be found within national administrations. His Government was pleased that the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group had now become an accepted forum for NATO consultation. A flexible response to developments in the political field was already a reality within NATO and took account of the ample variations which were possible in the common policy of preservation of the Western way of life. However, there were fields where Soviet policy was so rigid that the Western response must also be unyielding. For example, on the problem of Germany there was no lack of evidence that the Soviet aims remained unchanged. No real détente was possible as long as the right of self-determination continued to be withheld from so large a part of the German population.

91. As regards East-West trade, the Netherlands was one of five countries which had submitted to the Permanent Council a proposal on the granting of export credits which kept within the limits of the Berne Union rules (vide AC/127-D/144). He urged that other nations give careful study to this proposal. The Netherlands, with the United States, was anxious that the granting of credits to the Soviet bloc should not by imperceptible stages come to constitute economic aid.

92. Commenting on the situation in the Far East, he recalled that diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia had been resumed early in 1963, a step which was welcomed by the Netherlands as a means of increasing contact between Indonesia and the West. He regretted that the recent welcome creation of Malaysia had been met by the Indonesian "policy on confrontation" but the Netherlands was reluctant to jeopardise her relations with Indonesia so soon after their re-establishment.

93. As regards the state of the Alliance, he discounted the view that progress was at a standstill. He was particularly encouraged by the successful outcome of the patient and difficult negotiations which had been conducted within NATO regarding the Air Defence Ground Environment Plan. On the problems facing NATO it was essential that a real effort should be made at all times to understand other national points of view. Member countries could take satisfaction from the progress which had already been achieved and he urged them to persevere if success were not immediate. Some ventures would inevitably be of direct concern to some countries more than others and each should choose from the great range of NATO activities those in which it was most interested.

94. The Netherlands maintained an unshaken belief that the defence of the West was indivisible. She would also continue to work for closer political co-operation within Europe. He was encouraged by the recent Ministerial Meeting of the Western European Union and by the statement made earlier by Mr. Butler.

95. The Netherlands had decided to participate in studies for a multilateral seaborne nuclear force, without undertaking any further commitment.

96. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) associated himself with the tributes paid by other Ministers to the memory of President Kennedy. He said that, at the time of the assassination, he had been in Moscow and had had the opportunity of assessing the reaction of the Soviet leaders to the tragedy. He believed that they had felt the loss as deeply and sincerely as Western leaders.

97. During his visit to Moscow he had talked with Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko and, as a result of these conversations, could support the remarks of other Ministers concerning the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and the need to pursue efforts towards a détente with the Soviet Union. He thought that there was no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had changed their policy in any way. Also, it would be false to base the Alliance's plans on the assumption of Mr. Khrushchev's early disappearance. He had not had the impression that Mr. Khrushchev was a man in a weak position; on the contrary, he had appeared to be very self-confident, sure of his own strength and of that of his country.

98. Mr. Khrushchev had, during the conversations, not tried to hide the present economic difficulties of the Soviet Union. He had said, however, that these difficulties would be overcome within two years and that the West would make a mistake in framing its policy solely in the light of the Soviet Union's current economic problems. Although these problems might slow down the development of the Soviet Union, they could not bring it to a halt. He believed that Mr. Khrushchev had been sincere in his remarks on this matter. The recent Soviet-Danish trade negotiations had, in fact, revealed that, in the coming two years, the Soviet Union would not be able to deliver certain commodities and would require others to be supplied. There had been much hard bargaining in the trade negotiations, but this had been determined by economic and not political factors. The present Soviet Government evidently felt that it was profitable to trade with the West in purely economic terms: it purchased only what it needed and at the most competitive prices. He believed that other Western countries would draw the same conclusion in any trade negotiations which they might have with the Soviet Union.

99. In the discussion which he had had with Mr. Khrushchev on political issues, he had been struck by the fact that no great stress had been laid on criticism of Denmark's participation in NATO. There had been no discussion of the difficult problems which Denmark itself felt were raised for the Soviet Union by certain aspects of the situation in the

Northern part of the Alliance, such as the Baltic Command. Mr. Khrushchev had, however, placed a certain emphasis on the Kekkonen Plan, according to which the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) would bind themselves by treaty never to accept nuclear weapons in their region. He had replied that this idea was unacceptable for Denmark, repeating at the same time that Denmark's policy on nuclear defence remained the same as in past years - i.e., not to foresee the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory. He believed that this policy - like the similar policy adopted by Norway - had created a quiet atmosphere in Northern Europe, which was in the best interests not only of NATO but also of Sweden, Finland and perhaps also of the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev had not pressed the issue further and he believed that Mr. Khrushchev had accepted the reasoning advanced above.

