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REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE

REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

Note by the Secretary General

Attached is the Fifteenth Report by the Political Committee on the implementation of the Final Act.

- 2. This report is a follow-up to the Fourteenth Report prepared in May 1982(1) and covers the period 1st April, 1982 to 1st October, 1982.
- 3. The sections of the report dealing with implementation of Chapter II provisions have been prepared by the Economic Committee.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

NATO, 1110 Brussels.

This document includes: 1 Annex

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE

Fifteenth Report by the Political Committee (1st April, 1982 - 1st October, 1982)

Review of Implementation by the East European States and the Soviet Union

I. Introduction

- 1. At its meeting on 1st October, 1975, the Council agreed that reports on those aspects of the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE which have a particular importance for members of the Alliance, could be prepared by the Political Committee.
- 2. This is the fifteenth such report and covers the period from 1st April, 1982 until 1st October, 1982(1).

II. General Assessment of Implementation by Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union

- 3. During the period under review, implementation of the Helsinki Final Act by East European countries and the Soviet Union showed no improvement and in some cases showed signs of significant deterioration.
- 4. The reporting period was dominated by clear violations of Polish and Soviet commitments under the Helsinki Final Act.

Declaration of Principles Governing Relations between Participating States

- The effect of martial law in Poland remained the overriding concern in the period under review, with a particularly negative development as to Principle VII, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The human rights situation in the country did not improve, although by the end of April and in the course of July a considerable number of persons, deprived of their liberty without charges and in internment camps throughout the country, were released, among them all female internees. However, thousands of persons are in prison or (re)interned for having violated martial law regulations. Telephone conversations were officially listened in to. All-round censorship on postal and telegram communications was also still in effect. After the street demonstrations in May and August the curfew was temporarily reimposed in some towns. The Polish government accepted to some extent co-operation with the International Labour Organization, the International Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations operating in Poland.
- (1) This report has been based on information supplied by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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6. The situation in Poland continued to have effects on other Eastern countries, as the attitude of authorities towards opposition elements remained sharp and no changes were recorded since the previous reporting period in implementation of the provisions of Basket I. The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan strikes at the heart of the Final Act principles related to the rights of sovereign countries, the threat or use of force, the right to self-determination and the acceptance of rules of international conduct, as do Soviet actions vis-à-vis Poland. Within the Soviet Union itself the authorities expanded their campaign to repress Helsinki monitors and only a few activists remain at liberty. The arrests and trials of activists continued and harassment and persecutions of religious dissidents intensified.

Confidence Building Measures

7. The large Warsaw Pact military manoeuvre, SHIELD 82, took place in Bulgaria between 27th September and 1st October. Prior notification was given 21 days before the start of the manoeuvres but was incomplete as regards information on the participating countries, the strength and type of forces or the area covered by the manoeuvres. No observers were invited.

Co-operation in the Field of Economics, Science and Technology, and the Environment

During the reporting period, Soviet and East European compliance with the provisions of Basket II relating to business working conditions and economic information showed no real improvement. The lack of progress observed in this Chapter was not so much a result of governments' intransigence or trade, but rather the serious economic and financial difficulties affecting the majority of countries in Eastern Europe. The often very high level of hard currency indebtedness has lead these countries to reduce their imports requiring foreign exchange. A contraction in business opportunities over the recording period cannot be linked directly to deliberate action on the part of the authorities. There was, however, a worsening in business conditions in the Soviet Union an inevitable by-product of the abolition of the direct-dial telephone system, the reasons for which are more political than economic. Though there was not a noticeable deterioration in Czechoslovakia, neither was there an attempt to improve a negative situation, typified by bureaucratic indifference and incompetence. For certain East European countries, Western industrial co-operation is vital for acquiring advanced technology to develop their economies. Interest may be keen and access more open, but negotiations are designed to reap the greatest advantages in their favour. In its current state of economic impasse, Polish involvement with Western commercial interests is at low ebb, save in the realm of industrial investment. The German Democratic Republic is resolutely trying to boost exports to the utmost and restrict imports to only those goods absolutely necessary for its industries.

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Human Contacts

- 9. There was some deterioration in Eastern implementation in the human contacts field from the last reporting period, particularly in the Soviet Union where the situation is probably worse than at any time since the signing of the Final Act. Jewish emigration decreased sharply as did that of ethnic Germans and Armenians. Harassment of would-be emigrants was stepped up and there was a marked slow-down in the resolution of family reunification cases. Beginning in mid-July 1982, there was a dramatic reduction of telephone links from the Soviet Union to other CSCE states.
- 10. As for Poland, a negative development continued in most areas, in particular as far as personal and professional travel, tourism, exchange of information and radio jamming was concerned.

Information

- 11. Implementation in Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union in this field remained unchanged from the last reporting period.
- 12. In Poland, all information was under strict military censorship, while many publications were still suspended or forbidden. In this climate of severe control, exchange of information became almost impossible. All Western information was scrutinized carefully and, if possible, used for anti-Western propaganda. Working conditions for journalists in Poland were very difficult indeed. All Western journalists were summoned by the Foreign Ministry regularly and criticized for their work. Also, harassment by militia, strip-searching at the borders and frequent arrests were reported.

Co-operation and Exchange in the Field of Culture

13. The level of activity remained basically unchanged from the last reporting period.

Co-operation and Exchange in the Field of Education

14. There were no changes from the previous reporting period.

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COUNTRY IMPLEMENTATION

1. Bulgaria

Genera1

There were no significant changes in overall Bulgarian performance during the reporting period in spite of declarations by the Bulgarian authorities that Bulgaria strictly observed the Helsinki Final Act.

Declaration of Principles

The Bulgarian government continued to profess total commitment to the principles laid down in this Chapter while in practice following them only when they coincide with Bulgarian or Warsaw Pact policy (e.g. support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan conflicts at the very least with Principles I to VII inclusive). Bulgarian attitudes towards events in Poland were clearly patterned on Soviet views and are relevant to Principles I, IV, VI, VII and VIII. The Bulgarian authorities continued to maintain that the events in Poland were an internal affair and they accused "imperialist forces" of attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish state. In the view of the Bulgarian authorities such interference called for strengthened unity on the part of the Warsaw Pact states.

