



ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT MEETING

ENQUIRY IN THE NATO COUNTRIES ON EAST/WEST CONTACTS
AND EXCHANGES

Reply by the Federal Republic of Germany

I am forwarding herewith the text of the reply by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the questions set out in document PO/60/30 on East/West contacts and exchanges.

(Signed) P.-H. SPAAK

10th February, 1960

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGReply by the German Delegation to NATO document PO/60/30

A.

General Questions

I.

Introduction

During the forthcoming Summit Meeting there will probably be very little time to deal with the agenda item "East/West relations". Consequently, the West will have to work out certain basic requirements and present them in a manner impressing the world public and advocating the principles of a democratic way of life.

In any case, the Heads of Government will not be in a position to decide on more than certain basic principles; it will have to be a matter for bilateral negotiations to give substance to the framework of basic principles and to implement their underlining ideas by concrete agreements.

These comments should therefore only be regarded as a preparatory review of the experience hitherto gained in the field of East/West contacts; the question as to what form should be given to the western proposals at a conference of Heads of Government will have to be solved in later discussions.

II.

Contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany

Within the general framework of East/West relations the contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany are of a special nature insofar as these contacts do not take place between different states and their inhabitants but rather between the forcibly divided parts of one and the same nation. Although, therefore, these relations are sui generis, a description of these contacts should be of value in

the present context, as the contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet occupied Zone - which forms part of the Soviet bloc - furnish certain indications of the general attitude of the Soviet bloc in regard to the question of East/West contacts. In order to achieve greater clarity of presentation this statement has not been included in the comments as such, but has been added to them as an annex. As a conclusion to be drawn from the description of the relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet-occupied Zone the following may be stated:

The rulers in the Soviet-occupied Zone consider any contacts with the Federal Republic exclusively in their political significance. Human contacts are manipulated in a manner which - under purely political aspects - is to cut off the population of the Soviet Zone as far as possible from its relations with the West, while certain channels are being kept open for the purpose of communist infiltration of the Federal Republic. As far as administrative contacts are concerned, the Zonal régime is not interested in the practical solution of concrete questions but only in achieving that these questions are dealt with at as high a level as possible in order to deduce from this the recognition of the Soviet Zonal claim for independence as a state. This attitude of the Soviet Zone allows certain conclusions as to the general policy of the Soviet bloc in the field of East/West contacts: these contacts are not sought after on the basis of a genuine requirement for human understanding and a peaceful spiritual contest but are invariably subject to political considerations.

Nevertheless, the Federal Government will, for reasons of humanity, continue to do everything in its power to maintain and to strengthen internal German contacts. In spite of the danger that the zonal rulers may attempt to exploit internal German contacts for the purpose of communist infiltration of the Federal Republic, the Federal Government is not reluctant to strengthen these contacts further. In doing so, it is fully aware of the limitations on the effects of all-German contacts: these contacts can, it is true, keep awake the yearning of the Soviet Zone population for freedom, but they cannot undermine the position of the régime, which is not supported by the free will of the population but exclusively by the ability to buttress its claim for power with the aid of Soviet force.

III.

Contacts with the Soviet Union and the Satellite States

1. Special problems resulting from East/West exchanges:
 - (a) Soviet Union

The cultural contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union have been given a contractual

basis by the conclusion of an agreement on cultural and technico-economic exchanges on 30th May, 1959.

Commercial relations are based on the trade agreement of 25th April, 1958, which runs for three years and under which lists of goods are negotiated every year.

The Federal Government has been induced to sign the cultural convention because it wanted to bring Soviet activity in the cultural field under control and at the same time ensure the possibility to be active in the Soviet Union as well. The implementation of the Cultural Convention so far has not met with any serious obstacles. The experience gained in questions of detail is dealt with under the comments in reply to question 5 in part B.

Trade with the Soviet Union is developing satisfactorily. The main problem is that, owing to the policy of strict bilateralism pursued by the Soviet Union, an increase of Soviet imports from the Federal Republic is meeting with difficulties because the goods offered by the Soviet Union in return are in many cases unsaleable in the Federal Republic because of their nature or quality.

(b) Satellite States

Cultural exchanges with the satellite states are not covered by intergovernmental agreements. As far as Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia are concerned, there are hardly any cultural contacts worth mentioning. Cultural exchanges with Poland are taking place more extensively on a private basis. However, the Federal Government is not in possession of detailed progress reports.

