

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 603  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
26th March, 1969

NATO SECRET  
DOCUMENT  
C-M(69)16

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE: CONTINGENCY STUDIES

ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET THREAT IN EUROPE  
AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior Level

PART ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

In their Communiqué of 16th November Ministers referred to "grave uncertainty about the situation and about the calculations and intentions of the USSR".

2. Ministers said that this uncertainty was directly aroused by the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and they drew attention to two particular grounds for disquiet. In the first place, they said that "the use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there"(1) were the principal contributing features. Secondly, they also drew attention to the "doctrine" which has been used by Soviet leaders and apologists to justify intervention in Czechoslovakia and which indicates that "there exists a right of intervention in the affairs of other states deemed to be within a so-called 'Socialist commonwealth'".(2) Ministers pointed out that "the new uncertainties resulting from recent Soviet actions also extend to the Mediterranean basin".(3)

3. Taking these points in the Communiqué as its basis this paper surveys the potential threat to the Alliance in Europe and the Mediterranean in territory not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

II. THE SOVIET USE OF FORCE

4. The first need of the Alliance after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was to consider whether the Soviet Government had decided on this step merely in order to restore

- 
- (1) Final Communiqué of North Atlantic Council.  
16th November, 1968 (M(3)68(1) paragraph 3).  
(2) As above.  
(3) M(3)68(1) paragraph 5.

NATO SECRET

their control over Czechoslovakia or whether it was the first step in a new policy of expansion which might sweep on into other areas even outside the Warsaw Pact. In their report to Ministers entitled "The Political Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis" the Council expressed the view that the Soviet Government's "over-riding general motivation was a defensive concern about a process of erosion of the political, economic and military integrity of the Warsaw Pact and Socialist bloc"(1) but drew attention in strong terms to the new uncertainties of the situation.

5. In representations made to member Governments of the Alliance at the time of the invasion, Soviet representatives abroad repeatedly said that this was a matter which contained no threat to members of NATO and which was not aimed at any of them. Articles in the Soviet press claimed that it was simply intended to restore an order which had been set up as the direct result of the 1939/1945 war and which had been seriously threatened by imported and local counter-revolution. The Russians thus tried to give the impression that they were merely preserving the "status quo" and that this was the final aim of their policy in Europe provided that they could maintain their grip over the area of the Warsaw Pact.

6. On the other hand, members of NATO have had to take note of a number of disquieting features:

- (i) The ultimate Soviet objective of a world Communist order under Soviet hegemony has not been disavowed. "Peaceful co-existence" permits the pursuit of Soviet objectives by any expedient means short of direct Soviet involvement in war.
- (ii) The apparently successful use of force in Czechoslovakia could affect the quality of Soviet judgement and lead to increasingly rash decisions with unforeseeable consequences.
- (iii) Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was followed by distinctly threatening language against the Federal Republic of Germany, suggesting that the Soviet Government reserved the right to intervene in that country if it thought fit under its own interpretation of certain clauses of the United Nations Charter. There have also been indications (not consistently and so far not translated into action) of possible moves against Berlin.

---

(1) C-M(68)43(Final) paragraph 17.

- (iv) The increasing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, which has been a source of anxiety to NATO for some time, is directed to backing the spread of Soviet influence in the area and also reflects Soviet efforts to strengthen the general strategic position and political influence of the Soviet Union.

7. The Ministers at their meeting in November concluded that there was no immediate threat of the use of force by the Warsaw Pact against NATO territory. On the other hand, they were disturbed by the possibility that the Soviet Union might eventually be led to use force against certain countries in Europe which were not members of NATO. Three of these (Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania) are generally considered to be "Socialist countries" in the sense employed by the Soviet Government. It appeared therefore that they might well be threatened with military intervention in accordance with the "doctrine of intervention" referred to in paragraph 2 above. This doctrine is examined in the following section.

### III. THE 'INTERVENTION' DOCTRINE

8. The doctrine to which Ministers alluded in their Communiqué is not an innovation in Communist theory. But its enunciation in 1968, in the terms used, is definitely a new factor in the situation.

9. Soviet theory has for decades included the concepts of the Socialist 'camp', 'community' or 'Commonwealth', and has from time to time indicated that there are limits to the sovereignty of a Socialist state which must be (or indeed by Communist definition is) exercised in the context of the class struggle and in conformity with the common interests of the Socialist camp as they are interpreted in Moscow. This has of course consistently meant that a "Socialist" state must follow the Soviet line.

10. What the Soviet leaders have now said, more explicitly than ever before, is best given in their own public words, thus:

- (i) "The weakening of any of the links in the world Socialist system directly affects all the Socialist countries, which cannot look on indifferently when this happens."(1)

---

(1) Article in Pravda of 26th September by Kovalev.

"The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have on many occasions warned those who are tempted to try and roll back the Socialist Commonwealth, to snatch at least one link from it, that we will neither tolerate nor allow this to happen."(1)

- (ii) "When internal and external forces hostile to Socialism attempt to turn the development of any Socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of Socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the Socialist Commonwealth as a whole - it already becomes not only a problem for the people of that country but also a general problem, the concern of all Socialist countries."(2)

11. What the Soviet leaders have not done is to define the extent of the 'Socialist Commonwealth' within which the newly formulated doctrine applies. It is not surprising that they have chosen to be vague on this point. It would be a mistake to suppose that we can somehow elucidate the doctrine, and put ourselves in a position to list definitively those countries to which the doctrine applies and which may therefore be regarded as under a threat from which other countries could be deemed to be free. We cannot find in the doctrine a clarity which its authors deliberately chose to keep out of it.

12. Clearly it would be far more difficult for the Soviet Government to apply the theory in some instances than in others. Nevertheless the Soviet leaders have provided themselves with a formula which could be used as justification if political motives called them to intervene by force in any country which is or has been under Communist rule, and in this sense it must be assumed that the theory, as a general statement of doctrine, holds good for Yugoslavia, for Albania, for China, and for any country which the Soviet Government considers to be in or to have been in the Socialist camp, according to whatever is their current definition of that camp.