100. In conclusion, he announced that he had just received notice that Mr. Khrushchev had finally accepted an invitation to visit Denmark and the Scandinavian countries in June 1964.

101. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) joined his colleagues in assuring the United States that its allies shared its mourning at the death of President Kennedy and associated himself with the expressions of sympathy for the American nation. Turning to the international situation, he remarked that the atmosphere was very different from the one which had prevailed at last year's Ministerial Meeting, under the impact of the Cuban crisis. He thought that while this crisis was still unexplained, being due either to a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to shift the balance of forces by sending atomic weapons to Cuba or to a miscalculation, and while its repercussions were still having a serious effect on the Latin American situation, it could, militarily speaking, be considered as over.

102. Since this incident, changes in the international situation had been of two kinds. In the first place, the general inclination to abandon the over-simplified concept of a straightforward ideological conflict between the two blocs had led to a diversification of the positions adopted by countries on either side of the dividing line and in particular to the reappearance of the national factor throughout the world, especially in Communist countries.

103. He referred in this connection to the evidence he had already mentioned of a marked tendency on the part of the satellite countries to follow a more independent policy vis-à-vis Russia, a tendency which had been demonstrated in the negotiations which some of them had entered into with the Federal Republic of Germany for a partial resumption of relations, particularly for trade purposes.

104. He then turned to the second type of changes, i.e., those which had led to a more thorough-going transformation of the situation: the now open dispute between China and Russia, and the economic difficulties being experienced by Russia, particularly in agriculture. The dispute between China and Russia seemed fundamental both from the point of view of the balance of forces and because Russia, which constituted the principal threat to the Alliance, was thereby compelled to hold a new front to the East. As regards the agricultural crisis, which had proved the bankruptcy of the policy pursued over recent years, he considered that while it would not lead to any essential change in the balance of forces between East and West or even in Russian policy as a whole the present difficulties would influence this policy over the next two or three years.

105. As for the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, he believed that they must be considered within the context of a possible détente between East and West. To his mind, it was obvious that this possibility did not depend on the Western powers, which had often expressed their desire for a relaxation of tension, but solely on Russia. The preliminary question, in his view, was whether the Western powers could contribute towards a détente by, for example, supporting certain persons in the Communist World who were peacefully inclined or certain members of the Soviet Government rather than others. Personally, he felt, as did Mr. Haekkerup as a result of his recent journey to Russia, that Mr. Khrushchey was firmly in power and that the possibility of influencing Russian Government policy from the outside was wishful thinking. This being so, the possibility of a détente was wholly dependent on Russia's desire for it, a desire which should be shown by a certain attitude; for example, if the Russian Government were to refrain for a while from creating incidents in connection with communications to Berlin or from threatening the Western world with its nuclear power.

106. None of this had been done and if the attitude of Russia was unchanged it was because, in its view, Germany was still the fundamental political problem, the others, such as those of Vietnam, Laos and even Indonesia, being in fact marginal. He remarked in this connection that the aims of Soviet policy, which had been clear for several years, were to maintain the status quo, i.e., the division of Germany, by the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, and by the creation in West Berlin of a third neutralised German state; as far as he could see, there was no indication that these aims had changed. To achieve their purpose, the Russians were endeavouring at every step to consolidate this status quo, i.e., to obtain recognition of the Communist régime in Eastern Germany, and to prevent the continuing existence of what did not suit them, namely, the West Berlin régime. He recalled

in this connection that in all the negotiations since last July between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, the latter had always come back to the German problem. During the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, it had attempted to obtain recognition of the East German Republic. During the discussions on the establishment of control posts against surprise attack, its conditions had been a certain reduction in the number of troops on either side of the dividing line, possibly as a start to the denuclearisation of Germany. In the talks on the non-dissemination of atomic weapons, the sole negotiations started on the initiative of the West, the Soviet Union had raised the problem of German participation in the multilateral force, seeing a threat in the fact that that country might be able to possess and use a nuclear weapon.