Trade with the satellite states is based on lists of goods running generally for one year; commercial exchanges are taking place satisfactorily and without major problems.

2. In the light of present experience the following juxtaposition of the interests pursued by East and West respectively, can be furnished:

Generally speaking, the East is only interested in contacts insofar as they furnish political, economic or technical advantages or open up possibilities for propaganda activities in the West. The Soviet bloc is placing its main emphasis on widening its technical horizon, which it is trying to achieve by sending specialists to study at western scientific institutions, by visiting western industrial facilities and by studying scientific and technical literature published in the West.

On the other hand, the East is keenly interested in "exporting" its cultural achievements, which are systematically exploited in order to present to the western public a non-ideological picture of the average communist and to prove that the people of the Soviet bloc are cultured, creative and amiable fellows.

The Soviet bloc does not appear to be interested in large-scale cultural exchanges without strings, as it is afraid of infiltration with western thinking.

In the commercial field the Soviet bloc's chief interest is to bring about the early elimination of discriminatory restrictions. Countries of the Soviet bloc are trying to find new outlets for their products in order to be able in this manner to increase their imports in order to speed up their economic development programme.

As opposed to this, the interest of the West should be to give the people of the Soviet bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, a true picture of the free world and its spiritual attitude. This could be achieved if the West familiarised as large groups of people of the Soviet bloc as possible with western fiction, economic, philosophical and historical literature and displayed modern artistic forms of expression directed against any kind of ideological complacency and inviting criticism. In the technological field, too, the West should act in the spirit of mental cross-fertilisation without enabling the Soviet bloc to carry out industrial espionage.

3. The West should not be afraid of any intensification of cultural exchanges with Soviet bloc countries as it is to be hoped that these exchanges will, in the long run, prove beneficial to the aims and objects of the West, if carried out in the framework of bilateral arrangements which make it more difficult for the Soviet bloc to carry on independent propaganda actions.

Consequently, during the Summit Meeting the West could, in general language, suggest an intensification of cultural exchanges, insisting at the same time that in the implementation of these exchanges the principle of reciprocity and of equal chances for either side should be observed. This could be amplified by certain basic proposals dealing with specific questions in which the Soviets obstinately refuse to grant free exchanges.

On the other hand, it would not appear advisable that the West take the initiative to intensify trade relations between East and West as the greater interest in changing the present situation lies with the East (for detailed statements see B, paragraph 7). However, the West should already now try to find arguments to use against the Soviets if they should - by making reference to the present relaxation of tension - demand the abolition of the embargo lists and the elimination of the restrictions existing for strategic goods.

B.

Replies to the specific questions of the Secretary General1. Non-interference in domestic affairs

The Federal Republic is a favourite target for aggressive Soviet radio propaganda. The Soviet-occupied Zone also continuously and actively interferes in the domestic affairs of the Federal Republic: Soviet-Zonal broadcasting stations are engaged in a systematic campaign against the Federal Republic; approximately one million communist propaganda pamphlets per month are sent to the Federal Republic by mail. Nevertheless, it would not appear indicated to demand that the East discontinue these actions by way of mutual obligation, since an agreement of this kind would only interfere with western propaganda activities vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc without there being any real prospect of the East changing its policy too.

Moreover, the Soviets are always in a position to make use of the communist parties to practice interference, infiltration and subversion without encroaching upon the sphere that can be covered by international treaties.

The demand for non-interference in domestic affairs should, therefore, only be expressed by the West in the form of limited partial proposals (e.g. deliveries of weapons to third states); in the formulation of details the West should take care to avoid any commitments having a unilateral effect and should not deprive itself of the possibility to have access to the population of the Soviet Union and particularly the satellite states. It should also be considered if, in accepting the principle of non-interference, the West would not, by implication, express recognition of the present status quo.

2. Official contacts

In the present experience the propaganda effect of all official East/West contacts (visits of political leaders and of parliamentary delegations) has been in favour of the Soviet bloc. The visits of Soviet leaders to western countries have contributed to making the Soviet régime more acceptable in the eyes of the western public and to strengthening the impression on western public opinion that "the communists aren't so bad after all". A similar result could be observed after the visits of western government representatives and parliamentarians to countries of the Soviet bloc; moreover, these visits are bound to create the impression among the population of the satellite states that the legality of the communist régimes is recognised by the West, and that the West is prepared to negotiate with them on an equal footing.

