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From: Secretary General

KARLOVY VARY CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES

In view of the significance of the Karlovy Vary Conference, I have had prepared the attached analysis of its "Declaration on European Peace and Security" issued on 26th April, and speeches by chief Communist spokesmen at the Conference.

2. The text of the "Declaration" has previously been distributed to Delegations as POLADS(67)20 of 3rd May, 1967.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

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Le document est en prêt et doit être
renvoyé au Bureau de Documentation
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KARLOVY VARY CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES

A. SIGNIFICANCE

1. Summary Assessment. The Karlovy Vary Declaration, issued on 26th April, 1967, is the most important Communist document since the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, on which its substance is largely based. It restates the common denominators of Communist policies in Europe. Like the Bucharest document, the Karlovy Vary scriptures will be variously interpreted by Communist régimes and parties whose interests are not everywhere identical. Nevertheless, its objectives are ambitious and accord well with Soviet policy aims. Whereas the Bucharest Declaration tended to express these objectives through circlocutions, the Karlovy Vary text states them boldly, almost harshly, and adds some important new points. It becomes clear that the Communist proposal for a Security Conference of European States will be increasingly used as a chief instrument to influence Western public opinion and Western governments to make use of 1969 to bring about an end to NATO. Not least significant is the degree of solidarity that the Pankow régime and Poland have obtained, to their great satisfaction, from the rest of the Warsaw Pact. As regards Karlovy Vary's importance for joint Communist action in Europe, BREZHNEV remarked that the meeting was the best answer to "bourgeois politicians who claim that Communists have retired to their national quarters".

2. "Peace" Movement Heralded. The Declaration goes far beyond Bucharest language in calling for a great movement on an all-European scale to attain its aims, foremost among which is an end to NATO. Unlike its predecessor, it calls specifically on non-Communist Western European groups - workers, socialists, Social Democrats, Christians, intellectuals, youth, women and "realistic bourgeoisie" - as well as Communists everywhere to support its programme by mass action. It clearly foreshadows an elaborate "popular" campaign to swing Western public opinion decisively against NATO and towards Communist "peace" initiatives. BREZHNEV's speech singled out the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and United States military installations in Europe as targets for eventual elimination.

3. An End to NATO. The Declaration specifically mentions 1969 as a target year, on which the Bucharest Declaration was silent: "Everything must be done for a wide movement of the peaceful forces of our continent against the renewal or any readaptation of the Atlantic Pact.....the approach of the year 1969, the end of the twenty years for which the Atlantic Pact was concluded, puts high on the agenda the possibility of a clear alternative: a Europe without military blocs". According to BREZHNEV, the idea that NATO might have a rôle in improving East-West relations was "absurd". He maintained that progress was faster when NATO members dealt individually with the East.

4. Security Conference of European States. Moreover, Communist timing becomes more visible. At Karlovy Vary, Belgian Communist Politbureau member Jean BLUME said the idea would be to "persuade statesmen of the European capitalist countries to express publicly their views on prolonging NATO a year or six months before this question (European security conference) is formally submitted to governments and parliaments" so as to "inform" public opinion. Possibly having in mind the NATO "Future Tasks of the Alliance" exercise, he said, "A few months, perhaps even a few weeks of delay could result in confronting us with NATO in a renewed form but as harmful as in the past".

5. The anti-NATO character of a pan-European security conference, obvious but implicit in the Bucharest Declaration, thus is now made explicit. The Karlovy Vary Declaration calls for "wide campaigns" and "mass action" to concentrate on bringing it about; ~~a new stage in softening up Western public opinion has clearly been reached.~~ The Soviets for the moment seem no more prepared than before to make concrete proposals for a conference to Western governments. BREZHNEV's call for a "conference of European peoples", for instance, implies that, at least in the Soviet view, the purpose of the conference is not to move constructively toward European détente, and that a Communist-front propaganda spectacle may be envisaged.

6. Karlovy Vary speeches, if not the Declaration's text, made it perfectly clear that the Pankow régime must attend any such meeting with a status equal to that of the Federal Republic.

