

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 216
COPY

in det
ORIGINAL : ENGLISH/FRENCH
17th December, 1963

NATO SECRET
VERBATIM RECORD
C-VR(63)76

VERBATIM RECORD

of the

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

TUESDAY, 17th DECEMBER, 1963, at 3.30 p.m.

at

NATO HEADQUARTERS

PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS XVIe.

*f rect du
19/2/64*

COMPTE RENDU

de la

SEANCE DU CONSEIL

tenue le

MARDI 17 DECEMBRE 1963 à 15h30

au

SIEGE DE L'OTAN

PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS XVIe.

OTAN/NATO
Paris, XVIe.

NATO SECRET

II. MILITARY QUESTIONS (Contd)C. The Defence Problems of GreeceMr. STIKKER

Gentlemen, we have now reached Item II.(C) of our Agenda - The Defence Problems of Greece and on the Agenda it is indicated that I should give an oral report on these problems. These problems, in plain words, are the defence assistance to Greece. As you know, on the basis of resolution C-M(62)58, adopted during the Ministerial Meeting in Athens in May 1962, the Permanent Council has been invited to seek the ways and means of providing the additional resources necessary in 1963 and 1964 for the Armed Forces of Greece, to reach the level which is indispensable.

Now, as far as 1963 is concerned, the Ministers already noted in December 1962 - that was resolution C-M(62)154(Final) - that, for that year, several member countries had undertaken to provide their support to Greece and that the governments concerned would make the necessary contacts with the Greek Authorities to give effect to their commitments.

Now, although I have been kept continually informed of the developments, it still is rather difficult for me in the circumstances to be completely up-to-date and I feel that Mr. Venizelos, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, might be in a better position to comment for the Council, if he so wishes, on the most recent picture of the situation, which is described in a note which has been circulated by the Greek Delegation and which bears the number C-M(63)132. Could I invite the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to comment on this document and, if he wants to speak also on the problem of 1964, I think that the Council would appreciate that.

Mr. VENIZELOS

M. le Président, la thèse hellénique sera développée par le Ministre de Coordination, M. Mavros. Alors, je crois que le Conseil va entendre l'exposé de la situation économique de mon pays ainsi que les obligations qui découlent de notre participation à l'Alliance Atlantique.

Mr. MAVROS

Mr. Chairman, the present high force level maintained in Greece is a consequence of goals established by SACEUR for this NATO area. These goals were drawn up in recognition of the increasing military strength of Bulgaria subsidised by the USSR, as well as by the geographic position of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. MAVROS (Contd)

The geographic position of my country results in an extremely long and difficult task to defend borders with the Communist bloc. In point of fact, if Greece were situated some 500 or 1,000 kms. from its present position and had not common borders with a potential aggressor, such high levels of defence expenditure and military preparedness - 170,000 men under arms - would not be required of her and the subject "Defence Support to Greece" would not appear on this Agenda.

While maintaining this extraordinary military effort, Greece, at the same time, has to cope with a number of structural weaknesses, consisting of high rates of unemployment and under-employment, excessive emigration of workers to Western Europe, a low level of average per capita income, a considerable inequality in regional development, relatively backward agricultural and industrial sectors, a fundamentally weak and worsening balance of payments on current account and, finally, a critically inadequate level of investment in education and the deficient quality of education in terms of the pressing economic and social requirements of the nation.

In the past 12 years, Greece has not only reconstructed her war damage but had also to take steps to correct some of these structural weaknesses. However, the relatively modest investment expenditure devoted to carrying out these programmes have led to overall budget deficits and, consequently, the public debt has increased by \$450 million from 1959 through 1963.

Moreover, the Greek Government is seriously concerned over the dangerous increase in the rate of departure from Greece of an important part of the labour force. On the basis of available data, the rate of emigration - farmers and workers - to Western European countries has accelerated and now amounts to 100,000 persons a year. In fact, from 1946 to date, half a million Greeks have left the country. Consequently, it becomes imperative for the Greek Government to create employment opportunities to check this emigration which, in the final analysis, also affects the country's ability to maintain the necessary manpower in the Armed Forces.