Therefore, the West should not propose any intensification of official contacts, particularly since it is to be expected that this question will be emphasised by the Soviet side. The West should rather make proposals to encourage non-official exchange visits (see paragraphs 5 and 6).

This applies particularly to the satellite states (especially Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia), as the rulers in those countries are considered by a large part of the population as dictators; the resistance of the non-communist populations would be weakened by any encouragement of official contacts.

3. Freedom of movement for persons

In view of the restrictions imposed on western foreigners and even western diplomats and journalists in the Soviet Union, the West should insist that the restrictions on the freedom of movement for foreigners be abolished. At any rate, however, the West should remind the Soviets of the existing inequality of the rights of foreigners in the Soviet Union and in western countries and should require the Soviets to prove the sincerity of their aims by eliminating gradually the existing restrictions on the freedom of movement for persons and by reducing the large-sized areas which are at present "off limits". In this connection, the West should also demand the elimination of the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the members of foreign diplomatic missions and foreign journalists in the Soviet Union.

4. Freedom of information

The removal of the obstacles existing in the field of exchange of information and ideas is one of the neuralgic problems of the Soviet Union. This problem, which contains a number of very important aspects, should therefore be raised by the West most energetically. In doing so the West should point out that mistrust and misconceptions concerning the other side can best be overcome by granting free access to all sources of information. The discontinuation of the Soviet policy of obstruction in this field should be considered by the West as a test case for the sincerity of Soviet intentions in carrying out East/West exchanges. The West should pursue this point with great energy because the populations of the Soviet Union and of the satellite states feel a great need for information concerning the West.

Therefore, the West should, on the one hand, raise the fundamental demand for the removal of the obstacles to an exchange of ideas and information and should, on the other, make a number of concrete proposals. The emphasis should be spread approximately in the following order of priorities:

(a) Abolition of Censorship

Although it is almost certain that the Soviets will not give up censorship, the West should not desist from demanding it, if only to place the Soviets under a certain degree of moral pressure.

(b) Cessation of the jamming of news and information broadcasts

Although in this field, too, Soviet concessions appear unlikely the West should make this demand and should, in return, be prepared to accept that western countries are inundated with Soviet propaganda broadcasts.

(c) Removal of the restrictions on foreign journalists, particularly of censorship of their foreign telegrams

This is another field where major concessions are not to be expected from the Soviets. However, the West should point out the existing restrictions and lay stress on their being removed.

(d) Distribution and sale of foreign books, newspapers, and periodicals

The West should demand the creation of possibilities for the unhindered public distribution and sale of foreign books, newspapers, and periodicals, even though it is unlikely that western demands in this respect will be entertained. Experience has shown that in this field the Soviets invariably uphold certain fictions, for example, that the Soviet population does not want to buy foreign books but prefers to read them in public libraries, that they are only interested in certain foreign newspapers, and that they do not wish to subscribe to them but look at them in reading rooms, etc. Nevertheless, the West should emphasise its corresponding proposals.

(e) Intensification of the exchange of books, newspapers and periodicals

There may be certain prospects for Soviet concessions in this field. The West should therefore try, by way of exchange, to introduce philosophical literature and fiction into the Soviet Union, whose main interest still is in being informed in the field of science.

(f) Creation of reading rooms and information centres

Present experience shows that the Soviets obstruct western demands for the establishment of reading rooms and information centres by creating considerable

administrative difficulties. However, this demand should be maintained by the West, who should at the same time try to obtain guarantees for the free use of these facilities.

5. Cultural and artistic exchanges

The experience gained by the Federal Government confines itself to exchanges with the Soviet Union, which have been covered by the conclusion of an agreement on cultural and technico-economic exchanges signed on 30th May, 1959. Cultural exchanges with the satellite countries have up to now taken place on a private basis, without attaining any great scope. The experience of the Federal Government in the implementation of the German-Soviet Agreement may be summed up as follows:

- (a) Originally, cultural exchanges have been suggested by the Soviet Union apparently on the assumption that they would bring advantages to the Soviet Union only. Meanwhile, however, the Soviets seem to be somewhat concerned that too frequent cultural exchanges might involve the danger of spiritual infiltration by the West. Consequently, they are displaying a tendency to delay cultural exchanges. From the very beginning the Soviet side had put the emphasis on scientific subjects. In the majority of cases, the Soviets approve visits of representatives of German cultural life and delay decisions on the application of persons representing natural science. On the other hand, the Soviets try to obtain "experience" in the technical and scientific field outside of the Agreement, which provides for a centrally controlled and strictly reciprocal exchange. In the light of the comparatively short experience with this Agreement the Federal Government is inclined to feel that the greater interest in German-Soviet cultural exchanges lies with the West, provided that the cultural agreement makes it difficult for the Soviets to operate independently in the field of propaganda. The fact that audiences in the Federal Republic are confronted with Soviet cultural achievements does not at present appear too dangerous. After the initial curiosity has been satisfied, the western public will automatically acquire a habit of evaluating Soviet displays with more critical eyes; it is also possible that a comparison between national and Soviet achievements will have a stimulating effect.

In the present situation it should be difficult for the West to object to the possibilities for exchange opened up by the East, as the West had for many years accused the East of refusing, for very transparent reasons, to engage in cultural exchanges with the West.

- (b) (i) In the experience of the Federal Government the Soviet Union approaches the exchange of representatives of education and the fine arts with particular reluctance. The proposals made up to now in this field in accordance with the cultural convention have been given dilatory treatment. It is also noticeable that the Soviet Union seeks to avoid individual journeys of Soviet cultural personalities and only considers visits by delegations.

In its proposal the West should therefore place its main emphasis on suggesting individual journeys of Soviet personalities from cultural life, particularly in the field of education and the fine arts - possibly for long-term studies - and should especially encourage visits of painters, sculptors and writers, as the Soviets obviously show particular reluctance regarding visits of people of this kind.

- (ii) It has become obvious that the Soviets are strongly disinclined to make the Soviet public familiar with certain forms of artistic expression (jazz, abstract painting, and sculpture). The West should therefore attempt to commit the East to admit these modes of art.

- (iii) The Soviets are clearly particularly interested in sending to the West students and scholars of natural science. In doing so the Soviets apparently intend to collect experience which is to help them further to increase the lead they hold over the West in certain fields of technology. The West should frustrate this policy.

6. Exchanges in the fields of tourism and sport

(a) Sport

In the field of sport, exchanges with the Soviet Union have had a good start. However, the Soviets are apparently interested in an exchange only in those disciplines where they are superior and where they can expect victories and the propaganda effect resulting from them.

Although in the view of the Federal Government sport is far from being the best medium to make propaganda for the West in countries of the communist bloc, the West whose governments have at any rate only limited influence on exchanges in the field of sport probably cannot do but advocate an encouragement of these exchanges. However, western proposals in this field could be in rather general terms.

(b) Tourism

The promotion of tourist exchanges with the Soviet Union is problematic because travellers from the Federal Republic to the Soviet Union are real tourists and in many cases owing to their naive and uninformed reactions to conditions in the Soviet Union fall victim to the propaganda efforts of Soviet Agencies while the Soviets generally send delegations of specialists who mostly have special economic, technical or propaganda missions; according to German investigations the emphasis is placed on scientific and technical "reconnaissance".

Although it is not to be expected that the Soviets will change their interpretation of the word "tourism" the West should insist on an encouragement of tourism and should concentrate its efforts on the removal of obstacles to free travel, particularly individual trips of bona fide tourists in both directions.

7. Economic relations

- (a) In the view of the Federal Government it would not be wise for the West to take the initiative for a discussion of economic relations at a forthcoming Summit Meeting, as the greater interest in changing the present situation lies with the Communist bloc.

The strengthening of economic contacts with the West is an important aspect of Soviet policy. Present experience seems to indicate that the Soviet side will demand the liberalisation of western exports and imports as well as payments procedures in relation to the communist bloc. These demands will in all probability concern the following points:

- (i) the dissolution of the economic organizations and the termination of the technical agreements on which western European economic co-operation is based (e.g. EEC, EURATOM, etc.) and the establishment of joint organizations with eastern and western participation;
- (ii) The complete abolition of embargo restrictions;
- (iii) The extension of most favoured nation treatment to all import and export quotas;
- (iv) The Soviets will try to generalise, and to obtain confirmation, in principle, of any concessions or advantages which they have occasionally been able to obtain in their economic relations with individual western countries;