13. The point of more practical concern to us is this. In what circumstances would the Soviet leaders apply the doctrine of intervention? What criteria would the Soviet leaders use in deciding whether to intervene or not in a given situation? The likely answer is that they would almost certainly do so if (as happened in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia last year) they judged that in a member country

- 
- (1) Speech by Mr. Gromyko at the UN on 3rd October.  
(2) Brezhnev, addressing the Fifth Congress of the Polish Communist Party, as reported in Pravda of 13th November.

of the Warsaw Pact there was a threat that power would pass out of the hands of the Communist Party or that a fundamental change of policy contrary to vital Soviet political and security interests was imminent. They would regard intervention in these circumstances as feasible in execution (all the members of the Warsaw Pact being accessible to Soviet military intervention). For the rest, however, that is to say, for Socialist countries which are not members of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leaders would have to apply a fairly complicated set of criteria. The essential consideration would be whether there was a real chance of bringing the offender to heel. (In the case of China, for example, there is no such foreseeable chance and the general doctrine could not therefore be applied). But they would also have to ask themselves whether, even if the operation was feasible, they could "get away with it" and whether the final balance of advantage from their point of view would be in favour of the proposed action or against it.

14. The phrase 'get away with it' needs to be explained. It includes, of course, the question whether the Soviet Government can do whatever it may be thinking of doing without serious risk of provoking a wider and unwanted conflict especially with the West. But it also includes questions relating to international reactions - the effect of the proposed action on the Allies of the Soviet Union and the general coherence of the Warsaw Pact, on Communist Parties in other countries, on the non-aligned countries in the United Nations and so forth. These must all be weighed in the scale in so far as they would be likely to affect the ability of the Soviet Union to achieve whatever are its other major objectives at the time. This balancing operation could in some instances be a very fine and complicated one.

15. The sections which follow are written with the above in mind.

#### IV. THE BALKANS: THREE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

##### A. Assessment of the Situation in Rumania

##### The Issues

16. The Communist Party of Rumania is a tightly organized Party. While making pragmatic adjustments in its organization and domestic policy, it has maintained full control of the country and has shown little inclination to allow liberal trends. The changes in the organization of the administrative apparatus undertaken some time ago tend, if anything, to reinforce the centralised monopoly of the Party on instruments of internal power. The Party is in full charge in Rumania, and there is no sign of any reduction of its "leading rôle".

17. At the same time, since the early 1960s the Rumanian leadership has been taking positions on intra-Warsaw Pact affairs and in foreign policy vis-à-vis the outside world which are at variance with those of the Soviet Union.

18. Thus, while there is very little similarity indeed between the present situation in Rumania and the situation which developed in Czechoslovakia in the spring and summer of 1968, an impressive range of issues has arisen between the Soviet and Rumanian rulers. The Rumanian Party leaders have courageously insisted upon strict observation of the principles of national sovereignty, independence and equality in relations between all nations, including those belonging to the Warsaw Pact; they have played a decreasingly active rôle in the military affairs of the Warsaw Pact while making demands for changes in the Alliance, e.g. for a rotational system of military command, a voice for all members of the Pact in nuclear affairs, arrangements for the stationing of Soviet troops in other Warsaw Pact countries on the basis of equality between the receiving state and the Soviet Union, and of a more equitable sharing of the financial burden; they have resisted adamantly the Soviet pressures to integrate their economy in the CEMA system or to impose any supernatural authority over economic decision-making; they have maintained friendly relations with the Chinese Communists and the Albanians, carefully balancing their gestures to Moscow with those to Peking; they initially offered active resistance to the Soviet campaign for an international conference of Communist parties, and even now their involvement in the project is far from enthusiastic; they have dared to differ with the Soviet Union on the important issues of the Arab-Israel crisis and the non-proliferation treaty; they publicly supported Czechoslovakia's right to be free from outside interference before and even after the invasion by the Warsaw Five, and were the only other active member of the Pact which did not participate in the intervention; and they have established closer economic and political relations with the West, including diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, than is agreeable to the leaders of the Soviet Union. All in all, these issues have sufficiently divided Rumania from the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Five for the Rumanians to boycott the Karlovy Vary Conference in April 1967. The Rumanians also failed to sign the statement on the non-proliferation treaty issued by the Warsaw Pact summit in Sofia (March 1968); walked out of the initial preparatory meeting for the International Communist Conference in February 1968; and were treated as though they were no longer members of the Warsaw Pact by not being invited to the Dresden, Warsaw, or Bratislava meetings in the spring and summer of 1968.

19. In brief, the Rumanian leaders are innocent of the cardinal sin of "revisionism", but guilty of the cardinal sin of "nationalism".

Soviet pressures against Rumania

20. The Soviets have available many forms of pressure in their efforts to contain Rumanian nationalism. They long ago began to apply some of these pressures, especially in the economic field. In the wake of the Czech crisis, the Soviet press, as well as that of the other invaders, began directly denouncing Rumanian policies. While the Rumanians initially resisted increased pressure, and even took the step unprecedented in intra-Pact relations of lodging an official protest in Warsaw against attacks by the Polish press, the Rumanians have found it prudent to stop their public support for the Dubcek régime; they have been badgered into playing the host to a recent gathering of Chiefs of Staff from Pact countries; Foreign Minister Manescu has been prodded into a reluctant journey to Pankow to patch up Rumanian relations with the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany; (strong efforts appear to have been applied to assure Rumania's attendance at the forthcoming summit meeting of CEMA; rumours, possibly of Soviet origin, of impending military moves against Rumania were rife for a while; and, most significantly, the Rumanians have been under heavy and prolonged pressure to permit Warsaw Pact exercises on Rumanian territory, to which they appear to have acquiesced while insisting upon full prior agreement on details, including the departure date of non-Rumanian troops). Economic pressures are also available of course (despite their efforts to gain economic independence, the Rumanians still have over 50% of their total foreign trade with member countries of CEMA), though there is no available information as to the extent of such pressures.

Assessment:

21. Despite the Rumanian desire to mollify the Soviets to a certain extent, especially through willingness to co-operate more closely in Warsaw Pact military affairs, the Rumanian Government continues to uphold the principles underlying its independent position. These principles are in the last resort irreconcilable with full Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet leaders have no guarantee that in a future crisis Ceausescu might not go significantly against their interests as he did during the Czechoslovak crisis. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet Union would welcome the present Rumanian leadership remaining in power indefinitely, or the theory behind their independent-mindedness being seen to go unchallenged. But while the Brezhnev doctrine clearly covers Rumania, as one of the "links in the Socialist chain", it stands to reason that the Soviet Union will want very much to avoid a repetition of the treatment ultimately meted out to Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the inhibitions against such action are much greater because Rumania neither involves the acute strategic interest that was present in the case of Czechoslovakia, nor pursues internal

internal policies which could be a source of danger for the stability of Communist régimes in other Eastern European countries. The sense of urgency about the need for corrective action is, therefore, not nearly what it was in the case of Czechoslovakia. However, the Soviet Government is likely to work, as opportunities present themselves, to undermine the basis of present Rumanian policies and, if this is not successful, may seek to replace the Ceausescu leadership with a group of whose loyalty towards the Soviet foreign policy line it could be more confident.