Confidence Building Measures

The large Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres, SHIELD 82, took place in Bulgaria between 27th September and 1st October. Prior notification was given 21 days before the scheduled start of the manoeuvres (the 25th September) but was incomplete as regards information on the participating countries, the strength and type of forces involved or the area covered by the manoeuvres. The Soviet news agency TASS announced on 4th September that a Warsaw Pact exercise designated SHIELD 82 would be held between 25th September and 1st October in Bulgaria and the adjacent Black Sea area. The number of troops involved, including staff, ground and naval forces of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, was stated as 60,000 (the announcement, not itself a notification, coincided with a notification from the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs giving the number as "about 60,000"). All NATO Attachés in Sofia were invited to an exercise briefing at the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence but this invitation was not extended to observe any part of the exercise.

Economic Co-operation

Foreign firms new to the Bulgarian market might find it difficult to establish business contacts as Bulgarian interest is usually directly related to the product and the terms offered. A foreign trade reform measure which gives individual enterprises more autonomy may facilitate end-user contacts at an earlier stage. Manufacturers are being granted more authority to adjust



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their production to export markets and two of the largest enterprises will be able to deal directly with foreign companies without resort to foreign trade organizations (FTO's).

During the reporting period, Dow Chemical opened an office in Sofia with an Austrian representative. The process of establishing representative offices remains fraught with delays. Services and rents are set so high, with the aim of maximising hard currency revenues, that only companies with an active trade and a high turnover in Bulgaria can afford such costs. Hotel accommodation is adequate, but rates are raised considerably during major trade events. Although few problems are encountered with the issue of visas and internal travel, a recent group of American agricultural businessmen were restricted in their access to agro-industrial complexes and collective farms and limited to a few pre-selected sites.

Harassment has been noted of businessmen who sometimes unwittingly fall victim to arbitrary arrests and penalties: for example, the harmless offering of small promotional gifts may lead to criminal charges of bribery and in other cases there have been accusations of economic espionage.

There is a complete suppression of statistics pertaining to imports of oil (particularly from OPEC countries) and raw materials, as such information has been deemed a state secret. What data is available does not allow sufficient analysis for those investigating commercial prospects.

A few joint venture projects got under way with Japanese, Swiss, and Italian participation. American interest has waned because of Bulgarian failure to adequately clarify the legal aspects of their decree pertaining to industrial and commercial co-operation. The Bulgarians have also withheld approval for the US firm Dravo to continue in the development of coal fields located in the northeast part of the country. The only on-going US-Bulgarian venture is that of the Gates Rubber project for an installation producing pulley belts and other related rubber goods.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

Here the situation remained unchanged from the last reporting period. Family meetings and family reunification remained highly restricted. Once a person's decision to leave Bulgaria became known promotion, educational opportunities and government controlled benefits usually dried up for them and their families. In binational marriages, travel and tourism the situation remained unchanged.

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Information

The chances for Bulgarian citizens to receive Western publications remained very limited. A number of Western periodicals and research journals were found in the reading rooms of specialised institutes and libraries but so far as could be determined, access to these facilities remained restricted to those with official clearance. Major Western radio broadcasts in Bulgarian including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Deutsche Welle continued to be jammed regularly. There was no change in working conditions of Western journalists since the last review period.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

No change took place here since the last review period.

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2. Czechoslovakia

General

Czechoslovakia continued during the last six months to claim complete adherence to the CSCE Final Act; nevertheless implementation could still be judged quite unsatisfactory.

Declaration of Principles

Czechoslovak policy did appear to have changed. example, with regard to Principle VII on human rights, the three remaining "dissidents" (Jiri Ruml, Milan Simecka and Jan Mlynarik) of the seven held since May 1981 on charges of "subversion" were released in May 1982. However, two of the seven (Mlynarik and Karel Kyncl) had applications for emigration pending and their requests were met with continual bureaucratic delay and confusing requests for additional information. The past practice of isolated individual trials of human rights activists continued, although the number of trials and arrests in the last six months were even lower than during the previous reporting period. This fact may have been more related to the forthcoming November visit of President Husak to Austria, however, than to any change in basic policy regarding treatment of dissidents. Overall Czechoslovak compliance in this Basket I area remained fundamentally flawed, and harassment of religious activists appears to have increased. Czechoslovakia continued to place a heavy emphasis on the Final Act's principle of non-intervention. In the past this has been cited with regard to Western interest in the treatment of human rights activists. Since recent events in Poland, however, the Czechoslovak authorities continued to be in the forefront of those who accused the United States and certain Western European states of violating this principle with regard to the actions taken in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland. The inability of Poland to solve the perennial problem of facilitating economic reform while not permitting major political change reinforced the memory of Czechoslovakia's own unhappy experience in 1968. In a statement issued by Charter 77 on the 30th August anniversary of the Gdansk agreements, the Charter spokesman invoked the memory of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and called on the Polish authorities to strive for an agreement "of all patriotic forces of the Polish nation" without outside interference. Religious activists did not go unnoticed by the authorities during this period. In the Spring two priests were sentenced to one year and eighteen months for "anti-state" activities. This sentencing was a symptom of the friction between the government and Catholic clergymen who have refused to join the government sponsored "Pacem in Terris" movement. The Czechoslovak government demonstrated its unwillingness to support religious activities with its refusal to grant Cardinal Hoeffner of Cologne a visa to attend a commemorative pilgrimage held at Svata Hora in Southern Bohemia in June. However, the government also indicated a healthy respect for the strength of the Catholic Church by only marginally disrupting the services at Svata Hora, cancelling regular bus and train connections to the area rather than imposing

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a heavy police presence. Then again, it could be said that the authorities reacted in a rather moderate way to this pilgrimage (which drew an estimated 10,000 people) not out of benevolence or respect for freedom of thought but simply because they recognised the potential power and influence of the Church. Poland, of course, served as a constant reminder of this power. In general the Czechoslovak authorities used the principle of non-interference to block Western attempts to draw attention to human rights and other abuses. They continued to seek to invalidate all their obligations under the Final Act on the grounds that nothing within it could be at variance with Czechoslovak national law.

Economic Co-operation

Trade with the West has declined because of Czechoslovakia's policy of reducing its foreign debt burden by maximising exports to and restricting imports from non-Socialist countries. As a result, Czechoslovakia is likely to be a depressed market for Western exporters and any transactions will be accompanied by requests for long-term suppliers' credits and better financial conditions.

Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Organizations (FTO's) continued to obstruct direct access of businessmen to end-users. An experimental "re-organization" of foreign trade competence scheduled to be implemented next year, whereby some authority will be transferred from the FTO's to the larger industrial trusts, may theoretically promote such contacts.