As a result of inadequacy of resources in relation to the economic problems facing Greece, social and educational needs have been badly neglected. This has now become a critical problem. Not only must the Greek Government contend with internal pressures requiring rapid progress in these fields, but she must consider the necessity to adapt the Greek people as rapidly as possible to the economic and social environment of the Common Market. As an illustration of the voted inadequacy of expenditure for education alone, Greece devotes only 10% of Government civil expenditures to this purpose, compared with 28-40% for other NATO members. In terms of gross national product, Greece spends 1.7 for education, which is the lowest in NATO and 5.1 for defence which is among the highest in the Alliance, if we take into account the per capita income. There is a direct relation in Greece between social, political and economic development and the strength of the domestic Communist Party.

Mr. MAVROS (Contd)

For example, in 1952 EDA, that is the front for the Greek Communist Party, received 9.6% of the vote. In 1958 this percentage rose to 24.3%. In the elections, held last month, the Communist vote dropped to 14.3%, largely, in our view, because of the programme of social and educational reform promised in the electoral campaign of the Government. It is our view that this percentage can be brought below 10%, which is the normal Communist force in Greece, assuming we are successful in implementing our programme.

The special geographical, political position of Greece makes necessary a military effort well beyond the ability of the country to finance from its own resources. This is the basis for the contribution of the NATO Allies to this military effort. Even before the NATO Alliance was formed, the United States, under the Truman doctrine, provided this extraordinary assistance which has enabled us to defeat the Communist armed attempt to take over Greece. It is a fundamental principle of NATO that there must be a balanced effort on the part of all members of the Alliance and that this effort must be based on sound economic and social policies of the member governments. This principle was reaffirmed in 1952 when Greece was admitted to NATO. It was specifically noted, then, that no country should bear more of the common defence burden than its resources permitted. The President of the United States, in his report to the Congress in January 1959, stated, I quote "Greece's NATO obligations are heavy; in proportion to her resources and population she bears one of the heaviest defence burdens of the Free World nations".

Unfortunately, since then, the situation has not changed. On the contrary, a quite major expenditure in Greece has increased at the same time that United States economic defence support has been eliminated and Greece's rate of growth has slackened. I fully agree with the words of Mr. Butler that we have to heed the threat to the Alliance from the Communist menace to the under-developed world if we are not to be out-flanked. Let us not forget that the Alliance contains under-developed areas as well and that strong pressure is exercised by the USSR on those economically weak areas. We must ask ourselves whether the present NATO goals for Greece are really necessary for the defence of the West. If so, a means must be found to finance the requirements of these goals. In the current year, the requirements set by SHAPE were partly met by raising the Greek contribution from 154 million dollars to 161 million dollars, with the commitments made by other NATO allies, total defence expenditures were raised 185 million dollars. We appreciate the assistance offered in this respect by our NATO partners, although, on the basis of experience gained this year, it appears to be desirable to find a mutually acceptable method of making the NATO contribution earlier in the year. Incidentally, I would like to inform the Secretary-General that the defence assistance programme for 1963 will be settled before the end of the year, so far as all the countries which have accepted to contribute are concerned.

Mr. MAVROS (Contd)

In addition to that aid, we must take note of the fact that the United States of America will deliver, this year, over \$150 million worth of modern military equipment. In 1964, SACEUR has set the goal of \$213 million plus \$10 million to cover gaps in our defence infrastructure owing to the inadequate financing in 1963. Greece is of course, prepared to again raise its contribution in order to help meet the goal set for the next year, even though we shall have to thereby forego certain parts of our social and economic programmes. It is, however, assumed that the balance will be provided by the NATO Alliance. If the total required expenditure level cannot be reached, then a reappraisal will have to be made of the whole size and structure of our defence forces and defence expenditure. The Secretariat has already circulated a Draft Resolution on this matter which we hope the Council will not object to adopt. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STIKKER

Thank you. Are there any Ministers who would like to comment at the present moment? I thought this morning, already, that Germany wanted to start to speak on this subject - Mr. Grewe.

Mr. GREWE

Mr. Chairman, I can be extremely brief. On behalf of my Government I would like to make the following statement:

"By the aid made available in 1963, the Federal Republic has indicated that it fully appreciates the difficult defence problems of Greece. This morning, Minister von Hassel stressed again the importance of these problems. I am happy to be able to confirm that the bilateral arrangements about the German contribution to the NATO defence aid for 1963 have been concluded and that they will be signed in the very near future. The Federal Republic continues to be prepared to support the Greek defence effort in 1964, on the assumption that this will be a genuine common effort of the Alliance."