107. In conclusion, he said that, for the French Delegation, the basic situation was unchanged and even though negotiations with Russia might continue, the problem of relations with Russia and the Communists in general and the prospects of a détente would remain stationary until such a time as the Soviet Union modified its views on the settlement of the German question by accepting, at the very least, that the German people should be given the right of self-determination.

108. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said he fully agreed with the speakers who had stressed the need for a united and strong Alliance. He wondered, however, whether, in its assessment of the political situation and of the conclusions to be drawn from it, the Alliance was in fact united. He recalled that, at Ottawa, the Council had noted that the dynamic and even aggressive policy followed by the Soviet Union throughout the world had changed, that the manner in which the United States had handled the Cuban crisis had had favourable repercussions, that an agricultural crisis which had not then taken on spectacular proportions nevertheless existed in the USSR, that the Common Market created major theoretical and practical problems for the Communist World and lastly, that the dispute between China and Russia was a major event.

109. In his view, the two most noteworthy events which had occurred since then were, firstly, the Moscow Pact to which he attached, without exaggerating its importance, a symbolic value and, secondly, the distress of the Communist World on hearing of the assassination of President Kennedy. It seemed to him remarkable that the reactions of the Communist countries had been almost identical with those of the West and the reasons must be sought in the fact that in the Western World, as in the Communist World, President Kennedy had become the symbol of a policy. In calling for a reappraisal of the attitudes adopted vis-à-vis Russia, President Kennedy had given the whole world the hope that a new concept of politics was to be launched,

explained and upheld. Thus, the shock felt by the Soviets at the death of the President of the United States had reflected the anxiety that the new policy which he symbolised might be transformed. He was gratified that President Johnson's statements seemed to indicate that the United States would continue along the path traced by President Kennedy.

110. He added that, in visits to Russia and then to Poland in the past few months, he had, like Mr. Haekkerup, gained the impression that the main concern of the Communist World leaders at present was the success of their economic and social experiment. He thought that the Communist revolution had followed the normal historical pattern of all revolutions and was now very different from what it had been in 1918. While certain factors remained constant, tactics and methods seemed to have undergone far-reaching changes and it was his feeling that, except in China where the revolution was more recent, the Communists hoped to profit from the improvements which they believed they had brought to the world. He had found among the leaders he had seen a desire for stability which was enhanced by the serious difficulties they were having to contend with. He pointed out that the agricultural crisis was not peculiar to the USSR but common to the whole of the Communist World and was due, in his opinion, not to unfavourable climatic conditions but to the failure of a certain method of farming. The conclusion to be drawn from this situation was that if the Communist leaders were compelled to make the success of their experiment their most immediate concern, not only could they not wish for war but they must also abandon a policy of aggressiveness which, by involving them in international complications, would prevent them from continuing their economic effort. It even appeared that to settle some of their problems they were considering an approach to the Western World similar to the one they had recently made to obtain wheat.

111. If this assessment of the international situation was correct, he thought that the Western World now enjoyed a number of advantages which it should put to good use. He emphasised, in this connection, that he did not share the views of Mr. Couve de Murville on the détente. In his opinion, the détente must be seen simply as a method contrasting with that of the cold war and the day the German and Berlin questions were settled there would no longer be a détente but peace between the Western and Communist Worlds. If this was to be achieved, he suggested that the first step should be to seek a solution to the "peripheral" problems as understood by the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Federal Republic. He remarked that after fifteen years of cold war, the Soviets could not abandon their positions on basic problems any more than the Western Powers could abandon their policy of self-determination for Germany or the principles which they had always upheld in Berlin. Consequently, he proposed that talks with the Soviets be pursued, that proposals be submitted without waiting for them to take the initiative in every case, that an attempt be made to settle certain "peripheral" problems so that perhaps one day the fundamental problems would be settled.

112. He regretted that, owing to the lack of unanimous agreement within the Atlantic Alliance on the need for a positive policy, no headway could be made with certain issues. He warned the Council of the responsibilities it would bear if, because of a deliberately passive attitude or because it was unable to reach agreement, it missed opportunities of exploring these problems.