Austrian Airlines retained its office in Prague despite withdrawing its representative due to reduced flights to Vienna. Olivetti (Italian) officially commenced operations as of 1st October, 1982, and the French bank Société Générale opened a branch in Prague in August 1982. Obtaining office and living space, as well as engaging competent local personnel, is made difficult not only because of prohibitive costs, but also because of bureaucratic indifferences and ineptitude. Rates for hotel accommodation remain exorbitant, especially during trade fairs when Western business people are obliged to pay in hard currency almost four times that of their East European counterparts. Mention was made of hostellike accommodation costing approximately \$65. The granting of visas and the behaviour of the authorities have become somewhat more arbitrary: illustrations of this being the abrupt and definitive denial of an entrance visa to a Dutch flower exporter with over twenty years of business dealings and the detention for two days of a German representative of an American firm. Internal travel is permitted only within the framework of a previously announced business trip.

In the realm of economic information, there is usually a delay of 10-11 months in producing the Statistical Yearbook covering the previous year. Due to budgetary constraints, the Yearbook, as

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well as a handbook of trade statistics will no longer be published in French. It is difficult to obtain current information and data on key industrial sectors is four months old when released. The ponderous Czechoslovak foreign trade administration, with overlapping responsibilities, confuses and greatly delays negotiations. There is uncertainty over import priorities and the allocation of hard currency takes longer and is subject to stricter controls. The signing of previously arranged contracts is held up by Czechoslovak requests to Western exporters for lengthy grace periods, short-term financing and counter-trade as the government grows more reluctant to offer official commercial bank guarantees.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

There were no improvements during the reporting period. Officially the authorities were required to respond to all applications for exit permits within thirty to sixty days of their submission. In fact, the process often took much longer. In addition to applying for passports and exit permits individuals desiring to travel to countries outside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have to submit an application for a hard currency allocation in January of the year in which they wished to travel. Czechoslovak citizens, in theory, are allowed to travel to the West once every three years. In practice the granting of exit documents varied widely; a few Czechoslovaks were able to visit relatives in the West every year, but others have been denied exit documents so far. In addition, the ability of Czechoslovak citizens to travel relatively freely in the communist bloc was restricted in the last year. In the case of Poland, group tourism was largely discontinued and it was far more difficult to travel there on an individual basis. In the case of Hungary, there was a limit on the amount of forints which may be obtained each year, which put an end to the regular shopping trips to Hungary many Slovaks were accustomed to make. Czechoslovaks desiring to travel to Yugoslavia had to apply for a specially designed "grey" passport valid only for travel to Yugoslavia, although there were some indications that this was not a very effective deterrent in preventing refugees from fleeing via the Yugoslav route to Austria and other Western countries.

Information

There was no change in Czechoslovak policy toward the dissemination of information which continued to be extremely restrictive.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

Co-operation remained limited and difficult and no changes took place since the last review period.

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3. German Democratic Republic

General

There was no improvement in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act by the German Democratic Republic.

Declaration of Principles

The German Democratic Republic stressed the virtues of Basket I security issues for propaganda purposes. The GDR expressed continuing support for martial law in Poland and preferred even harsher suppression by the Polish régime of organizations, including Solidarity, which it regarded as hostile to communism. In the media, the GDR referred to Solidarity and other democratic forces inside Poland as counterrevolutionaries, terrorists and hooligans. For its own domestic purposes, the GDR leadership wanted to see in Poland the development of strict Party discipline coupled with a sound economy. Although the régime remained tolerant of the Church in general during the period, individual activists in the Churchsponsored peace movement were subjected to repression. The "swords into plowshares" badge was prohibited by the régime in April and the police fined and questioned persons wearing the badge. A number of peace activists had their regular identity cards impounded and were issued the so-called PM-12, which is usually reserved for common criminals. In order to provoke individual activists who previously served in the armed forces, the régime selectively ordered persons to perform reserve military duty. A number of reservists were convicted of refusing to perform military duty and an estimated forty of these reservists are currently serving prison terms. The Church criticized the state in a pronouncement issued during the period for instituting new school laws which promulgated paramilitary training for school-age children and adolescents.

Economic Co-operation

The high degree of East German indebtedness has obliged the country to adopt a rigid policy of maximising hard currency earnings through exports and minimizing expenditures for imports. A development unrelated to economic co-operation, but within the scope of Chapter II, was the GDR's discussions with Norway concerning atmospheric pollution emanating from East German factories. Moreover, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany have entered into an arrangement, whereby the latter is prepared to contribute DM68 million in a GDR project to clean up the waters around Berlin. The GDR government is aware of its pollution problems, but is unwilling to make the necessary investment commitments. In this respect the active rôle of the Protestant Church in investigating this problem has not been officially discouraged.

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Contacts with industrial end-users have not been facilitated, despite the 1st January, 1981 reorganization of GDR foreign trade bureaucracy. There is a continued reluctance to grant on-site visits to factories and laboratories. The problem of internal business travel is largely avoided as all appointments are arranged in Berlin.

The procedures for opening business offices remain the same: Western firms are allocated space in the International Trade Centre against high rents and service charges payable in hard currency. Similarly, Western businessmen are required to stay in the more expensive chain of Inter-hotels in Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden (soon to be opened) and to pay for their accommodation in Western currency. Rates in hotels and restaurants experience significant price hikes during the Leipzig trade fairs.

The GDR Statistical Pocket Book and Yearbook, covering the year ending 31st December, 1981, appeared in July 1982, considerably earlier than in previous years, but is still deficient in the publication of certain key indicators. In a departure from the usual practice of expressing trade statistics only in total turnover, the GDR released separate import and export figures for trade with socialist and non-socialist countries. A completely revised foreign trade directory is published in both German and English during the first quarter of each calendar year.