22. The immediate question is whether the Soviet Government thinks it necessary to have some Soviet troops permanently stationed in Rumania, and to what length it is prepared to go in order to achieve this. Even if the Rumanians obtain the guarantees they are apparently seeking as regards the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops participating in manoeuvres in Rumania, these will be essentially paper guarantees, and there will remain a risk that the Soviets would find a pretext for "delaying" the departure of their troops.

23. The presence of Soviet troops in Rumania would secure for the Soviet Union a logistically important territory, and place it in a better position to exert pressures against Yugoslavia, and, for that matter the Southern flank of NATO, to help stamp out manifestations of Rumanian nationalism, and generally to tighten Soviet control over Warsaw Pact and CEMA machinery. On the other hand, further resort to armed force would compound all the disadvantages of their action in Czechoslovakia in terms of East-West relations, Sino-Soviet relations, the world Communist movement, and relations with the Third World.

24. Always bearing in mind that Soviet leaders have their own sense of values and their own sense of priorities - which are not always discernible to Western eyes - it seems quite unlikely that the Soviet Union would apply direct force to bring Rumania into line in the immediate future. The more likely prospect is that the Soviets will continue to exert a spectrum of pressures on Rumania, at a minimum to tone down Rumanian assertions of nationalist policies, and, at a maximum, to engineer the replacement of the present Rumanian leadership with a more malleable group.

25. The pressures could lead to a "developing situation" in Soviet-Rumanian relations of crisis proportions. (One discernible "crunch" point in this situation will be the Warsaw Pact and CEMA summit meetings which are reportedly to take place in the near future; and another could be the period immediately preceding, during and immediately following the Warsaw Pact exercises in Rumania anticipated in the spring, or possibly as early as February). It is possible, of course,

that the Soviets will opt for a lighter touch in dealing with Rumanian recalcitrance, e.g. that having brought strong pressure to hold manoeuvres, they would live up to the letter of their pre-manoeuvres agreement, to demonstrate that manoeuvres are not always precursors of armed intervention. Furthermore, the Soviet Government have lived with the Rumanian opposition to greater integration in Eastern Europe for a number of years, and it is possible that they will see no viable alternative to allowing the current stalemate to continue.

26. None the less, given the gravity with which Moscow takes the issues existing between it and Bucharest, a close and continuing watch on the part of the Alliance is warranted. For deployment of Soviet armed forces in Rumania would sharply increase the threat to Yugoslavia, and could thus create the basis for a Soviet move which would further and seriously disturb the present military balance in that part of Europe.

B. Assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia

The Issues

27. Marshal Tito broke with the Soviet Union in 1948 over the issue of national independence. Periods of tension and rapprochement between the two have alternated ever since, but Yugoslavia has maintained a staunchly independent line, and has been in the forefront of efforts to organize "non-aligned" countries into a "third world" force.

28. In keeping with its uncommitted status, Yugoslavia has never been a member of the Warsaw Pact; it has only an associate status in CEMA, has a diplomatic representation at and is negotiating a commercial agreement with the ECE, has acquired observer status in OECD and has opened the door to foreign investments. While Yugoslavia remains essentially an authoritarian one-party state which claims to be faithful to Marxism-Leninism, the Yugoslav Communist Party has conducted more far-reaching reforms than has any other ruling Communist Party. This applies to the rôle of the Party in Government, to economic organization, and the participation of workers in management. Despite its efforts to suppress extremely unorthodox views, such as those of Djilas or Mihajlov, the Yugoslav régime has allowed freedom of expression exceeding that elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

29. Yugoslavia has more extensive and varied relations with the West than any other Communist-ruled nation. These have included military assistance, food aid under United States Public Law 480, public and private loans, and joint economic ventures. While Yugoslavia has voted more often than not with the Soviet Union in the United Nations, it has differed with Moscow on a number of issues, including nuclear

matters, attitudes toward the Federal Republic of Germany, and the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. Most recently, the Yugoslavs have resisted Soviet efforts to organize an international Communist conference and have boycotted the preparatory meetings in Budapest. Tito conspicuously supported the Dubcek régime in Czechoslovakia and the reforms it planned before the invasion. He denounced the Soviet occupation of that country and has consistently and forcefully reiterated the need for scrupulous observance of national sovereignty, independence, equality and freedom from external intervention. He also made it clear that, if invaded, the Yugoslav people would offer armed resistance. And although publicly Tito brushed aside any thought of Western protection, the Yugoslav press interpreted the NATO Communiqué of 16th November, 1968 as a welcome support of their country's independence, and Yugoslav diplomats have confided privately that Yugoslavia owes its security against Soviet attack to the existence of NATO.

30. Despite periodic efforts to ease relations with Yugoslavia, Tito remains a heretic in Soviet eyes: Yugoslavia is a member of the "Socialist camp" but its present leaders are renegades, and its internal policies constitute a most serious threat of infection for other Eastern European countries. Thus, the Soviets would likely go to considerable lengths to see a more orthodox and compliant Communist régime in Belgrade.

Possible Soviet pressures against Yugoslavia:

31. Over the years, the Soviet Union has applied various degrees of pressure against Yugoslavia. For a while Tito was vilified by the Soviet press as an opportunist and a dictator comparable to Hitler. While such extreme personal attacks ceased after Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in 1955, the anti-Yugoslav innuendo continued. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet press resumed its explicit attacks on Tito and Yugoslav policies, and these attacks made the Yugoslav leaders feel sufficiently threatened to mobilise and deploy their armed forces.

32. Soviet military action against Rumania would, therefore, have serious repercussions in Belgrade because of the increased threat.

33. Since 1948 the Soviet Union has also been applying its economic leverage. Economic sanctions against Belgrade were extremely heavy immediately after Tito's break with Stalin, and, given the fact that the volume of Yugoslav trade with the CEMA countries still amounts to about 30% of the total - the Soviets continue to have a very powerful tool to apply an economic squeeze.