On this basis, Mr. Chairman, we agree with this draft decision.

Mr. STIKKER

Thank you. Mr. Maudling.

Mr. MAUDLING

I think the Council will recall, Mr. Chairman, last year I said that our position is that we would be happy to participate in the defence support programme for Greece, but there are some matters that have to be settled between Greece and the United Kingdom first. Those matters have not been finally settled, though I am confident that they soon will be. When we have settled that problem we will, I can confirm, be glad to participate, to an appropriately modest degree, in the 1963 and 1964 defence support arrangements.

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Mr. STIKKER

Thank you very much, M. Couve de Murville.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE

M. le Président, la délégation française apporte son accord au projet de résolution qui est maintenant en discussion et dont M. le Représentant de la Grèce a exposé les grandes lignes et les motifs. Et en donnant cet accord, je voudrais ajouter que le gouvernement français est disposé à se joindre aux gouvernements qui prévoient de fournir une aide à la Grèce pour sa défense pour 1964, dans le cadre des programmes actuellement approuvés par l'OTAN. Le montant et les modalités de cette participation feront l'objet de négociations bilatérales entre les autorités helléniques et les autorités françaises.

Merci.

Mr. STIKKER

Are there any other governments who wish to express an opinion ? Canada.

Mr. MARTIN

Mr. Chairman, Canada has been glad to provide aid in support of the Greek defence effort in the past. This year in the context of the special programme in support of the Greek defence budget, my Government was able to give assistance in the amount of \$ 1 million in commodity aid, in addition to continuing the mutual aid programme. We are fully aware of the difficulties which the Greek Authorities face and we are anxious to continue to do whatever we can, within the limits of Canadian possibilities, to contribute to a common NATO effort to deal with this problem. I am sure that my colleague from Greece will appreciate that it may be too early just now to say what might be possible for us to do in 1964, but I can assure my colleague that any request that his Government may put forward for commodity aid in 1964 will be given sympathetic consideration.

Mr. STIKKER

Thank you. Luxembourg? Italy.

M. ALESSANDRINI

Pardon. La délégation italienne confirme ce qu'elle a déjà communiqué à propos de l'aide à la Grèce; elle s'en tiendra aux communications qu'elle a déjà faites à ce sujet.

Mr. STIKKER

Délégation du Luxembourg.

M. SCHAUS

La délégation luxembourgeoise donne son accord au projet de décision qui nous est soumis et, au nom du gouvernement luxembourgeois, je déclare que le gouvernement luxembourgeois participera au programme d'action en faveur de la Grèce dans les mêmes conditions que celles de 1963 et pour le même montant.

Mr. STIKKER

Mr. Rusk.

Mr. RUSK

I am glad to say Mr. Chairman the United States supports the resolution and will be a member of the party, when the party assembles.

Mr. STIKKER

Are there any other statements?

No other speakers at the present moment?

If there are no other speakers at the present moment - naturally this problem will be discussed again - but I would like to say at the present moment that we have heard very encouraging statements. On the one hand Mr. Mavros, Greek Minister for Co-ordination, announced that his country, under certain circumstances, would increase her financial contribution to defence in 1964, and if these circumstances should arise, I understood this increase might be roughly of the same order of magnitude perhaps as the extra effort made by Greece in 1963. On the other hand, several Ministers have declared their willingness to extend defence assistance, to join this party, and I hope that when we go on with our discussions that some others may also join them.

The Permanent Council and the Secretary General will certainly actively pursue the matter, with a view to allowing Greece to maintain her military contribution to the common defence at the necessary level. If there is, as expressed here today by several Ministers, agreement on this, may I then suggest that the Council conclude this discussion by taking the decision, of which I have seen a draft already before you, and on which some of the members of the Alliance have already made their comments. Can we agree to accept this draft decision? All right, there are no other comments then, Mr. Mavros.

Mr. MAVROS

Mr. Chairman. May I be permitted to express the appreciation of our Delegation for the response the NATO countries, of whose delegates have already spoken, have taken on this Greek aim for the defence scheme programme for 1964. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

III. CO-OPERATION IN RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Mr. STIKKER

Well, Gentlemen. This is then decided and we will continue our efforts together with the Greek Delegation in the Council.