The tighter control on the foreign exchange expenditures of the Kombinats (industrial conglomerates) and the transfer of competence over hard currency trading to the State banks may impede dealings. The East Germans in their overtures to Western firms, have hinted that better political relations with these Western countries might lead to improved economic prospects. Apart from very few exceptions, this is refuted by comments indicating that the treatment afforded to Western companies, regardless of political affiliations, is generally uniform. The GDR has also expressed interest in co-operation with neighbouring countries on mutual economic problems: e.g. pollution, as mentioned in the introduction.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

There was no change here from the previous reporting period. The experience of those who applied for family reunification continued to vary greatly. Some lost their jobs or had to take on less meaningful work but others continued to work as usual. Occasionally children were discriminated against in school. Most applicants had to undergo long interviews with security or police officials during which they were pressured to abandon their application to leave. Some, however, experienced no problems at all while they waited for the authorities to act. The authorities made one "humanitarian" concession during the review period. Under new legislation, people who left illegally

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before 1st January, 1981 are released from their GDR citizenship and no longer liable for the "crime" of escaping. Many of them were, however, still denied re-entry to visit relations. There was no reduction in the minimum hard currency exchange requirement (MER) of DM25 per day for visitors from non-Socialist countries. Statistics which became available during the period showed that during the first half of 1982 the number of visits from the Federal Republic of Germany to the GDR increased, in comparison with the equivalent period in 1981, by 3.2%. There were still, however, only about half as many visits as in the equivalent period in 1980, before the increase in the MER.

Information

Aside from Western Communist Party publications Western periodicals were unavailable to the general public in East Berlin and the GDR. The only exceptions were two East Berlin hotels serving foreigners almost exclusively, which carried the International Herald Tribune under the counter in limited quantities (10-15 daily) for DM4 per copy. The International Herald Tribune was available to foreigners in Leipzig during the Leipzig Spring and Fall Fairs. Western publications were not available at news-stands. Major libraries and institutes received some Western magazines and scholarly journals but the general public had no access to them. The broadcasts of Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and RIAS were not jammed.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

There was no change from previous reporting periods.

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4. Hungary

Genera1

Hungarian policy on CSCE implementation has not changed fundamentally during the last six months. The main preoccupation has been the economy and Hungary's hard currency shortage. This led to a cut back in trade (particularly imports) with the West, which Hungary claimed was only temporary. But the process of economic reform and of overture towards the West continued, and was strengthened by Hungary's entry to the IMF and the IBRD. The Polish situation too continued to receive attention. Hungary supported the official Warsaw Pact line; but also expressed anxiety about the possible effect of a deterioration of East-West relations. The media - in particular radio and television - continued to discuss the Polish crisis and Hungary's own economic problems with a frankness unusual in Eastern Europe. The openness of the media and the government about Hungary's economic troubles was a feature of the past few months.

Declaration of Principles

Hungarian dissidents continued the same level of activity as during earlier reporting periods. Two more issues of the most sophisticated <u>Samizdat</u> publication, the journal "Beszelo", were printed in approximately 1,000 copies and distributed throughout the country, primarily to young people and intellectuals. Three issues of this publication, which addresses topics and themes not permitted in the official press including sympathetic descriptions of Polish Solidarity appeared. The authorities did not interfere with it nor with informal channels for the distribution of other Samizdat literature and a "free university" which offered lectures and discussions on themes not addressed in official educational institutions. A brief campaign of harassment against several leading dissidents, including editors of "Beszelo", ended shortly after a number of establishment intellectuals sent a protest letter to the Minister of the Interior. Several dissidents distributed leaflets along the route of an officially sponsored "peace march" in Budapest which called attention to Soviet troops and weapons in Hungary. Police eventually stopped the distribution and checked identity cards but took no other action. Approximately fifty individuals participated in a rally to show sympathy for Solidarity on 30th August. The organizers were briefly detained but released as soon as the event ended. Only one arrest (of a Samizda and publisher, Gabor Demszky) occurred during the reporting period The authorities, however, did try to discourage or at least moderate some activities by influencing job possibilities, both positively and negatively, and by arbitrary treatment of requests by some dissidents for permission to travel. A degree of specialised dissent continued within the Catholic Church centring around the "basic community" movement which charged that the Church hierarchy was "collaborationist". The Cardinal suspended the leading figure from exercise of his Church functions

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and referred the doctrinal dispute to the Vatican. The authorities took no action against Church members. Approximately a dozen young people, at least some of whom had been influenced by pacifist teachings of the "basic community" movement, were, however, given prison sentences of up to three years for refusing military service. There were also sketchy reports that some Hungarian youths would find secular arguments of independent European peace movements appealing. The public peace movement in Hungary, however, remained tightly controlled by the authorities and its activities were kept consistent with Warsaw Pact foreign policy objectives. While Hungarian intellectuals and dissidents continued to work and meet normally, their influence on society at large remained marginal. Many Hungarians, for example, despite a historical tradition of Polish-Hungarian friendship, were sharply critical of what they deemed to be excesses of Polish workers and were concerned that the Polish situation diverted Hungarian economic resources to the detriment of their own standard of living. The official Hungarian policy of demanding only tacit support from the populace, encouraging the active co-operation of intellectuals and others in national life, and providing in return relative economic prosperity and such Helsinki objectives as increased travel and cultural opportunities remained effective and broadly popular. The success of this policy was facilitated by the authorities' readiness to turn a blind eye to instances of dissent of the sort which in other Eastern European countries produced sharp government reaction, as well as to engage in a type of hesitant and informal, but gradually increasing dialogue with those dissatisfied with one aspect or another of government policy.

Economic Co-operation

Despite a more liberal and less centralised economic policy, Hungary has nevertheless been adversely affected by the deterioration in East-West trade, the increased caution on the part of Western money lenders and domestic limits for producing exports capable of competing on Western markets. Although its foreign exchange reserves were depleted, Hungary managed to repay its commitments albeit after some delay. The hard currency shortage has also resulted in delayed payments to some Western creditors. The guaranteed \$300 million stand-by credit authorised by the Bank for International Settlements and application for drawing rights of up to \$650 million from the IMF should alleviate this tautness somewhat. The Hungarians were unable to make the forint convertible as foreseen during 1982. Despite internal economic strains, Hungary continues to emphasise expansion of trade relations with the West. The necessity, however, of reducing imports to basic essentials has diminished business opportunities. About 160 enterprises have received foreign trading rights and are actively seeking Western business partners without resort to foreign trade organizations.

No Western firms opened representative offices in Budapest during the review period, but it was reported that several American companies are considering doing so and that the status of the German

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firm Hoechst will shortly improve. Operating costs, rents for office and living space and telex and telephone installations are very high and involve long delays. With regard to personnel, it was confirmed in 1982 that no Hungarian national could be engaged directly as the local representative of a foreign company.

The opening of five modern hotels during the reporting period has increased bed capacity by 4,500 in the luxury category. Though the problem of vacancies has been eased, there still remains a deficit for medium price range hotels.

Since joining the IMF and the World Bank, Hungary has made a fundamental qualitative improvement in the economic and financial information provided to these institutions, although it is not always available to private businesses.