34. Marshal Tito seems to enjoy widespread popularity in his country. But the Soviets are probably also taking into account inherent divisions in Yugoslavia. The traditional ethnic rivalries and antagonisms have persisted, and are also reflected in the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Rankovic affair is one of the latest examples of this. These ethnic antagonisms co-exist with and are often sharpened by, tensions resulting from the failure of the régime so far, in spite of the remarkable industrial and tourist expansion of the last 20 years, to achieve true economic stability and equality of opportunity for all regions, or sectors of the population. It is quite possible, therefore, that the Soviets are waiting for Tito's departure from the scene and planning then to exploit the internal stresses. Should the post-Tito leadership show the tendency to move even further away from orthodoxy, the incentive for the Soviets to act will be all the greater.

Assessment

35. From the Kremlin's point of view, the Yugoslav régime and most of its policies prejudice Soviet interests. The Yugoslavs' spirit of independence and experimentation is extremely appealing to other Eastern Europeans and has had considerable influence on the Czechoslovak reform movement. Some other Eastern European countries have also been trying to take pages from the Yugoslav book, although much more cautiously. Although the Soviets have lived with the Yugoslav heresy for 20 years, the Czech events could not but sharply reduce Soviet tolerance toward Belgrade.

36. Yet the means available to the Soviets for corrective action are fairly limited. It has become clear over the years that Soviet propaganda, diplomatic, and economic pressures can have little or no effect on Belgrade's policy; if anything, they have pushed the Yugoslavs closer to the West. By identifying himself with the non-aligned world, Tito has greatly increased the political price the Soviets would pay for any action against him. While the Soviets could put an uncomfortable squeeze on the Yugoslavs economically, they probably assume that such pressures could be compensated by Tito through further accommodations with the West. Militarily, the Northern plains of Yugoslavia would presumably be easy prey for the Soviet armies, but it is unlikely that the Soviets could prevent significant elements of Yugoslav armed forces from withdrawing to mountainous regions, which would be much more difficult to occupy and from which guerrilla activities could be conducted. The Soviet Government would not relish the prospect of prolonged and possibly inconclusive actions against Yugoslav partisans. Moreover, because of serious implications of a Soviet military move for the military balance in that part of Europe, as well as in the Mediterranean, Moscow probably realises that such a move would evoke a very strong Western reaction.

37. In view of all this, as well as of the fact that any Soviet pressure is skilfully used by Tito to build popular support for his régime, the Soviets may well feel that a serious crisis with Yugoslavia would not produce commensurate gains - although such a crisis would arise automatically in the event of a Soviet military intervention in Rumania. Most likely, the Soviets will find no other choice but to limit themselves to keeping alive their ideological differences with Tito, while hoping that his eventual disappearance from the scene will open opportunities for bringing the Yugoslavs back into line under a régime more loyal to Moscow. If the Soviet leadership stays on its present course of rigidity, the passing of Tito from the political scene may well open a new and serious crisis in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The will and ability of Tito's successors to withstand such a crisis and to maintain the country on something like its present course will largely depend on the régime's success in the next few years in solving the problems inherent in their attempt to create a highly-industrialised multi-national state.

38. Given Yugoslavia's important strategic position in the European and Mediterranean context, it is in the interest of the Alliance to stay abreast of the situation as regards Soviet-Yugoslav relations and, if need be, to deter - through timely and appropriate preventive diplomacy - any attempt by the Kremlin to encroach upon that country's independence and territorial integrity.

C. Assessment of the Situation in Albania

The Issues

39. Soviet-Albanian relations, initially strained as a result of the Soviet rapprochement with Tito in 1955, deteriorated sharply after the Sino-Soviet split came into the open. Ever since, Albania has been taking a strictly pro-Chinese line, and its attacks on Soviet policies, as well as the Soviet leadership, have been perhaps even more violent than those by Peking. An inactive member of the Warsaw Pact for a number of years, Albania withdrew from it formally following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tirana is also the only Communist capital having no diplomatic representation either from or in Moscow.

40. From a strategic standpoint, Tirana's defection deprived the USSR of its foothold in an area that could be very useful in the pursuit of Soviet interests in both the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Politically, it resulted in the emergence within the original Warsaw Pact membership of a vociferous proponent of Peking's anti-Soviet line and demonstrated the Soviet giant's inability to keep the Albanian dwarf under control.

41. However, the Soviets took the Albanian action with at least outward calm, choosing to accord Tirana largely a silent treatment and focusing their ire on its mentor, Peking. In fact, Albanian policies do not seem to constitute a significant threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Although there have been such isolated incidents as the defection of a few Polish Communists to Tirana, Eastern Europe - where the ferment is in the direction of liberalisation rather than of a return to Stalinist rigidity - does not appear to be a very fertile ground for Hoxa's ideas. But the Soviets may view with concern the effect Radio Tirana, whose powerful signal - unlike that of Radio Peking - can be picked up on any standard broadcast receiver, has on ultra-leftist, pro-Maoist groupings in Western Europe. Also, the very fact of the existence of a Chinese Ally, however insignificant, in Eastern Europe, as well as of a spokesman for Peking in the United Nations, must be a source of considerable irritation to the Kremlin.

Soviet Pressures against Albania:

42. The scope of pressures the Soviets can apply on Albania is extremely limited. In view of Albania's geographic position, the possibility of guerrilla resistance by its montagnard population, and last but not least the international reaction such a move would provoke, a Soviet takeover of that country by military means would be a rather complicated and politically costly operation. While the Chinese have given pledges of support to Albania, they seem to have stopped short of a firm military commitment, and it is unlikely that they would be willing or indeed able to render significant assistance to the Albanians if they were attacked. At the same time, a Soviet military move against Tirana would not only further aggravate Sino-Soviet relations but also give the Chinese a trump card in their polemics with Moscow.

43. Soviet economic leverage against Albania is minimal since the volume of Albanian trade with the CEMA countries is negligible. In fact, despite their virulent "anti-imperialist" and "anti-revisionist" public posture, the Albanians have sought over the years to broaden their economic relations with some Western European countries as well as Yugoslavia.

44. The main tactic used by the Soviets against the Albanians within both the Communist movement and the United Nations was to isolate them. Although this tactic has had little if any effect, the Soviets are probably taking a longer-term view. They may be hoping that in view of Chinese preoccupation with their domestic problems, the Albanians - particularly once their present leaders have departed from the scene - will seek to break out of their isolation and attempt an accommodation with the Soviets.