- (v) Eligibility of Soviet countries for government guaranteed export credit insurance facilities;
- (vi) Approval for western exporters to grant medium and long-term credits to government controlled banks and foreign trade organizations in communist countries.
- (b) In view of the probable Soviet initiative in the field of economic relations between East and West, the West should be prepared for a discussion of economic questions, particularly as far as trade between East and West is concerned. However, before this problem is accepted as an item for the agenda, the Soviets should be referred to the ECOSOC meeting scheduled to take place from 7th July to 6th August, 1960, where economic relations between East and West are to be dealt with.
- (c) In the opinion of the Federal Government the proposals set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of document C-M(58)93 can still be regarded as valid. No progress has been made in respect of the points listed in paragraph 6.
- (d) The following further suggestions should be made by the West:
 - (i) The introduction of a multilateral payments and clearing system for foreign trade and the exchange of services between East and West;
 - (ii) The granting of global import quotas giving greater consideration to the import of consumer goods into the Soviet bloc, a wider range of offers of interesting export goods, and delivery contracts with long-term guarantees for the export of these goods from communist countries;
 - (iii) The granting of the right of settlement to western industrial and commercial enterprises including full freedom of action and unhindered advertising in communist countries (as equivalent for the rights of eastern trade missions in western countries);
 - (iv) The easing of business trips to communist countries by the introduction of a realistic rate of exchange and a more liberal granting of entry visas for this purpose;
 - (v) Recognition of the internationally accepted specialised arbitration procedures, as well as uniform terms of delivery and acceptance, by the eastern partners;
 - (vi) Adoption of uniform transit facilities for the civilian transport of persons and goods by land, by sea, and by air.

8. Financial problems

- (a) An important obstacle to East/West trade results from the bilateral clearing system, which compels the western countries to buy undesirable or low quality goods even at unfavourable prices and terms in order to enable western exports to the Soviet bloc to continue.
- (b) There are at present no major problems involved in the performance of German payments agreements with the Soviet bloc.
- (c) The opening of credits has up to now only been requested by the Soviet bloc through the medium of interested firms. No such requests have been addressed to the Federal Republic through official channels. The financial performance of contracts has generally not met with any difficulties.
- (d) The views expressed in document C-M(59)75 are still valid. Any considerable expansion of East/West trade on the basis of western credits would only delay the solution of the problem of increasing eastern deliveries of goods to counter-balance western exports. In such a situation the need to balance accounts might compel the West to accept undesirable commodities which might interfere with existing trade relations within the free world. Moreover, any credits granted to the Soviet bloc would be to the detriment of credit facilities for underdeveloped countries. Credits which in size and term exceed normal commercial practice could enable the Soviet bloc to exercise political pressure from a heavy debtor position.

CONTACTS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND
THE SOVIET-OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY

I.

Under the general heading of East/West relations the contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany are in a special category insofar as they do not take place between different states and their inhabitants but between the forcibly divided parts of one and the same nation. Although therefore, these relations are sui generis, their description should be worth-while in the present context as the contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone - which forms part of the Soviet bloc - furnish certain indications of the general attitude of the Soviet bloc in the question of East/West contacts. However, this statement cannot follow the questions asked by the Secretary General because these internal German contacts are characterised by certain peculiarities. These are primarily to be found in the artificial nature of the division of Germany as well as in the fact that the vast majority, i.e. approximately 90-95 per cent of the Soviet Zonal population, are anti-Communist and only the remaining very small minority consists of confirmed Communists.

The attitudes of the Federal Republic on the one hand and the Soviet Zonal regime on the other hand towards the problem of intra-German contacts are based on views and intentions which are diametrically opposed.

It is the aim of the Government and of the population of the Federal Republic to maintain and to strengthen the spiritual and human cohesion of the nation by fostering and intensifying the relations with that part of the German people living in the Soviet Zone, in all conceivable fields of personal contact, culture, science, and sport, to prevent the population of the Soviet Zone from resigning itself to submission to the Communist dictatorship, as well as to maintain as far as possible the principle of German legal unity by technical contacts and to solve the problems jointly affecting the administrations in both parts of Germany.

The intention of the Soviet Zonal regime, on the other hand, is to encourage or permit such contacts only insofar as they support the thesis that the Soviet Zone has developed into an independent state, or contribute to the strengthening of the social, economic and ideological structure of the Communist system in the Soviet Zone.

II.