Interest in economic co-operation with Western interests remains high. The joint venture with Eli Lilly (American) for a fermentation plant has advanced with the appointment this summer of Lilly's Vienna based representative.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

There were no changes since the last review period, as Hungarian implementation in comparison to other East European states remained good. Hungary followed a relatively liberal travel policy for its citizens. For example, as of 1st January, 1982 regulations were modified to afford Hungarian citizens the legal possibility of visiting the West at least once each year, if financial support was available from friends or relatives for hard currency expenses (previously depending upon the age of the Hungarian citizen, it had been once every two or three years), and to purchase more hard currency for the one private trip in three years when Hungarian citizens may exchange Hungarian currency for Western currency. At the same time, Hungary became an increasingly popular place for Western tourists to meet relatives from other Eastern European countries who could not obtain permission from their governments to travel to the West.

Information

Copies of a number of Western publications were available at the international airport and at various hotels. The opening of six new first class hotels within the past year increased the number of points at which such publications could be obtained in the capital. These publications were available to Hungarians and could be purchased for Hungarian currency at prices which converted to a level approximately equivalent to the prices for which they were sold in other European countries. Hungarian authorities claimed that over forty outlets carried such publications, and this estimate, although not confirmed, appears

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credible. Some Western communist publications were also available but the numbers and the percentage of the market are unknown. It was possible, but expensive, for a Hungarian citizen to subscribe to Western periodicals and payment could be made in forints. Hungarians regularly listened to Western radio broadcasts and the Hungarian language services of Radio Free Europe, Voice of America and the BBC were all popular. There was no evidence of jamming.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

There was no change since the last review period.

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5. Poland

General

1. 1. 1.

There was a gradual relaxation of a number of martial law measures during the period under review but martial law is still in force. There was little real progress toward meeting the three criteria set forward by the NATO Allies on 11th January, 1982. Basic civil liberties, including those theoretically guaranteed by the Polish constitution, remained suspended. Aside from a handful of régime front groups, none of the trade unions and social organizations outlawed or suspended after implementation of martial law were allowed to resume operations. Although some of those interned on 13th December, 1981 were released, the régime continued to hold several thousand political prisoners. Through a combination of restricted access and statistical obfuscation, the régime made it impossible to determine with assurance the true number of prisoners.

Martial Law

Although General Jaruzelski and other régime spokesmen expressed the "hope" of lifting martial law by the end of 1982 it was evident that such a move would be determined by the government's perception of the security situation in Poland at the time. At various times during the past Spring and Summer, the régime proclaimed limited relaxation in the administration of martial law. Most of these relaxations were carefully hedged or were purely cosmetic in nature and none restored fully the basic civil liberties taken away in December. By early summer, curfew had been abolished in most places. Restoration of inter-voivodship automatic telephone and telex connections, as well as ending restrictions on personal travel between voivodships, were necessary for the normal functioning of the economy. There was a limited resumption of the issue of passports for private travel. Many of the passports to date have gone to elderly or infirm persons with relatives living abroad who have vouched for their support. However meagre these relaxations were, the régime repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to withdraw them when confronted by manifestations of popular dissatisfaction with martial law. Telephone service was cut off and curfews re-imposed in many parts of Poland in the aftermath of open unrest in early May and on 31st August. Many of the official announcements of martial law relaxations were preceded by intensive public relations campaigns aimed at dividing and weakening the régime's critics at home and abroad.

Political Prisoners/Detainees

Despite highly publicized releases of some internees, there was no end to the practice of internment without charge or to the use of summary tribunals to dispense harsh punishment for even minor violations of martial law. Following its 21st July

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announcement of the release or parolling of about 1,200 internees (including all women internees) the régime claimed that only 600-700 of those interned at the start of martial law remained in custody. This figure is open to question on a number of grounds. The regime obstructed efforts of the Church and the International Committee of the Red Cross to independently verify the total number of internees and to compile authoritative lists of their names. Among other ploys, it did not permit ICRC representatives to visit facilities housing persons detained subsequent to the initial implementation of martial law on the grounds that these people were not properly speaking "internees". The régime itself never presented a full list of internees. In a July newspaper interview, the Minister of the Interior justified this failure by the claim that internees themselves had protested such a move as a violation of their privacy. There were also reliable reports of arrests on trumped-up charges of former internees shortly after their release, as well as mass round-ups of ex-internees and other suspected régime opponents just prior to 31st August and other sensitive occasions. It was, moreover, unfortunate that so much of the concern about Polish political prisoners focussed on the category of internees, which, whatever its true size, probably constituted only a minority of those being confined in connection with martial law or opposition to the régime. Over 5,000 people were arrested or detained in the wake of the 31st August disturbances, although the majority were subsequently released. Sentences for martial law violations which carry no right of appeal have often been severe. Even minor offences, such as printing and distributing underground news bulletins or participation in nonviolent protests, entailed sentences of three to five years imprisonment. All assessments of the total number of current political prisoners are highly tentative, given the régime's ability to shift confinees from one category to another and its repeated revision of the numbers involved. It is probably safe to say, however, that several thousand Poles remain in some form of involuntary confinement as a result of martial law. Information about conditions of confinement continues to be limited and fragmentary. There were reports that some internees were being sent to psychiatric hospitals. Former internees and their families also reported that in at least some detention facilities, internees were kept in cells with common criminals. Senior Church officials expressed doubts about the value of even the limited number of inspection visits by independent organizations which the régime has permitted to date. According to senior Church officials and other reliable sources, beatings - often carried out by Zomo riot police brought in specifically for this purpose - were a routine part of the regimen of at least some detention centres.