Assessment

45. Although Albania, whose relationship with Peking constitutes a special element, is a nuisance to the Soviets, it is unlikely that Moscow is planning a drastic action against it. However, in the event that the Soviets should decide to invade Yugoslavia, they would probably try to subdue Albania at the same time, not only to tidy up an unsatisfactory situation within their orbit but also because of the advantages it would present for the Soviet posture vis-à-vis the Alliance. In the foreseeable future, the Soviets are most likely to continue pursuing their objective of isolating Albania as much as possible and place their hopes on an eventual change in its policies under a new leadership.

V. THE MEDITERRANEAN

46. Document C-M(68)21, Part III entitled "The Situation in the Mediterranean", of 13th June, 1968, remains the basic assessment of the situation in the area as approved by the Council of Ministers. Since that date, the Soviet political activities in the area have by no means diminished; and while the numerical strength of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean varies periodically, it can be rapidly reinforced from the Black Sea when required. Moreover, it is safe to assert that its qualitative strength is on an upward trend. During 1968 Soviet ship days - representing the presence of one ship in the Mediterranean for one day - reached a total of 12,743, an increase of some 40% over 1967.

47. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is, of course, an expression of the age-old Russian quest for access to warm water ports and it serves to assert, at least in principle, the right claimed by the Soviet Government to safeguard the approaches to their Southern ports.

48. The specific objectives of Soviet political and military activities in the area have been defined in document C-M(68)21, Part III (paragraphs 22-26). The Soviets aim at greater political influence in the area, seeking by the same token the reduction and, if possible, the elimination of Western political influence and positions. Thus they use their military presence in the area to gain influence with numerous Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa and to encourage anti-Western tendencies in their policies. Similarly, the success of Soviet policy in trying to gain influence with Arab countries of the area has been greatly helped by the large scale supply of arms and military training and by Soviet economic and diplomatic support. However, Soviet behaviour suggests that the USSR is concerned about the possibility of renewed fighting breaking out in the Middle East and a possible further Arab defeat with the consequences this might have on their position. This concern may exercise a moderating influence on Soviet policy in the area.

49. The Russians also seek to improve the strategic position of the Soviet Union on its South Western periphery and to enhance their capability for flexible military action on a limited scale. Their naval presence in the Mediterranean, which in part is due to their increasing awareness of the importance of naval strength to a world power, serves to complicate Alliance defence problems, in particular the various tasks assigned to Allied naval forces there. The Russians have improved their capability to inhibit or interfere with policies and activities of the West in the area.

50. The Soviet decision to build up a major naval presence in the Mediterranean and the claim frequently stressed by Russian spokesmen that the Soviet Union is a Black Sea power, and consequently a Mediterranean power, could place the USSR in a good position to take initiatives of a political character with the aim of disrupting NATO security and defence arrangements. Such initiatives could also be directed against other countries bordering on the Mediterranean which are friendly to the West. They might also have the ultimate aim of seeking to bring about the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.

51. The Soviet forces in the Mediterranean are to a great extent dependent on maintenance in their own Black Sea ports and on their own resources. Their capabilities could be increased if they enjoyed major base facilities in the Mediterranean. In spite of rumours that the Russians were likely to obtain a base in Algeria, there has not yet been any firm evidence of this. On the other hand, the increasingly frequent naval visits - and more or less permanent presence - at such Arab ports as Alexandria have led to permanent, though still limited, facilities for Soviet vessels. To a certain degree these ports are now carrying out functions usually reserved to bases and could, in time, be extended until they were hardly distinguishable, at least in the logistical sense, from what are normally called "bases".

52. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean now provides a basis on which the following threats could in certain circumstances be developed:

- (a) Sea-borne support for a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia or Albania (although the Soviet Mediterranean squadron does not at present have the necessary amphibious assault capability).
- (b) Assistance to Arab states in the event of a decision by the Soviet Government to intervene in a renewed Middle Eastern War, if hostilities should start for any reason.
- (c) Action to deter or prevent activities by Allied forces in the Mediterranean.
- (d) In case of hostilities between East and West, submarine attacks on Allied naval and merchant ships in the Mediterranean, or attacks by submarines and surface

ships (particularly guided missile attacks) against Allied naval units and naval bases, and attacks to disrupt lines of supply and reinforcement to members of the Alliance in the Mediterranean.

Thus, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has provided an additional element of flexibility to a powerful military capability which the Soviet Union has had at its command since it acquired a large medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles force in the early 1960s. Through the creation of a new and more flexible military instrument the Soviet Union disposes now of intermediate options and of greater practical possibilities both for political persuasion and limited military action.

53. Although the above capabilities present a very serious possible threat to Allied naval forces and sea communications, there is no present sign that the Russians intend to take action as defined in (a) above; and the cases envisaged under (b) and (d) above are of course dependent on further contingencies which lie rather beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that the Soviet Government would be ready to threaten action under (c) should a situation at any time develop in such a way as to make this desirable. While, in general, Allied naval forces in the area remain very much stronger than Soviet forces and have easier resort to their own bases, it should not be overlooked that the Soviet squadron may enjoy an increasing degree of air support thanks to the use of friendly Arab facilities.

#### VI. CENTRAL AND NORTHERN EUROPE - "NEUTRAL COUNTRIES"

54. Because of the strategic proximity of Austria and Finland to the territory covered by the Warsaw Pact - and in view of the relationship between these nations and the Soviet Union - the possibility of a Soviet threat or pressures directed against them has also been examined. Since neither is a "socialist" country, the Brezhnev "Socialist Commonwealth" doctrine could not easily be applied to them. The USSR might, however, use other pretexts, including its respective treaty relationships with Austria and Finland, for applying pressure on them in furtherance of its interests.

#### AUSTRIA

55. The Austrian State Treaty, of which the Soviet Union was one of the four signatory powers, does not confer any special rights or privileges upon any of the signatories devolving from their prior occupation of Austrian territory. Nor does it contain a guarantee of Austrian neutrality, which was subsequently proclaimed on the basis of a law enacted by the Austrian Parliament. The Russians attach great importance to this constitutional law of permanent neutrality which they regard as an adjunct to the State Treaty and as having international significance, though they cannot pretend that it has treaty force. Article 2 of the State Treaty does impose upon the four signatory powers the obligation

of respecting the independence and territorial integrity of Austria. Any Soviet military intervention, therefore, would be in violation of this provision. In the light of recent experience, however, it may justly be doubted whether the Soviet leadership could be restrained by legal obligations if vital power interests in their eyes demanded intervention.