(a) Human contacts

In the development of human contacts across the line of demarcation separating the Soviet Zone from the Federal Republic the year 1957 represents a break. Whereas originally the Soviet zone rulers considered that the encouragement of contacts within Germany would bring them advantages in striving for the extension of Communist influence to the territory of the Federal Republic they seem to have realised in 1957 that the far-reaching contacts between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone have only strengthened the feeling of unity in the minds of the German people and have conveyed to the people in the Soviet zone an idea of the free and democratic system in the Federal Republic. At any rate, in the autumn of 1957 the Soviet Zonal authorities suddenly introduced heavily restrictive measures of various kinds, as a result of which contacts in all fields considerably declined almost overnight.

(1) Exchange of persons

All traffic of persons is taking place only on four roads and six railways. The Soviet Zone has blocked altogether:

- 36 railway lines
- 3 Autobahnen
- 30 Federal highways
- 120 provincial highways as well as
thousands of public and private ways.

For visits to the Federal Republic inhabitants of the Soviet Zone require a special exit visa from their authorities which only grant for special compassionate reasons or, exceptionally, to participants of special congresses. Relatives of so-called "refugees from the Republic" are never given exit visas. Visitors from the Federal Republic must obtain residence permits from the local authorities of the Soviet Zone; these permits can only be obtained with difficulty and are only valid for a strictly specified location; during his stay the visitor is subject to strict police supervision. The authorities of the Federal Republic, on the other hand, are not creating any difficulties for visitors to or from the Soviet Zone; no special permits are required.

The throttling of the traffic of persons by the Soviet Zone regime in 1957 led to a reduction of traffic in both directions by approximately 75 per cent. It is interesting to note that as a result of these restrictions there has been a considerable increase in communications by letter, although the mails are also subject to strict controls on the Soviet Zonal side. The number of parcels sent from the Federal Republic to the Soviet Zone amounts to approximately 40 million per year.

(2) Contacts through organizations (Youth and womens' organizations, charitable and church organizations, etc)

In spite of these difficulties created by the Soviet Zone authorities numerous voluntary organizations in the Federal Republic are trying to promote contacts. Thus, from 1956 to mid-1959, numerous meetings were organized in which about one million people from the Soviet Zone took part. Since 1957, however, teachers, educationalists and students are almost invariably refused permission for such visits to the Federal Republic.

(3) Sport

While in 1956 and in 1957 more than 46,000 sportsmen from the Soviet Zone took part in 2,270 competitions in the Federal Republic, the number of Soviet zonal participants in the 780 joint events that took place in 1958 and the first six months of 1959 amounted to only about 14,000. There are no detailed figures on competitions organized in the Soviet Zone.

As is illustrated by the difficulties caused by the sport authorities of the Soviet Zone in connection with the formation of an all-German Olympic team, Pankow's only interest today is politically to abuse the relations between the two parts of Germany in the field of sport in order to reinforce Pankow's thesis of the alleged existence of two German states.

(4) Science and culture

In the field of science contacts continue, although with great variations from one discipline to another. From 1956 until mid-1959 about 18,000 scientists from the Soviet Zone took part in scientific events in the Federal Republic. Among them there were almost 12,000 doctors towards whom the Zonal authorities are somewhat more liberal in the granting of exit visas for visits to special congresses, particularly in view of the large number of doctors who fled from the Soviet Zone in 1957-1958. However, the SED carefully investigates whether the congress concerned is in the Communist interest or not.

As far as specialised meetings in the fields of industry, agriculture and the crafts are concerned, the number of participants from the Soviet Zone has strongly decreased since 1957.

Exchange performances of theatres, orchestras, etc. have for many years been numerically insignificant.

(5) Church affairs

The Evangelical and the Roman Catholic church are today the only organizations still embracing people from both parts of Germany. As a result of Pankow's growing efforts to emphasise the national independence of the Soviet Zone, the régime is interfering more and more in church affairs. In its day-to-day work the Roman Catholic church suffers from the fact that dioceses parts of which are situated in the Soviet Zone and where the bishop resides in the Federal Republic have practically been cut off as the Soviet Zonal authorities do not grant entry visas to the bishops. As far as the Evangelical church of Germany is concerned, Pankow's efforts are clearly directed at a division of the church.