113. Turning to the results achieved since the Ottawa meeting, he recalled that the Council had requested the Permanent Representatives to review NATO strategy in the light of the military forces essential to defence and of economic possibilities. He noted with regret that this study which would, in the long run, have made it possible to build up a military body on the basis of reliable and stable data, had come up against difficulties which appeared insuperable; and that if Ministers did not discuss these difficulties before separating, it was questionable whether the Permanent Representatives would be able to continue the work entrusted to them. The results achieved by the Council in Permanent Session in the study of the problem of observation posts seemed equally disappointing. He recalled that in the past the NATO Military Authorities had repeatedly warned members of the Alliance of the dangers of a surprise attack. He therefore thought that it would be very useful to have an organized system of observation posts spread over wide areas and not only in Germany, as he had always considered any discrimination against Germany in matters of defence to be unacceptable. He thought that if this system could be established in agreement with the Communist World, it would mean much more than a symbolic gesture and constitute an important step forward along the road to peace and disarmament. As for the argument that it would lull the West into a false sense of security, it should, in his view, be rejected since nothing could ever come of such a negative policy. Belgium, for its part, was convinced that progress, by practical and reasonable measures, towards an agreement with the Communist World would not have an adverse effect on defence. It also thought that the non-aggression pact must be the culmination of a series of partial disarmament or control measures which there was no reason to oppose in principle.

114. To sum up, he said that because the members of the Alliance were not fully in agreement on the policy to be followed, the practical work of the Organization was not making any headway. He hoped that after noting that Soviet foreign policy had changed, NATO would not limit itself to a static policy but would, on the contrary, attempt to explore the situation; in other words, not only ask the Soviet Union for its proposals but also draw up proposals itself.

115. Mr. LANGE (Norway) joined in the tributes paid to the memory of President Kennedy and expressed his deep sympathy to the United States Secretary of State. He went on to say that he was happy to have, in the message of President Johnson to the Council, a confirmation of the conviction that the imaginative policies of President Kennedy would be pursued by the United States administration.

116. As to the present debate, he could largely accept Mr. Butler's appraisal of the international scene. The main factor was that the Communist-dominated part of the world was no longer the monolithic bloc of the Stalinist era. Affairs in that part of the world were in a state of flux and this opened to the West the possibility of exploring further whether certain partial agreements with the Soviet Union might not now be feasible. He agreed with Mr. Spaak that it would be a fundamental mistake on the part of the Alliance not to investigate every possibility of finding solutions to at least some of the problems giving rise to tension and the danger of war. It was maybe an illusion to believe that the change of its mood and method reflected a change in the Soviet Union's long-term aims. It was possible to attribute the changed climate diversely to the bloc's internal agricultural crisis, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and sociological developments resulting in the rise of a new and educated middle class. But the changed climate was undeniable and its relative relaxation and rationality offered an occasion which the West should not be slow to seize for the purpose of exploring possible settlements. However secure of his position Mr. Khrushchev might feel, sudden changes affecting the present climate could not be excluded. He realised, as stated by Mr. Couve de Murville, that there was no foreseeable possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the reunification of Germany and on the Berlin question. But Mr. Spaak was surely right in thinking that the achievement of minor and partial settlements might create the conditions enabling agreement to be reached on these major problems - provided, of course, that the partial settlements contained no stipulations inimical to Germany's reunification in freedom.

117. The question of an agreement on observation posts should be further studied. Such an agreement should not be impossible to conclude. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, such an agreement would be similar to the Bulganin Plan and other ideas which it had put forward in the past. Even if such an agreement would not, militarily speaking, be very valuable for the West, it would have the advantage, once implemented, of accustoming the Soviet Union to the idea and practice of control - a difficulty which had proved to be the main stumbling block to disarmament. It would be advisable not to seek the establishment of so perfect a system of observation posts that any possibility of achieving it would be unrealistic from the start.

118. As to the proposal for a non-aggression pact, he could see little value in such a pact per se. However, if it were the culmination of a series of other agreements, it could serve a useful purpose, especially as the Soviet Union appeared to attach some importance to it.

119. In conclusion, he fully endorsed Mr. Butler's and Mr. Saragat's belief in the wisdom of reaffirming, in the final communiqué, the defensive character of NATO. A greater effort than hitherto should be made in explaining NATO policies especially to the uncommitted world. The forum of the United Nations General Assembly should be exploited to create a more truthful image of NATO in world opinion. However, a condition of the success of such a move would be the importance attached by the West to trading with and aiding the less developed countries and newly independent nations.

120. The COUNCIL:

agreed to resume discussion the next day.

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