56. The risks involved in an aggressive action against Austria particularly in the light of the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union under Article 2 of the State Treaty, and its adverse effects on the Soviet position in world affairs would be very great. Austria's international standing as an independent country, abiding by its own special brand of neutrality, is generally accepted. These factors have been reflected in Soviet policy towards Austria over the last decade. There have been occasional diplomatic pressures exerted to discourage too close an alignment with the West; for example, in expressing their opposition to Austrian efforts to enter into an arrangement with the Common Market, the Russians warned the Austrians against a violation of their basic commitment to maintain their political neutrality. Russian policy in general, however, has not normally tended to interfere with the development of Austrian policy.

57. Assuming that no new factor enters the situation which would make direct control of Austria vital to Soviet interests, the likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Austria seems remote. This assessment also assumes that, if the Soviet Union were to take action against Yugoslavia, the military advantage of sending forces through Austria would be heavily outweighed by the additional risks and complications involved in doing so.

#### FINLAND

58. There seems to be even less motive for a Soviet move against Finland in view of the relationship which Finland maintains with the Soviet Union on the basis of their 1948 Treaty and its declared policy of neutrality. It was concluded that further assessment was not required in present circumstances and need be undertaken only if warranted by later developments.

### VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

#### Introduction

59. The implications for the Alliance of potential Soviet actions - political, economic or military - with respect to the countries and areas discussed in this paper should be viewed in the light of the extent to which such actions would:

- (a) increase the uncertainties about Soviet behaviour and thus heighten East-West tensions;

- (b) provide the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact with military advantage; and
- (c) indicate adoption by the Soviets of an aggressively expansionist policy in Europe and the Mediterranean.

60. A brief analysis by country and area of these implications in terms of political and military(1) factors affecting the Alliance follows.

RUMANIA

61. While the establishment, through pressures, of a subservient régime in Rumania would strengthen the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe as a whole, with all this implies for the West, an invasion of Rumania or the stationing of Soviet troops there would not in itself alter basically the military balance in Europe but would, of course, improve the posture of the Warsaw Pact forces in the area. Despite the independence of its foreign policy in some respects, Rumania is a member of the Warsaw Pact and it must be assumed that in the event of a European war, the Rumanian Government would have no alternative but to go along with their Allies.

62. The presence of Soviet troops in Rumania would gain for the Soviets a favourable position for further action in the Balkan area, notably by providing a new base for the deployment of forces against Yugoslavia and by enhancing Soviet capabilities for concentrating forces against Greece and Turkish Thrace via Bulgaria. Bulgaria might conceivably thus be stimulated to adopt a more provocative attitude towards Greece and Turkey.

63. This general situation, as just outlined, could be used to try to intimidate the Yugoslav leadership and to oblige it, without Soviet recourse to armed force, to bend to the Kremlin's demands.

64. Moscow clearly considers Rumania as belonging to its sphere of influence and, thus, coming under the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention. A move against Rumania would therefore not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union aimed to extend its control beyond the Warsaw Pact area. However, it would mean that NATO's "unclear signal" of November 1968 had been ignored and would raise the question of whether further deterrent action is necessary to prevent a Soviet move against other peripheral states, especially Yugoslavia.

---

(1) See MCM-91-68

YUGOSLAVIA

65. An invasion of Yugoslavia would have far-reaching consequences for the military balance in Europe and for the security of the Alliance. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Yugoslavia would be provided with an excellent base for military action against Austria, Italy, Albania, Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union would also have full naval facilities under its own control in the Mediterranean area and its naval and air effectiveness there would consequently be strongly increased. The military situation in the Southern region of Allied Command Europe would therefore be radically changed and the threat against the Southern flank significantly increased.

66. As was pointed out in the analysis, direct military action against Yugoslavia is less likely than Soviet psychological and economic pressure. Even this would pose certain problems for the Alliance, the gravity of which would depend on the degree of success achieved by the Soviet Union in reducing Yugoslav independence and in acquiring the support and co-operation of Yugoslav armed forces and facilities.

67. An attack on Yugoslavia would show that there had been a radical change in Soviet policy from one of keeping the Warsaw Pact intact (by military force if necessary) to an expansionist policy prepared to use military force in order to subjugate for strategic and political ends a country (admittedly a Communist country) which was never a member of the Warsaw Pact. A Soviet attack on Yugoslavia in its present state of relative political solidarity and will to resist would moreover reveal an alarming degree of recklessness in the Soviet leadership and of unpredictability in their subsequent actions. This change in Soviet policy, as well as the fact that an armed Soviet-Yugoslav conflict might lead to a "spill-over", would be of vital concern to the Alliance.

68. Given the position of Yugoslavia as outlined above, the Alliance has the greatest interest to deter - through timely and appropriate preventive diplomacy - any attempt by the Kremlin to encroach upon that country's independence and territorial integrity.

ALBANIA

69. The Soviet leaders might calculate that, in political terms, a threat to Albania would be less intolerable to the West, given Albania's ideological alignment, than an attack on some of the other peripheral states. However, our analysis has shown that for many reasons, an isolated attack on Albania is unlikely. But if it did happen, it would clearly be another symptom of greater recklessness in Soviet policy and would cause a serious setback in relations with the West.

70. Moreover, possession of Albania would give the Russians strategic advantages, in terms of access to the Mediterranean, similar though smaller in scale to those to be derived from the occupation of the Yugoslav coastline. In any case, it would increase the threat to the Alliance, in particular with respect to Greece and Italy. The question of preventive measures should be closely studied by the Alliance.

MEDITERRANEAN

71. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has given more flexibility to the Soviet Union both from the political and military point of view. So far, the most notable use the Soviets have made of their naval units there is a demonstration of strength and presence which seems to give to these units primarily a political objective. However, the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean represents a menace in terms of pressures on the Southern flank of the Alliance. Moreover, if Soviet capabilities in the Mediterranean were developed to the point where they constitute a significant military threat to NATO capabilities, they would add a further dimension to NATO's defence problems. Indeed, the existing situation increases the risk of confrontation with the West either by miscalculation or because circumstances may lead Moscow to take limited local action in the region contiguous to the Treaty area for which it now increasingly has the necessary means.

THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

72. An overt Soviet threat to, or attack on, Austria would have grave implications, both military and political. As regards the strategic situation, Austria has long frontiers with two members of the Alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. In Soviet hands it would become an enemy salient stretching into the heart of the Alliance's defence system and would create a critically dangerous situation for the Alliance.

