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COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA

Report by the Committee on Africa

The Committee on Africa met at NATO Headquarters in Paris, 28th - 31st March, 1962, to prepare the attached report on "Communist Penetration in Africa". Representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States participated.

2. The attention of the Ministers is especially invited to Part III of the report, "Western Action", which contains the experts' conclusions and recommendations.

(Signed) ALEXANDER BOKER
Chairman

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

NATO SECRET

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COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICAReport by the Committee on AfricaPART I - THE AFRICAN SITUATIONThe March Toward Independence

Movements toward independence and self-government continued in Africa during recent months. The independence of Tanganyika in December 1961 will be followed by that of Uganda in October 1962. The termination of the Ruanda-Urundi trusteeship is envisaged for 1st July, with the two territories probably gaining independence separately.

2. Separate constitutional conferences are taking place in London on Kenya and Zanzibar; they are considering demands for the independence of both territories by the end of 1962. Gambia will hold general elections in May. The future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland remains uncertain.

3. As "colonial" questions continue to disappear, especially in the western and northern parts of the African continent, the problems of the internal stability and external orientation of the newly independent states assume increasing importance.

Inter-African Relationships

4. The most important developments in inter-African relations were greater cohesion among the moderate African states, demonstrated by the African summit conference in Lagos and the trade union conference at Dakar, growing divergencies between members of the Casablanca group, and the appearance of new trends at the conference of East and Central African states (PAFMECA) in Addis Ababa.

5. The Lagos conference can be considered a success because 20 moderate African states of various political persuasion established a basis for closer co-operation which contributed to the consolidation of the situation in Africa as a whole. It is true that a major objective of the conference, i.e. that of bringing together the Monrovia and Casablanca groups, was not achieved because this latter Group withdrew from the conference at the last moment - the alleged reason being that the Algerian Provisional Government had not been invited.

6. The main reason for the refusal to participate, however, is believed to be the different approaches taken by the two groups towards the problem of African unity. The opening

address of the Governor General of Nigeria, Dr. Azikiwe, revealed clearly the existing rift. He suspected the Casablanca nations of interfering in the domestic affairs of other African states and thus violating one of the fundamental principles of the Monrovia states - that of equality and the right to self-determination for all African states.

7. Libya and Tunisia, which had taken part in the Monrovia Conference last year as well as the Sudan, boycotted the conference as a manifestation of their solidarity with Algeria. On the other hand, the group was enlarged by the participation, for the first time, of the Congo Republic (Leopoldville) and Tanganyika. Of particular importance was the presence of Prime Minister Adoula, which gave rise to an unanimous rejection by the Lagos states of the Soviet demand for the convocation of the United Nations Security Council to deal with the Congo problem.

8. The most important result of the Lagos Conference is the agreement reached on the draft of a Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (UAM). In its 47 articles, this draft envisages a community of interest of the member states while maintaining their full sovereignty. Far-reaching co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and military fields is planned, and common institutions are to be created towards this end.

9. Furthermore, the conference, in 15 resolutions passed unanimously, commented on various international issues. These resolutions constitute in many instances compromises between the UAM Group and the English-speaking participants in the conference. It is significant that the resolution on the question of decolonisation is free from attacks against the West. It is directed against colonial rule everywhere in the world and recognises as a matter of principle the right of self-determination for all peoples. With its draft of a charter, and with the resolution referred to above, the Lagos Conference achieved positive results which may influence future developments in Africa.

10. While the Lagos Conference was successful in bringing together the moderate African states, a growing tension was noticeable within the Casablanca Group. This was intensified by the conflicting views held by the various member states with regard to the participation of the Group in the Lagos Conference. Both President Sekou Touré and President Modibo Keita, who were among the original sponsors of the Monrovia Conference, wanted to participate in the Lagos Conference. In spite of their extreme political views both favour a certain measure of co-operation with the other French-speaking countries of Black Africa and this tendency may have been reinforced by Guinea's disappointing experience with the Communist bloc.

11. There are signs that there is a growing rift between the Arab and black African members of the Casablanca Group. In this context the Israeli problem plays a rôle of considerable weight. The three-power union between Ghana, Guinea and Mali has become more and more ineffective and the three heads of state who were supposed to have met in Accra in November have not yet been able to agree on a new date.

12. The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Guinea did not fail to raise doubts in Bamako about the value and the disinterestedness of Communist aid. Both Guinea and Mali are now following a more neutral line than they did before the expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador from Conakry. However, the agreements between France and Mali have created differences between Guinea and Mali. For Ghana the Union - of which it is the banker - represents a heavy burden which up to now has not had any effective political value. In addition, Sekou Touré and Modibo Keita are watching the ambitious Nkrumah with growing distrust.

13. The fourth Conference of the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) held in Addis Ababa from 2nd to 10th February revealed some initial attempts at a new grouping in Africa. Sixty delegates from 15 territories, including representatives from three independent governments - Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanganyika - attended the conference. The conference agreed to change the PAFMECA statutes so that South African organizations could in future be represented and the name of the organization was consequently changed into Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA). The purpose of the conference was to agree on measures to liberate all Africans still under foreign domination in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa and to pave the way for a federation of the PAFMECSA nations already enjoying independence and those to become independent later on.