7. Dissolution of Military Blocs. While this theme was again sounded in the Declaration, BREZHNEV, ZHIVKOV and others made it clear in their speeches that for the foreseeable future, whatever hurts NATO is good, whatever weakens the Eastern European unity is bad. GOMULKA and ULBRICHT seemed to have less enthusiasm for dismantling the military structures although they had subscribed to the idea at Bucharest.

8. Anti-Western European Unity Ploy. The Declaration approximated Bucharest language about the need to eliminate "artificially erected" barriers to economic co-operation in Europe, by which Eastern European governments mean Western economic integration. They are the more afraid of this development in the West as it meets with the keen interest of public opinion in their countries(1).

(1) Czech and Yugoslav officials, for instance, have made the same attack against European integration in academic East-West forums. On the other hand, the interest of the Eastern European public in the unification of Western Europe is testified to by the many questions addressed to the editors of the Communist newspapers. The volume of these queries is apparently such that the editors feel obliged to answer them in their editorials.

B. OTHER MAJOR POINTS

9. Parliamentarians' Meeting. The Declaration supports a meeting of the representatives of all European parliaments, a point not raised in the Bucharest text.

10. Other Treaty Proposals. The Declaration calls for, as the Bucharest document did not, a treaty between all European states to renounce the use of force, or any such threat, as well as interference in internal affairs, and to settle disputes peacefully. This idea apparently stems from a GOMULKA proposal at Karlovy Vary for a complex of multi-national pacts for mutual security and renunciation of force in settling problems, and would appear to be a more specific formulation of the vague "European security pact" which the Bucharest Declaration said would cap any security conference.

11. Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The Declaration, unlike the Bucharest text, observed that a non-dissemination treaty would be "an important step" in halting the arms race. For the first time the Declaration spelled out that the Federal Republic must renounce the "European" form of access to nuclear weapons as well as the "Atlantic" and "multilateral" options. The thrust of this demand has a significant bearing on NATO discussions on a non-proliferation treaty text.

12. Germany. The anti-Federal Republic tone of the Declaration was more pronounced and the substance of demands against the FRG more specific than at Bucharest. The usual calls were made for the FRG to recognise existing "frontiers", recognise the Pankow régime, renounce nuclear weapons in whatever form, renounce the right to represent all of Germany, and recognise the Munich Treaty as invalid.

13. Added, however, was a demand for "normalisation of relations" between West Berlin and Pankow. West Berlin was identified as a "separate political entity", thus formally blessing the "three-German-states" theory of the Soviet Zone.

14. Internal FRG Matters. Despite its emphasis on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the text makes it the business of the signatories to support measures for "democracy" inside the FRG, for the suppression of neo-Nazis, revanchist propaganda, and "exceptional laws" there, for the "liberty" of democrats and peace forces, and for the legalisation of the FRG Communist Party.

C. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

15. United States. A somewhat more virulent tone than that in the Bucharest text was taken as regards the United States, which is now labelled "the principal force of aggression and reaction". While blasting United States "aggression" and "interference" in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Declaration does not mention Vietnam.

16. World Communist Unity. BREZHNEV muted the Chinese question in his major speech, probably still hoping to persuade the Yugoslav and Rumanian parties to join the forthcoming anti-NATO campaign. The Declaration itself did not mention China, although the Soviets reportedly pursued the issue en coulisse.

17. It seems likely that the Soviets may have given up hope of further public progress on their world Communist conference project this year. The Declaration did not refer to it. While BREZHNEV invited those parties present to attend the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebration in November, there was no indication that a formal conference would be called on that occasion.

18. Warsaw Pact Treaties. Although the subject was not mentioned in the Declaration, KADAR and ZHIVKOV announced the intention of Hungary and Bulgaria to sign treaties with the Pankow régime.

~~19. Who participated? Twenty-four European Communist parties~~
were represented: those from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Switzerland, Soviet Union, Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany, West Berlin. An "observer" from the Swedish party attended. Thus, the project was able to attract only five unimpressive new participants since the drafting commission's meeting in February: the parties of Cyprus, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Luxembourg and San Marino. The leading black sheep - Yugoslavia and Rumania - stayed aloof once more, as did the Icelandic party, the seriously split Communist Parties of Norway and the Netherlands, as well as pro-Chinese Albanian Communist Party.