73. The Soviet Government are aware that the United States, France and the United Kingdom have a particular interest in Austria arising from the State Treaty and that, on whatever pretext they moved troops into Austria, or threatened to do so, they would be risking a Western response. Given this risk, it is therefore highly unlikely that the Russians would contemplate the occupation of Austria unless general war had already broken out or seemed inevitable. In any event, a Soviet threat to its integrity would imply that the Soviet Government were prepared to take extreme risks in doing so.

74. While the absence of any motive for a Soviet threat against Finland was noted, Soviet intervention in that country would obviously have very serious political and military consequences.

INVENTORY OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES

PART TWO

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL

75. This inventory is designed as a check-list of measures which could be implemented by members of the Alliance, either individually or collectively, in situations involving the danger of aggression as outlined in the Contingency Studies: The Analysis of the Threat.

76. Three of the four sections of this paper deal with the diplomatic, economic and politico-military measures against the potential aggressor; the fourth section is concerned with measures vis-à-vis a threatened state. The order in which these measures are listed in their various categories, while, of course, having a certain logic of sequence, does not imply any particular priority or automaticity of application. They presumably could be drawn selectively from any of the various categories, in accordance with the requirements of the situation and of the particular interests of the country which would apply them. The listing is neither exhaustive nor definitive. It goes without saying that it does not impose a commitment.

77. The application of some of these measures under any of the categories might raise problems under domestic or international law.

78. It is presumed that measures employed by one or more states would be the subject of exchanges of views and consultation in NATO, except when time and circumstances do not permit. Measures applied by the Alliance collectively would, of course, be those approved by the North Atlantic Council or Defence Planning Committee.

79. In implementing these measures particularly those in the economic and politico-military sections, consideration should be given to the value of prior public announcement.

DIPLOMATIC

80. Diplomatic measures may be used individually or by more than one state as well as by the Alliance. The time-table of their implementation and the number and category used would be determined by individual requirements.

ECONOMIC

81. Economic measures taken by members of the Alliance might begin with steps having the character of warnings regarding the economic consequences of certain action anticipated or threatened by the USSR and/or allies.

82. If the situation warrants, preventive efforts may be intensified by implementing measures which, stronger in effect than warnings, would directly affect the flow of goods and services. These could be applied partially, wholly, or in tandem with warning measures, as circumstances warrant.

83. While economic measures could be applied either individually or collectively by member countries, their greatest effect would be realised through joint or nearly joint action by as many countries as possible, hopefully including non-NATO countries.

84. Implementation of the suggested measures would of necessity require consideration of the following factors:

- (i) the effect of these measures on the economies of members of the Alliance would vary from country to country, and in applying them care should be taken to safeguard to the extent possible the interests of those member countries which be most affected;
- (ii) the measures would be more effective, and therefore their number and scope could be limited, if they were directed at the weak points of the economy of specified Communist countries; these weak points vary from country to country and vulnerability studies should be made available to the Alliance.

POLITICAL-MILITARY(1)

85. The list of politico-military preventive measures provides a wide range of options from which Allies may make the appropriate selection. It covers the spectrum to include those which demonstrate NATO alertness, increase the readiness of forces-in-being, involve the initiation of force build-up and those which place emphasis on reinforcement and build-up to the extent required by the situation.

86. These measures are essentially warning in character, but may also go beyond the warning stage. Use of any selected measure would be dependent on the threat directed against certain countries in the so-called "grey area", its analysis and the time available for it to be implemented effectively. The measures would require prior authorisation by the nations concerned, and, as appropriate, by the Council or the DPC. Thus early political decisions would be required. Depending on the timing of their application and the circumstances of the situation, certain of these measures could also be implemented as countermeasures in response to indirect threat against the Alliance.

---

(1) The French Delegation stated that this part of the report which concerns the countries taking part in the integrated Defence Programme was not applicable to their country.

87. An example of one of the most effective measures for demonstrating and increasing NATO's readiness when the Soviets are seen to be preparing an initiative would be the holding of special pre-planned short-notice "exercises". These would be used as a cover when the Alliance wished to increase military readiness with less public alarm and reaction than if implemented as a part of the NATO Alert System. These exercises should be pre-planned in close co-operation between Major NATO Commands and the appropriate Defence Ministers. Moreover, the scope and timing of such pre-planned training exercises which improve readiness posture might be adjusted or extended and implemented as necessary to offset similar Warsaw Pact exercises, manoeuvres or military actions likely to be of an aggressive or occupational nature.

MEASURES VIS-A-VIS THE THREATENED STATE

88. With respect to measures relating to a threatened state, one or more members of the Alliance, or the Alliance collectively may choose to use selected measures after appropriate consultation with the state concerned.

MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST THREATENING STATES

I. DIPLOMATIC

(1) Measures by one or more than one member

- (a) Statements, inspired or direct, by government spokesmen or political personalities, to inform and alert parliaments, and through mass media, public opinion, as well as warn Moscow and/or its Warsaw Pact allies, as may be appropriate.
- (b) Diplomatic démarches, with or without publicity,
  - (i) in Moscow by NATO states and, as appropriate similar or related action in other Warsaw Pact capitals, and,
  - (ii) in NATO capitals.
- (c) Diplomatic signals to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact capitals through the intermediary of friendly third states.
- (d) Formal protests or warnings delivered to Moscow, and to Warsaw Pact capitals as required.
- (e) Messages from NATO Heads of State or Government to Warsaw Pact counterparts.

- (f) Breaking off or suspension of political negotiations or contacts which would affect the interests of the potential aggressor and/or have an impact on public opinion.
  - (g) Recall of Ambassador(s) for consultation and possibly protracted absence from the post(s).
  - (h) Use of Hot Line(s), with or without publicity.
  - (i) Sponsor or support appropriate measures in international fora, particularly the United Nations (the Secretary General, Security Council and General Assembly).
  - (j) Backgrounding of detailed analytical stories for the press and world opinion, describing the threat and suggesting the consequences that might result.
  - (k) Warning to own nationals against visiting crisis areas and potential aggressor countries.
  - (l) Announcement of the implementation of Civil Emergency Planning measures.
- (2) Measures by the Alliance
- (a) Official statement by a NATO spokesman.
  - (b) Publicly announced special meeting of the NATO Council in Permanent Session, with press briefings.
  - (c) Special meeting of the NATO Council in Ministerial Session.
  - (d) Formal NATO declaration or message authorized by the Council.
  - (e) Formal message from the Council to the Secretary General (or the President of the Security Council) of the United Nations.