Then we might turn now to Item III of the Agenda, that is the problem of co-operation in research, development and production, and, this Item appears on our Agenda as a direct result of the December Ministerial Meeting last year, which invited the Council in Permanent Session to submit a report to a meeting of Defence Ministers in December 1963 on the results obtained in the light of decisions they had taken with a view to giving a new impulse to co-operation in research, development and production of armaments.

As a matter of fact, we have two documents before us today: the Report by the Council in Permanent Session, with Annexes, and my report on action which I have taken in respect of one particular decision which was addressed to me.

Now the first report, C-M(63)124, singles out certain features in the implementation of the 1962 decisions, to demonstrate the existence among countries of this will to co-operate and the most important of these is the creation and the first meetings of the Army and Air Force Advisory Groups, following the pattern of the old NATO Naval Steering Group, which is now also entitled "Advisory Group". Now, other features cited are the submission of some limited projects for common action resulting from individual national or bilateral studies and certain improvements in methods of work.

Now all of this, I acknowledge, is excellent as far as it goes. Nevertheless, when I consider that the present programme for the implementation of co-operative projects was launched at a Ministerial Meeting in Spring 1960, I do not believe that progress in 1963 was as satisfactory as it should have been. Out of the original twenty projects, progress has been in some cases disappointing and with the time required for development and production of complex equipment, I must confess that I see little chance of having a significant number of new NATO weapons in the hands of forces by 1970-1975. And it is against this background that I felt it my duty to write my report in a way that you see before you in document C-M(63)125.

And to sum up, I believe that, insofar as the will to co-operate has improved, so far this has been translated mainly into general terms and I see as yet little evidence of that will continuing when the critical stage is reached, where nations are called upon to abandon national plans and to commit national resources to international products.

Mr. STIKKER (Contd)

It is true that the machinery to deal with these problems has increased very substantially and therefore I earnestly hope that in the coming year these increased efforts will show increasing results.

May I ask Ministers if they would like to comment on these two papers?

M. SEGERS

M. le Président, lorsque nous nous étions réunis il y a un an pour examiner le rapport du Groupe ad hoc de Haut niveau, nous avons unanimement reconnu la nécessité de cette volonté de coopération accrue, et nous avons en conséquence adopté une résolution et pris certaines décisions dont nous avons souligné à ce moment qu'il ne fallait pas exagérer immédiatement l'importance, mais que nous considérons comme un pas en avant d'une étape intermédiaire, même sur une base limitée. Et en toute objectivité, je pense Messieurs, qu'en 1963 et sans atteindre un résultat spectaculaire, nous avons tout de même progressé dans la bonne direction ; **en effet**, l'examen du rapport indique clairement d'ailleurs que d'une part plusieurs projets nationaux ou bilatéraux ont été ouverts à la participation des autres pays, et que d'autre part les groupes consultatifs des trois forces ont entrepris la confrontation de certains programmes nationaux de recherche.

Je crois que nous devons rendre hommage tout de même à ceux de nos partenaires qui ont ouvert leur projet à la coopération de tous, et qui, dès lors, nous ont permis et nous permettront, je l'espère, de passer des bonnes intentions aux réalisations concrètes ; en tout cas, dans mon pays, nous nous sommes associés à un projet OTAN de recherche et de mise au point que nous jugeons particulièrement intéressant et nous étudions pour le moment d'autres projets qui sont examinés par nos services en vue d'une éventuelle participation belge. Nous nous efforçons actuellement de trouver les moyens d'accroître l'ampleur de notre participation aux projets futurs, notamment par la mise en place de moyens financiers indispensables, ce qui est vraiment nécessaire pour réaliser les vœux qui ont été indiqués l'année précédente.

Mr. STIKKER

Are there any other statements to make? If not, we will take note of these documents and the statement just made by the Minister of Defence for Belgium. Then it's so decided.

IV. CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

Mr. STIKKER

That brings us to Item IV of the Agenda. We are making good progress. Civil Emergency Planning.