14. The emergence into a position of importance of this organization of African states and national movements is likely to lead to an increase of tension in the southern part of Africa, particularly in the light of its militant nature.

15. The Conference of Heads of State of the African and Malagasy Union (UAM), which opened on 25th March with speeches by Mr. Dacko and Mr. Senghor and the election of Mr. Ahidjo as President of the Group until the next conference of UAM Heads of State (Libreville, August 1962), ended on 27th March.

16. The Conference considered that the existence of the UAM is not incompatible with the existence of the organization envisaged by the draft charter tabled at Lagos by Liberia. On the contrary, they were held to be complementary, the UAM being a regional organization within a continental African organization,

in the same way as the Lagos organization is a regional organization within the United Nations. Nevertheless, a number of amendments and comments were made concerning the Lagos draft charter which were to be transmitted to the Federal Government of Nigeria by each UAM State.

17. The final communiqué states that the Conference, after adopting the principle of a meeting of all independent States of Africa and Madagascar, considered that contacts should be made with other States represented at the Lagos Conference so that a common attitude could be adopted towards the meeting to be held in Tunis (Pan-African Conference).

18. In this connection, Mr. Ahidjo, in his closing address, said that Heads of State were resolved to make the UAM fully receptive "to the main movements for unity which are spreading across the world and in particular the continent of Africa". He went on: "We are willing to meet others at any time, in order to extend the family circle, and we will do our utmost to promote a united Africa."

Africa in the United Nations

19. The twenty-three black African states now form the largest single geographical group in the United Nations. In the next few years they can expect several additions to their Group. This will mean that if all the Africans vote together and enjoy the support of the majority of the Asians, they can command an absolute majority in the Assembly.

20. The African delegates tend to be ruled by their emotions, in particular in regard to colonial issues. There have, however, been occasions in the present Assembly when the moderate Africans have felt able to align themselves with the West in opposition to African extremists and the Soviet bloc.

21. Outside the colonial context the Soviet bloc has had little success in obtaining the support of the African bloc on cold war issues. The annexed chart showing the voting on eight cold war issues illustrates this very clearly.

22. The French-speaking Brazzaville group has shown itself to be more tightly knit than any other African group. Their presence in the looser Monrovia (or Lagos) group may increase the cohesion of this group at the next Assembly. The Casablanca group has acted together more often than not. While they have been more faithful followers of the Soviet bloc than other African groups the chart shows that they have not followed them slavishly.

23. There have been signs of division between the Africans and Asians where their narrow sectional interests are concerned, As the process of decolonisation is completed, moreover, there seems less likelihood of an Afro-Asian alliance being maintained, except in economic matters where their interests coincide.

The United Nations in Africa

(i) The Congo

24. Although nearly two years have passed since it became independent, the Congo is still torn by dissensions. These will not end with the ending of the secession of Katanga, but will be resolved only when the Central Government has shown that it has the will and the ability to restore its authority throughout the country. Although the Central Government has greatly improved its position, many of the provinces, and not only Katanga, remain beyond its control. Moreover, the economic situation shows no sign of improving and the current budgetary deficit is running at the rate of about £7 million per month.

25. During the period under review the United Nations continued to be deeply involved in the Congo, while attempting to carry out its basic rôle of assisting the Central Government in the maintenance of law and order and providing a climate for peaceful negotiations between the various political factions.

26. On 24th November the Security Council adopted a resolution which, inter alia, authorised United Nations troops to use force if necessary to expel foreign mercenaries from Katanga. In December, the United Nations and the Katanga gendarmerie engaged in heavy fighting in Elizabethville. Reports of civilian casualties and property damage resulted in severe criticism of the United Nations by public opinion in some Western countries.

27. The United Nations helped in arranging and mediating the Kitona meeting between Adoula and Tshombe at which the latter accepted in principle the unity of the Congo and the constitutional authority of the Central Government. Following the Kitona Agreement relations between Tshombe and the United Nations improved. Mixed Katanga-United Nations commissions were set up to supervise the departure of mercenaries and the United Nations provided a legal expert to advise the Katanga Government on constitutional matters. Further conversations are in progress in Leopoldville between the Central Government and the Provincial Government of Katanga.

28. The United Nations' support of the Central Government contributed to the political eclipse of Gizenga and helped Adoula to withstand pressure from the more extreme nationalists. The United Nations has continued to provide technical assistance to the Central Government and to counsel moderation and patience towards Tshombe.

(ii) South West Africa

29. In failing to adopt a Swedish draft resolution, the General Assembly rejected an offer by the South African government to admit a committee of three persons of international standing to report on conditions in the territory. An African-Asian resolution was adopted which established a new special committee on South West Africa whose terms of reference preclude any possibility of the South African Government co-operating with it. Until the International Court has delivered its judgment on the Liberian-Ethiopian case against South Africa, no significant progress is likely to be made.