Social Conditions/Trade Union Activity

The bulk of martial law repression, however, were carried out not in jails or the streets, but in workplaces. In the early months of martial law, considerable attention was afforded a process called "verification", which involved purging politically suspect individuals from schools, universities, newspapers, mass media and the civil and economic administration. "Verification" was

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directed mainly against professionals and other white collar workers, but there was also an on-going effort to eliminate Solidarity trade union activists and sympathisers from the shop floor of factories and other enterprises. The basic weapon in this campaign was the "wolf ticket" which involved dismissal from present employment and effective denial of future employment in any state-controlled enterprise. Some one denied work in this manner had therefore to become dependent on the rest of his family for support. This was a particularly onerous sanction in the wake of steep price rises which caused the costs of food and other basic necessities to skyrocket. There was moreover the suitably kafkaesque touch that persons thrown out of work by official fiat were often subsequently threatened with prosecution on charges of "social parasitism". Military control continued in large industrial enterprises, the media universities and important sectors of civil administration. Employees in militarized institutions remained subject to military discipline, including war-time punitive sanctions for failure to carry out assigned tasks. An eye witness account of official measures to deter work stoppages and disturbances on 31st August at Warsaw's Ursus tractor factory provided a concrete notion of what militarization can mean in practice. Ten to fifteen truckloads of militiamen were brought into the factory compound late the night of 30th August and remained there throughout 31st August. After the day shift arrived for work in the morning, the factory gates were closed and locked. Workers were not allowed to leave during their shift. Every manager of the factory down to the lowest level was escorted by a military officer throughout the day. The régime continued to respond with massive police force to demonstrations and other public manifestations of dissatisfaction with martial law. Symptomatic of the régime's treatment of its citizens were attacks by Zomo riot police wielding clubs, tear gas and water cannon against crowds of elderly women praying and singing in Warsaw's victory square next to a floral cross they had constructed in memory of the late Cardinal Wyszynski. Although there were confirmed reports of crowd violence against police in the course of some disturbances, such violence always occurred after the authorities forcibly dispersed attempts to hold peaceful protest actions. The authorities acknowledged the deaths of four persons in connection with the 31st August disturbances, but unofficial and unconfirmed reports indicate a number of fatalities on that day as well as killings of protesters on 3rd May. There were no firm estimates of the number of persons wounded and injured during government pacification actions since the start of martial law.

Declaration of Principles

All labour unions and a few cultural and intellectual organizations remained suspended. Hundreds of people are still interned and thousands are awaiting trial or have been sentenced under martial law. Legal proceedings against the Chairman of the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), Leskek Moczulski have concluded although no sentence has yet been handed down.

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Leading members of KOR (Workers Defence Committee) which voluntarily disbanded itself at Solidarity's first national congress in Autumn 1981 were formally charged with conspiracy to overthrow the Polish Peoples Republic by force. The régime continued to state that it would not discriminate against those who hold different "world views" but the process of verification and weeding out of undesirables in schools, universities and civil administration detracts from those assurances. The Church remained virtually untouched by martial law and in view of the demise of Solidarity its unique position was enhanced. There was criticism in the official press and by régime spokesmen of sermons by particular Bishops and of Church decisions to help those charged with violating martial law by paying their fines. Weekly mass was broadcast on radio as are non-Catholic services.

Economic Co-operation

The introduction of certain economic measures in Poland has eased access to enterprises and shortened the duration of negotiations by dissolving the industrial unions and the control of the foreign trade organizations. Nevertheless, opportunities for business are limited as dealings can only get underway once the already scarce hard currency funds for imports have been allocated by the Polish authorities.

During the review period, Deutsche Babcock terminated its operations for economic reasons.

The cost of accommodation has risen along with the general wage and price increases in Poland. Rents for office and living space have gone up by 165%, although the drastic devaluation of the Polish zloty against Western currencies has somewhat reduced the impact. Domestic airplane flights are still five times more expensive for foreigners than for Polish citizens. This holds true for hotel rates, as well where Western visitors are charged six to nine times more than Poles. Hotel occupancy has picked up in Warsaw since the first half of the year when there was a large number of vacancies. Quality is not always commensurate with Western standards, despite comparable prices. Internal business travel is hampered by a sharp reduction in inland flights.

The veracity of certain statistics pertaining to productivity and exports is not always reliable. Financial information on the balance of payments, hard currency reserves and foreign debt is more complete and regular than formerly.

A new law, which came into force on 6th July, 1982, will evidently facilitate the activities of foreign firms involved in small Polish production enterprises. The scope of this decree will also affect mixed and completely foreign-owned companies. The major factors limiting business prospects are the absence of Western credits and the scarcity of foreign exchange.

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Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

Contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties have for the last couple of months been easier. Passport restrictions were relaxed to some extent. More and more passports were issued not only to elderly people but even to younger ones wishing to visit family or relatives in the West. In general passports were issued for visits to next of kin on the basis of invitations confirmed by Polish consular offices. The validity of the travel documents is still for one year and generally for a single trip abroad. Many of those under detention were informed that the only way they may be released is to leave Poland - disposing of all their property and belongings in Poland and paying off all debts. Most were not formally charged with the commission of specific crimes. Many of those detained and released following prolonged detention were likewise informed by Polish authorities that they must depart Poland. Some were threatened with renewed detention if they did not depart their native country. In the majority of the cases, the former detainees lost their jobs or the right to practice their chosen professions.

Information

All information was under strict military censorship, while many publications were suspended or forbidden. In this climate of severe control, exchange of information became almost impossible. All Western information was scrutinized carefully and, if possible, used for anti-Western propaganda. Jamming of many foreign broadcasts in Polish continues. Working conditions for journalists in Poland remained difficult. All Western journalists were summoned by the Foreign Ministry regularly and criticized for their work; harassment by the militia, such as stripsearching at the borders and frequent arrests was reported.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

Cultural relations with some Western countries picked up during this period after most of the travel restrictions were eased.

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6. Romania

General

There was no improvement in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in Romania. As before, the Romanian government placed far more importance on the security issues in Basket I than on the other provisions of the Final Act. The overall performance on human rights seemed to worsen rather then improve.

Declaration of Principles

Principles I-VI and VIII-X remained central planks of Romanian foreign policy and Romanian performance in regard to these principles continued to be good. Romania was particularly active on Principle V and put concrete proposals before the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. With regard to Principle VII, Romanian performance continued to be poor. In the course of the summer the hearings in the American Congress concerning Romania's Most Favoured Nation status focussed public attention on Romania's performance in the human rights field, particularly with regard to emigration. Romanian intolerance in the field of freedom of thought was exemplified by the Transcendental Meditation scandal, which merged in the early summer. This led to the downfall of a government Minister and a reportedly widespread purge of academics, artists and other intellectuals from various institutes and artistic associations. The events in Poland over the last two years served to underscore for the Romanian leadership the importance of tight internal controls on all sectors of society. Internal security measures increased during the period. Similar attempts by workers and intellectuals in Romania were harshly put down with arrests and long prison terms, physical and psychological intimidation and intensive surveillance. Romania's overall human rights record is at least as bad as any other Soviet bloc country. While the Romanian constitution recognises freedom of religion, active participation in Churches is discouraged for communist party members and for persons in "leadership" positions (including schoolteachers). So-called neo-protestant religions such as Baptists, Pentecostalists and Seventh Day Adventists were often subject to a wide range of harassment. The Romanian Uniate (Catholic) Church has long been suppressed. Bibles and other religious publications are constantly in short supply and not generally available to the public.