Ministers first directed their attention to Civil Emergency Planning at our meeting in Oslo in May 1961 and their interest in this matter has proved of great importance and assistance to those concerned with such planning, both nationally and internationally. Effective Civil Emergency Planning provides the only practical means by which our populations could hope to survive a nuclear attack and the Allied war effort be sustained to a successful conclusion. Such plans indeed form an essential complement to our military defence effort.

Ministers have before them this afternoon a concise report by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee - a report which summarises the present state of progress in this field, both nationally and internationally. The report shows that while there is an increased effort on the part of many member countries, progress is uneven and in many fields inadequate. The report refers to six specific aspects of civil emergency planning where greater efforts are regarded as essential. The Council in Permanent Session has noted this report and endorsed its general recommendation. The background document (document C-M(63)88(Revised)) is referred to on your Agenda and contains analyses of individual countries' efforts, together with recommendations addressed to each, as to the future action which it is hoped they may feel able to take in the more important fields.

Now, may I ask again if there are Ministers who would like to comment - the only thing Ministers are asked to do is to note the concise report C-M(63)87. Are there any comments? No comments. Then we have decided to note this report.

I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Contd)⁽¹⁾

Well, Gentlemen, may we start our discussions again and go back to the first item of the Agenda, the review of the international situation that we did not completely finish yesterday? I have been informed since yesterday that there are no other speakers, and so I can straight away make an effort to sum up very briefly what was said yesterday in the Council. I would like to do it in the following way. When I spoke to the Press on the eve of our Ministerial Session, I expressed a view that our meeting would most probably be one of reflection and of consolidation, and during our debate here in this room on the international situation I think that was largely true.

(1) See also C-VR(63)74

Mr. STIKKER (Contd)

It was not only a meeting of reflection and consolidation. We also had quite an important exchange of views of different opinions and an exchange of valuable information. Now I think it was towards the end of the session yesterday afternoon that a well-known divergence - well-known when we meet here in the Council on a permanent level - on the analysis of the East-West situation and on the future course of the Alliance emerged again. And yet, when we look more closely at the diverging appraisals we have heard, I ask myself is there really a wide gap in our approach to what can be done? Now if the appraisals were divergent, it was above all in the sense that, again, some emphasised the advantage of seeking what several Ministers have called peripheral agreements, collateral agreements, while others underlined the risks that may exist for some of our vital interests.

Now no-one yesterday was opposed to the continuation of some contacts, for example, in Geneva, bilaterally, trilaterally; nobody was opposed to such contacts with the Soviets, although those who are going to have these contacts do so, and I am sure that everybody agrees to that, on their own mandate. Furthermore, yesterday we heard quite a number of very eloquent pleas for an intensification of these contacts and for, as Mr. Spaak, I think expressed it, an untiring exploration, and, in this connection, a number of ideas with which we are all familiar have again been put forward. Now it is quite clear that these ideas cannot be advanced without contacts with the other side, and I believe there will be a variety of contacts and we will hear from those who have them.

Many here will study and weigh their reports and make full use of our now well-established procedures of consultation in the Council and in its Committees. I do not believe that there is any need for me to list all the ideas once again. Let me, however, select only one. It seems to me of some particular importance, and I refer to the question of observation posts. You know - and Mr. Spaak referred to this - the stage which our discussions in the Council have reached, and you know also that what the Council needs at the present moment is technical advice.

In a way, there is a sort of deadlock. Military authorities say: "We cannot proceed without political guidance", while here in our technical missions in the Council we say, "Well, we must have military advice". In some way we should try and get out of this. Now this being so, I would like to express the hope, and I'd like to emphasise that if all Ministers and certainly those who are so keenly interested in the development of a system of observation posts, and naturally all other Ministers, would strengthen their representation in the Committee of Political Advisers by sending civilian and military experts from capitals for an open-ended exercise, it would help us out of this deadlock in which we find ourselves at the present moment. In this way, I believe we can make progress which, in the end, perhaps would allow us to arrive at a conclusion. I need hardly add that, unless we do this, our contribution to the talks which will open next month in Geneva will be too late.