## II. ECONOMIC

- (1) Measures largely of a warning character
- (a) Abstention from any new official initiative to foster trade.
  - (b) Encouraging industry and business circles to use their channels to warn their contacts on the other side of official concern as regards the actions threatened and possible economic consequences.

- (c) Off-the-record indications to press, industry and business that economic consequences may ensue.
  - (d) Postponement of economic visits at official and technical level.
  - (e) Slowdown in examination of requests for credits, licences or other trade facilities.
  - (f) Strict enforcement of quotas and other conditions in trade agreements.
  - (g) Expressions of concern through diplomatic channels that the action threatened would adversely affect economic relations.
  - (h) Cancellation of scheduled high level official trade mission visits.
  - (i) Suspension of official participation in trade fairs, seminars and conferences.
  - (j) Public statements by allied governments' spokesmen that the current situation may seriously affect trade relations.
  - (k) Public announcement that - should the threatened country be submitted to economic pressure - allied countries would review their economic programmes with the intention of assisting it.
- (2) Additional measures going beyond warnings
- (a) Suspension of exchanges of information on industrial and technical matters and ending of visits to countries of the Alliance by trainees and technicians from the Soviet Union and/or its Warsaw Pact allies.
  - (b) Discouragement of tourist traffic.
  - (c) Interruption in extension of government guarantees to any new export credits.
  - (d) Expansion of COCOM controls.
  - (e) Implementation of increasingly stringent trade and exchange controls.
  - (f) Gradual suspension of deliveries of equipment and of critical commodities under existing contracts without, however, rejecting obligation to deliver at a later date.

- (g) Gradual suspension of procurements, under existing contracts, of goods in the Soviet Union and/or its Warsaw Pact allies, without, however, rejecting obligation to purchase at a later date.
- (h) Implementation of special economic aid programme in favour of threatened country.
- (i) Prohibition to ship owners to charter shipping to Communist countries.
- (j) Directive to member countries' ships and aircraft to avoid specified areas.
- (k) Embargo measures(1), such as: prohibition of all financial facilities for trade; freezing of assets in member countries; suspension of trade, commerce and air agreements; closure of ports and airports to ships and planes of specified countries; cessation of all imports and exports; and prohibiting member countries' ships and aircraft from visiting specified countries.

### III. POLITICO-MILITARY(2)

- (a) Arrangement of visits by senior national and NATO officers, ships and aircraft to NATO countries near the threatened area.
- (b) Convening of special meetings of the NAC/DPC and Military Committee to consider further demonstrative and military preparedness measures.
- (c) Execution of national decisions to increase defence efforts.
- (d) Setting up of national crisis staffs.
- (e) Increase of overt intelligence gathering (e.g. land, sea and air reconnaissance using visual, photographic and electronic means while operating on or over international waters and NATO territory).
- (f) Implementation, in addition to other possible measures of the State of Military Vigilance of certain visible measures, such as:

- 
- (1) It is understood that so drastic a step would be used only in a situation of extreme gravity.
  - (2) See footnote on page 22.

- (1) Manning of War Headquarters and communications centres with skeleton staffs (VAA, VCA).
- (2) Conducting readiness exercises (tests of units' states of readiness)(VOL).
- (3) Increase of readiness of earmarked forces and their logistic support forces (VOD).
- (4) Control of leave (VOQ).
- (g) Cancellation of Warsaw Pact visits to NATO ports.
- (h) Conducting special manoeuvres and/or field exercises such as:
  - (1) Routine, scheduled training exercises which might be adjusted in scope and timing.
  - † (2) Special pre-planned short notice "exercises" which increase military readiness.
- (i) Requests to national authorities to move elements of their naval forces towards the threatened areas and authorisation of the movement and demonstration by Allied naval forces, as appropriate.
- (j) Alerting and/or preparing for deployment of Immediate Reaction Forces in accordance with agreed concepts and policies. At this time these are:
  - (1) ACE Mobile Force.
  - (2) STANAVFORLANT.
  - (3) "On-Call" Allied Naval Force, Mediterranean.
- † (k) Announcement that relevant contingency plans, which include the transfer of operational command of certain units to Major NATO Commanders, are being reviewed and up-dated for possible early implementation.
- (l) Deployment of Immediate Reaction Forces to NATO areas bordering the threatened area in accordance with appropriate contingency plans (possibly under the guise of exercises).
- (m) Announcement of the intention to bring or in fact bringing certain units (combat, logistic and reserve) up to full strength by implementing appropriate mobilisation and force expansion plans.

- (n) Alerting and preparation for deployment of Reinforcement Forces in accordance with agreed concepts and policies. Some of these might be:
  - (1) US Rapid Reaction Force.
  - (2) Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic designated for support of ACE.
  - (3) UK Mobile Force.
  - (4) UK and US Amphibious Forces.
  - (5) Forces of other nations to be specified in contingency plans.
- (o) Alerting and deployment of dual-based US and UK forces.
- (p) Transfer of operational command of certain forces to the Major NATO Commanders.
- (q) Making full use of the inherent flexibility of the existing NATO Alert System in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.
- (r) Deferment of the release of conscripts.
- (s) Restriction of the activities of Warsaw Pact attachés.
- (t) Deployment of Reinforcement Forces and their logistic support forces in accordance with appropriate contingency plans (possibly under the guise of exercises).
- (u) Movement and exercises of major combat and logistic support units near their Emergency Defence Plan positions.
- (v) Implementation, as appropriate, of measures at the higher end of the spectrum of the NATO Alert System.

MEASURES VIS-A-VIS THREATENED STATE(S)

- (a) Diplomatic and political visits at Ministerial and high Parliamentary levels.
- ∟(b) Military exchanges and naval visits by arrangement with the country concerned
- ∟(c) Military staff consultations

- (d) Official and public expressions of support for threatened state(s).
- (e) Confidential or public expressions to threatened state(s) on readiness to consider requests for economic assistance and/or military equipment and supplies.
- (f) Provision of military equipment and supplies.
- (g) Intelligence exchanges.
- (h) Assurances to the threatened state(s) enabling the withdrawal of forces from frontiers with NATO countries for redeployment on threatened frontier(s).

(Signed) Joachim JAENICKE

OTAN/NATO,  
Brussels, 39.