Economic Co-operation

The period under review was dominated by Romanian efforts to reach debt rescheduling agreements with its Western creditors. To conserve sparse foreign exchange, Romanian trade policy emphasises the increase of exports and the limiting of imports, accompanied by stipulations for 100% counter-trade

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in dealings with Western businesses. Due to deficits in the balance of payments, the Romanian government has issued guidelines under which each foreign trade enterprise and ministry must assure a balance between receipts and disbursements. A further consequence has been a greater orientation towards countries with soft currency and clearing agreements.

Staff reductions and turnover in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and foreign trade organizations, combined with a reduction of international telephone and telex communications, have made establishing contacts more difficult. Although governmental access in the course of contract negotiations presents few problems, entrance to enterprises and research institutes is less easy. The high cost of maintaining representative offices and the more limited commercial prospects have caused several Japanese companies to close their branches in Bucharest. The new customs regulations which came into force on 1st January, 1982, have involved greater expenses for foreign business representatives resident in Bucharest. Whereas formerly a group of firms was permitted to occupy common premises, thereby sharing the burden of high costs, now only companies from the same country with a juridical connection may do so. Moreover, the Romanian authorities are linking the renewal of licences for business representation with the imposition of demands for 50-100% counter-trade.

Rental fees at ten times, hotel rates at six times and medical care at five times that paid by Romanian nationals give an idea of the high costs encountered by Western business people. In June 1982, price increases for long distance telephone calls and telexes forced Western firms to limit such communications to a minimum. Moreover, the 1981 revaluation of the Romanian leu against the US dollar has created an additional financial burden. Visa fees were recently increased and there is a compulsory daily exchange rate of \$10. People who can produce an official Romanian government invitation are exempt from such provisions although they continue to apply in cases where a Romanian enterprise has merely issued an invitation to commence commercial discussions.

In connection with current debt rescheduling, commercial banks have been afforded considerably more precise and up-to-date economic and financial data than was hitherto available. As a member of the IMF and the IBRD, Romania submits data to these organizations which are incorporated into reports and distributed to member states. These reports, however, are not made public. However, information on economic performance remains scarce and belated and of questionable reliability.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

Excessive taxes on international telephone calls impeded Romanian citizens' access to relatives living outside the country.

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Information

Romania's performance in the circulation of, access to and exchange of information remained unchanged. Non-communist foreign newspapers and journals were in very short supply for the expatriate community and virtually unavailable to the general public.

Cultural and Educational Co-operation

There was no improvement since the last reporting period. Scientific exchanges seemed to become even more difficult as illustrated by a number of cases.

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7. Soviet Union

General

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As on previous occasions the period under review has been marked by increased violations of the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union continued to support the Polish régime and launched a major press campaign against Western radio stations broadcasting to Poland. Arrests and harassment of dissidents continued. The number of Soviet Jews and ethnic Germans receiving exit visas was at the lowest level since 1970. Access to Western embassies remained difficult. Jamming continued to make reception of Russian language Western radio broadcasts difficult, though not impossible. A disturbing new development over this period has been the reduction of telephone lines and the termination of direct dialling services between the Soviet Union and the West (including Japan and Finland). Communication had formerly been greatly facilitated by additional lines and automatic circuits introduced for the Olympic Games in 1980.

Declaration of Principles

The Soviet Union continued to support martial law in Poland and to display hostility to the Solidarity movement, contrary to Principles VII and VIII. The persistent suppression of civil liberties in Poland, violating Principles I, II, VI and VIII, was consistently described by the Soviet Union as a Polish internal matter made necessary by the attempts of imperialism to alter the post-war division of Europe, within the ideological warfare and the attempted economic blockade imposed on the Socialist countries and aimed at gaining supremacy over them. Such persistent presentation of the events in Poland continued therefore to represent the most obvious indication of the Kremlin's interpretation of the provisions and of the spirit of the Final Act. Repression of dissidents continued and, as the number at liberty diminished, the sweep for them became wider. In early April 1982 the KGB started rounding up young left-wing intellectuals, some employed in establishment jobs in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk who had been active in printing and circulating Euro-Communist literature. They advocated the reform of Marxism from below. Others circulated religious texts. A trial or trials are likely to be pending. Of the few wellknown dissidents still at liberty, Sofia Kalistratova, has now been officially informed that a case is being prepared against her for anti-Soviet slander under Article 190(1) of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Consequent on this, she and the other two members of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group still at liberty decided to disband it. Additional restrictions were put on those already in detention: the denial of visits to Marchenko and Shcharanski (who started a hunger strike on 27th September) and of parcel rights to Azadovsky. On the night of 3rd-4th August, Zoya Krakhmal'nikova, who had openly edited a religious Samizdat journal entitled "Hope" for 6-7 years without any reaction from the

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authorities, was arrested and charged with anti-Soviet slander. Although "Hope" was reprinted by an "anti-Soviet" publisher in the West, it had eschewed politics. Her arrest and the public recantation 2nd July of writer Evgniy Kozlovskiy, rumoured to have forestalled an imminent show trial, in effect were a warning to other writers of the dangers of non-conformist activities and contact with Western publishers. Other dissidents who suffered include Jewish activists, other religious activists, independent peace demonstrators, and divided families (hunger strikers). Pressure on prominent Jewish figures has continued: Alexander Lerner was warned in September to break off all contacts with foreigners or undergo trial and imprisonment and F. Kochubievsky was arrested in September. Further cases of the revocation of refuseniks' academic degrees came to light. A relatively new and disquieting feature was the intensified physical harassment of foreign visitors who sought to contact refuseniks. The independent Soviet Peace group which came into being in June-July around the time of the Peace March was subjected to harassment and certain of its members temporarily imprisoned. The harassment and persecution of religious dissidents intensified, perhaps in preparation for a wave of trials. Last 6th April twelve persons who reproduced religious literature on a mimeograph machine and then sold it were arrested. More recently, numerous searches of the homes of members of fundamentalist Protestant sects occurred in connection with the upcoming trials of four Pentecostal emigration movement leaders. Vasiliy Barets, a Pentecostal preacher and the founder of a "Committee for the right to emigrate" was arrested in August in Rovno and transferred to Rostov-on-Don, where he awaits trial. There has been no substantive sign of movement in the case of the Siberian Seven and their families in Chernogorsk. Another Pentecostal family group which approached the British Embassy in June/July was subsequently subjected to a degree of harassment. Unregistered Baptists continue to be arrested and put on trial. Only two of the "Divided Families Group" (who were also involved in hunger strikes) received exit papers and left the USSR: the mixture of procrastination and divisive tactics used by the Soviet authorities seemed to discourage the other members.