Mr. STIKKER (Contd)

Perhaps you will allow me to say that, personally, I attach great importance to continued contacts with the Soviets. As one of the Ministers said, we certainly do not want to revert to cold war methods. We all seem to agree that interesting developments and changes are going on inside the society of the Soviet Union and its Satellites. In this context, we have noted Mr. Rusk's suggestion that we exchange information in detail on developments in Eastern Europe and, in particular, on the way in which we might improve bilateral relations with the countries in this area. If my memory is right, I think this is also one of the problems that are on the Agenda of APAG to be examined more from the long-term point of view, but I believe that it might be important for us to try and look at these matters also, as a problem of more urgent importance here in the Council or in the Committee of Political Advisers.

Now, amongst suggestions made by other Ministers, I think I might mention the Greek Foreign Minister's proposal to hold a NATO Council meeting at Heads of Government level and I think the Italian Foreign Minister proposed that we might have perhaps, in the future, three Ministerial meetings a year. The Icelandic Foreign Minister made a plea for increased economic co-operation within NATO, particularly with respect to the smaller NATO members. The Turkish Foreign Minister made a proposal for further study of the relations to be developed with Iraq and Syria, and the United States Secretary of State expressed the hope that NATO would look into the Cuban problem and consider what members can do in that situation.

Now, I am sure that the Council in Permanent Session will come back to all these suggestions, particularly so to the economic problems as mentioned in document C-M(63)129, which was point (7) under Item I of the Agenda and on which several of the Ministers gave their opinion. I think that, as far as the Greek request with regard to the south-eastern flank of the Alliance is concerned, we already discussed and already reached a conclusion on this problem during this morning's session, which was devoted to military questions.

Now, finally, the common theme of all discussions was the continued need for unity, for solidarity and strength in our Alliance. I think that everybody will agree that we have always had these three - unity, solidarity and strength - in times of tension and in times of crisis. But in times of relative calm and especially so when there are difficult problems to be solved - and we have some very difficult problems to solve - I think the Alliance needs patience and it needs that spirit of mutual respect and forbearance which was mentioned yesterday by Mr. Butler.

Mr. STIKKER (Contd)

Therefore, to sum up, we must - and I again quote Mr. Butler - we have to make use of diplomatic boathooks to avoid collision within the Alliance and, above all, we must not drift lazily down the stream. I think that today we must have a sense of urgency and united purpose and if, in that same sense, all the Ministers could help us out of that deadlock on the observation posts, I think it would be possible to make more progress in our discussions. That is all I can say to sum up, because I do not wish to go into all the problems that have been raised. I have nothing more to add to them.

Can this be considered to be the first summing up? There are no comments? Can we, then, go back to the problem of "Any other business"? Are there any questions to be raised under Item V - "Any other business"? No questions under "Any other business"? Then we have Item VI. At every December meeting a decision has to be taken on the date and place of the next Ministerial Meeting. Mr. Luns.

VI. DATE AND PLACE OF NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING

Mr. LUNS

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Netherlands Government, it is my pleasure, and, I may add, my honour to extend a formal invitation to this Council to hold its coming Spring meeting in The Hague, Holland. If it is convenient to my colleagues, should this invitation be accepted, I would suggest 12th, 13th and 14th May as dates for the meeting. That means that we would convene in the week preceding Whitsun. I express the hope that it will be possible for my colleagues and for the Permanent Representatives and their able staffs to stay on a little after the meeting in order to see something of the Netherlands.

Mr. STIKKER

Now, Gentlemen, I think we are all grateful for this invitation. Certainly, I personally am and may I suggest that we express our gratitude for this invitation to Mr. Luns and that we accept it? Are we all agreed?

Mr. RUSK

May I, as the Temporary President, express both our gratitude and our great enthusiasm about this prospect. We look forward to it very much indeed.

Mr. STIKKER

Now, Gentlemen, the draft communiqué is not yet here, so we are far ahead of time. Shall we reassemble at a quarter past five, then there may be a chance that we shall have the draft communiqué before us. Quarter past five.

VII. PRESS COMMUNIQUE

△The Council then discussed the draft of a press communiqué which was subsequently released to the press under reference M2(63)3.7

Mr. STIKKER

Well, Gentlemen, that is now agreed and that brings us to the end of our discussions. Now there is only one remark and I should have thought perhaps about it earlier, but I think I should not close this meeting without expressing - and I am sure that I speak for all of you - our heartfelt thanks for the message from President Johnson which Mr. Rusk conveyed to us.

And that brings an end to this meeting.