Both churches have in recent years helped old, ill and needy people from the Soviet Zone to spend their holidays in the Federal Republic and have distributed large quantities of foodstuffs, medicaments, clothing and books to the Soviet Zone. However, the increasing suppression of church life in the Soviet Zone is rendering this work very difficult. To what extent internal German church contacts have declined is illustrated, for example, by the fact that for the German Evangelical church rally in August 1959 only 2,048 people from the Soviet Zone received permission to attend, while the church rally in 1956 could still be attended by approximately 22,000 people from the Soviet Zone.

- (6) In the field of human contacts in general, a special position is occupied by Berlin, which has become a kind of all-German meeting point. West Berlin, which can still be reached by people from the Soviet Zone relatively easily via East Berlin, is for millions of East Germans the only possibility to meet relatives and friends from the West and to keep informed of developments in the free part of Germany on the basis of the example of Berlin. However, visits to Berlin have also been rendered more difficult since the Soviet Zonal authorities have introduced stricter controls of travellers from the Soviet Zone to East Berlin and now require special permission for such visits.

(b) Administrative contacts

Many administrative and legal agencies of the Federal Republic still maintain official contacts with agencies of the Soviet Zone, in spite of considerable difficulties created by the latter. In the majority of cases these contacts take place

by correspondence. They can be found in almost all branches of the administration. These contacts mainly take place between authorities at the local and county level, in the Federal Republic primarily at the level of local authorities, while agencies of the central government play a less prominent role. Courts of law at all levels as well as the public prosecutors' offices maintain such contacts with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Zone.

Official contacts, although much smaller in scope, are also maintained by the intermediate levels of government administration (e.g. the Federal inland waterways directorates, various Federal post directorates and other federal agencies at the intermediate level) as well as by supreme Federal or Land authorities (Federal Statistical Office, Federal Office of Criminal Investigation) and agencies of public co-operations and institutions.

Special mention should be made of the following Supreme Federal Authorities, which partly maintain such contacts on a permanent basis:

- (1) The Bank Deutscher Länder communicates with the Deutsche Notenbank of the Soviet Zone in questions of internal German payments.
- (2) The Interzonal Trade Office carries on extensive negotiations on interzonal trade problems with the corresponding authorities of the Soviet Zone and concludes interzonal trade agreements with them.
- (3) The German Federal Railways are in touch with the Soviet Zonal Railways and the German Federal Post with its opposite number in the Soviet Zone in order to agree on questions of interzonal railway traffic and the exchange of mail.

In previous years the authorities of the Soviet Zone have again and again tried to raise these purely administrative contacts to a higher level. By exercising pressure, for example in the field of traffic through the Soviet Zone to Berlin, they attempted to compel the Federal Government to take part in negotiations at the government level and to conclude intergovernmental agreements in order to interpret them as a recognition of the Soviet Zone as a state. All these attempts have been frustrated by the Federal Government. The Federal Government is of the opinion that all pending questions can very well be solved at a lower level, provided that the will to solve them exists on the Soviet Zonal side; it therefore maintains that such administrative contacts should not take place at a policy-making level, in order to avoid any misinterpretation and any semblance of political recognition.

III.

The conclusions to be drawn from this description of internal German contacts may be summed up as follows:

For the rulers of the Soviet Zone these contacts with the Federal Republic are exclusively a political matter. Human contacts are manipulated in a manner which - under purely political aspects - serves the purpose of cutting off the Soviet Zonal population as far as possible from its relations with the West, while at the same time keeping certain channels open for the communist infiltration of the Federal Republic. As far as administrative contacts are concerned, the Zonal regime is less interested in the solution of practical questions but much more in raising these questions to as high a political level as possible in order to interpret this as recognition of the independence of the Soviet Zone as a state. This attitude of the Soviet Zone allows certain conclusions as to the general attitude of the Soviet bloc towards the problem of East/West contacts: these are not sought after on the basis of a genuine desire for human understanding and a spiritual contest, but are invariably subject to considerations of a political nature.

Nevertheless, the Federal Government will - for human reasons alone - do everything in its power to maintain and to strengthen internal German contacts. In spite of the danger that the rulers of the Soviet Zone might exploit internal German contacts for the purpose of communist infiltration of the Federal Republic, the Federal Government is not reluctant to promote such contacts. In doing so, it is fully aware of the limitations inherent in all-German contacts: while they may keep awake the yearning of the Soviet Zonal population for freedom, they cannot undermine the position of the regime, which is not supported by the free will of the population but only by its ability to maintain its claim for power with the aid of Soviet force.