Confidence Building Measures

The Soviet Union continued its interpretation of the confidence building measures in Basket I. For TASS announcement of SHIELD 82 see page 1 of Annex.

Economic Co-operation

The most significant development affecting business conditions in the USSR was the abrupt severance of international direct-dial circuits to Western Europe, North America and Japan. Moreover, telephone and telex connections to various other countries have briefly been totally cut-off without reason or prior notice. Foreign businessmen are now obliged to place all long-distance calls through Soviet operators and the waiting period can

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last from several hours to several days. During the reporting period, Shell Oil received accreditation, but has been encountering delays in opening its Moscow office. Hotel prices have become slightly higher, ranging from \$40 to \$90 depending on quality. Reservations are accepted when one is in possession of a Soviet visa, although actual confirmation may be as late as three days before arrival.

In the realm of economic and commercial data, there is a noticeable lack of figures relating to agricultural production at Union and Republic levels. No information has yet been released pertaining to the comprehensive re-alignment of wholesale prices which came into effect on 1st January 1982. There are periodic disappearances and reappearances of statistics for certain key industrial sectors. In the area of industrial co-operation, the Soviets have shown enthusiasm for projects in which their interests are served in the acquisition of technology and the development of energy sources, for example, the Astrakhan and Tenghiz sour gas/oil sites and the exploitation of raw materials (asbestos mines). The cost of massive grain imports has led the Soviet Union to increase requests for shortterm credits. Hard bargaining for favourable financing is becoming more of a challenge to Western firms vying for Soviet contracts.

Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Human Contacts

There was no indication that the Soviet authorities were easing restrictions. New bureaucratic obstacles to emigration were added to the old. Required letters of invitation from relatives abroad were considered valid only for a period of one year from date of issuance. Embassies formerly could extend the validity of the letters. Jewish applicants continued to experience problems in receiving letters of invitation from Israel through registered international mail. Persons reapplying for exit permission after the statutory six months waiting period were also increasingly being required to supply new documents (formerly reconsideration was made on the basis of previously submitted documents). Acquiring new documents, including clearances (spravki) from places of residence and employment, is very time consuming and often, because of bureaucratic obstructionism, virtually impossible. Emigration from the Soviet Union continued to decline for all ethnic categories. Jewish emigration has declined from a 1979 peak at 51,000 to a present annual rate of approximately 3,000. Further reductions from this level - the lowest in a decade - are anticipated. This decline is parallelled by the fall in Armenian emigration, now at an annual rate of approximately 300 - less than 5% of the number allowed to leave the USSR in 1980. While Yerevan OVIR is now accepting applications from persons with parents and children as well as spouses abroad, the number of applications

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continues to be arbitrarily limited. Only 1,345 Jews were allowed to emigrate from 1st April-30th September, 1982 compared to 2,027 from 1st October, 1981-31st March, 1982. If the present trend continues, fewer than 3,000 Soviet Jews will emigrate in 1982, compared to 9,447 in 1981, 21,471 in 1980 and 51,320 in 1979, the zenith of Jewish emigration. At the same time, only 1,708 ethnic Germans emigrated in the first nine months of 1982, compared to 3,773 for the whole of 1981, 6,954 in 1980 and 7,226 in 1979. Only 282 Armenians have emigrated so far in 1982, compared to 1,903 in 1981, 6,107 in 1980 and 3,656 in 1979. Emigration from the USSR reached a peak in 1979 when approximately 60,000 persons received exit permits. With the deterioration in East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the USSR began systematically to reduce emigration. Should emigration in 1982 continue at the present rate, fewer than 5,000 persons will be granted exit permission. Prospects are, moreover, that the emigration rate will not appreciably increase in the near term. Various Western countries reported continued difficulties over achieving family reunification for Soviet citizens. The Soviet Ministry of Communications notified in May-June the telecommunication administrations of a series of Western countries, including the members of the EC and the US, that the number of telephone circuits between Moscow and their capitals would be reduced by 50% or more from July 1982. There was no advance consultation by the Soviet Ministry of Communications and unspecified technical difficulties were cited as reasons for the Soviet action. In mid-July the direct dialling facility for international calls from Moscow was cut without warning. On 2nd September the Soviet Union took a new unilateral measure, with the minimum of advance warning, by removing almost entirely automatic dialling facilities between Western capitals and the Soviet Union. Severe disruption of telephone services and significant delays in connecting calls resulted from these measures. Businessmen, journalists and private citizens were all badly affected. On 16th July, 1982 the Danish Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow made a demarche on behalf of the EC countries to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for further explanation of the Soviet action and pointing out the adverse effects of the move. The French, the German, the Norwegian and the US and other governments made bilateral demarches to the Soviet authorities who have so far rejected any suggestion of contravention of the Helsinki Final Act and ignored requests to rescind the measures.

Information

During the last six months no significant change took place in the field of information. For most Soviet citizens the main source of information from abroad continued to be foreign broadcasts such as BBC, Voice of America, France Inter, Deutsche Welle and Radio Liberty. Most Russian language broadcasts from abroad continue to be jammed. Printed information and relevant material from the West were still not available. Some Western newspapers and magazines were sold in stands located in hotels

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where normal Soviet citizens had no access. Similarly no data was available on how many copies of foreign newspapers were bought by libraries open only to people enjoying special permission. Working conditions for foreign journalists in the Soviet Union deteriorated in a climate of tightening internal security. Access to unofficial Soviet sources became increasingly difficult. The restrictive measures in the field of international telephone communications had obvious negative repercussions on the work of foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union. Attacks in the Soviet media against foreign journalists and instances of physical and other harassment increased. The most serious infringement by the Soviet Union of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act was the expulsion, without valid reason, of the Moscow correspondent of Newsweek Magazine, Mr. Andrew Nagorsky. In general it may be remarked that official Soviet propaganda was increasingly engaged in a campaign against the foreign press, and especially against foreign radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These radio stations were accused of deliberately striving to undermine law and order in the socialist countries, and in Poland in particular.

Culture and Educational Co-operation

There was no improvement or extension of relations during the reporting period.