(iii) The Seventeen-Member Committee

30. The special seventeen-member committee to be nominated by the President of the Assembly was established to examine the application of the "Colonial Declaration" and to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of its implementation. Its members are: Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

31. The committee's attention will be given primarily to the remaining dependent countries in Africa and it has been proposed that it take up as a first category Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mozambique, Zanzibar, Kenya, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and as a second category, Angola, South West Africa and Ruanda-Urundi. The committee has agreed to co-ordinate its work with other United Nations organs concerned with these territories. Its first item of business has been a discussion on the status of Southern Rhodesia, and it has decided as a first step to send a sub-committee to London for discussions with the British Government.

(iv) Angola

32. In November, the General Assembly considered once more the question of the transmission of information by Portugal concerning her overseas territories generally. A resolution was adopted by 90-3-2 establishing a Special Committee to examine available information on Portuguese territories and report to the Assembly. This committee has begun work and has requested assistance from the Government of Portugal, although the latter opposed its establishment. In January, the General Assembly considered the report of the Sub-Committee on Angola. The General Assembly passed a resolution (99-2-1) reaffirming its earlier decisions concerning the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence and calling upon Portugal to undertake the reforms necessary to comply with these decisions. The delegation of Portugal did not participate in the vote on this resolution and objected to the Assembly's consideration of this subject.

(v) Apartheid

33. The consideration of apartheid covered little new ground and came no closer to solving the problem of persuading the South African government to alter its policies. An African resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions by all members failed to obtain a two-thirds majority. Amendments to an Asian resolution calling for South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations, an arms embargo and oil sanctions were also defeated and the resolution condemning apartheid, but calling only for individual action by members against South Africa, was adopted by 97-2 with one abstention.

(vi) Ruanda-Urundi

34. On 23rd February the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 88 to 0 with 11 abstentions (Soviet bloc and Iraq) a resolution on the future of Ruanda-Urundi. The resolution called for the creation of a five-member United Nations commission (Togo, Iran, Liberia, Haiti and Morocco) to go to Ruanda-Urundi to discuss with the administering power and the local governments the various political, social, and economic problems facing the territory and to lend its good offices toward finding a solution to them before independence. The Assembly will meet in a resumed session in the first week of June to consider the commission's report. The resolution requested that the powers of internal autonomy be transferred to the governments of Ruanda and Urundi by 30th April and envisaged the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement on 1st July, 1962, if so approved by the General Assembly after examining the commission's report. The General Assembly adopted a separate resolution instructing the commission to discuss with the administering power and the Government of Ruanda the future of the Mwami of Ruanda who was defeated by the referendum held last September.

35. The General Assembly resolution was a compromise between conflicting viewpoints - those wishing to set a firm and early date for independence and those preferring to postpone a decision in the hope that a mutually acceptable formula for political union between the two territories could be found. One of the most contentious issues was whether the forces of the administering power should leave the territory before independence. After the Acting Secretary General made it quite clear that the United Nations did not have the resources to replace Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi, the Afro-Asians agreed to redraft the resolution to provide that Belgian forces might remain in the territory after independence if their presence were considered necessary.

Africa and the EEC

36. In the economic field, exchanges of view between representatives of member countries of the European Economic Community and African countries associated with the Community have been held in order to study the new treaty of association which is due to replace the first one which was drawn up in pursuance of the Rome Treaty and which expires on 31st December, 1962.

37. The principle of continuing the Eurafriean association beyond 1962 was adopted during the discussions. The terms on which this association will be renewed have yet to be determined. Since February 1962, a steering committee and various working parties, composed of Africans and Europeans, have been pushing ahead with their task of preparing a draft treaty to be submitted to the different governments and parliaments concerned.

38. These developments have been followed all along by the African countries of the Commonwealth. The problem of their possible association with the EEC will be studied in the light of their relations with other African countries and the entry of the United Kingdom into the Community.

Africa and the Arab World

39. The successful conclusion of the negotiations between the French Government and the National Liberation Front brings closer on the horizon the prospect of an independent Algeria, with all that this implies for the relations of Africa with the nations of both East and West. The emergence of a new Algerian state not only presents the possibility of a powerful counterpoise in Western Africa to the influence of the UAR and the other Arab states of the Middle East; it is also likely to affect profoundly the relations among the Arab states of the Casablanca Group and their rôle in that Group. It may well be that with an independent Maghreb (whether unified or not) the division between the Arab states and black Africa may become more accentuated.

40. For the time being, however, membership of the Casablanca Group provides both the UAR and Morocco with one of their principal means of exerting influence in Africa and, whatever their principal means of exerting influence in Africa and, whatever may be the cohesion of the Group, both countries are likely to continue to use their position therein to promote their respective rôles in Africa.

41. UAR policy in respect of Africa seems to be still showing the effects of the reverse sustained in the Congo with the dissolution of the Gizenga régime. So far, reaction to the loss of Syria does not seem to have led to any new emphasis on Nasser's long-standing aspiration to a rôle in pan-African

leadership. Rather, the continuing interest of the UAR in restricting Israeli influence with African states for the present appears to be the dominant feature of UAR relations with these countries. The active support of several members of the Brazzaville group for the Israeli position on the Palestine issue at the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly must have suggested the need for renewed UAR effort in this field.

42. It is expected, however, that should President Nasser succeed in strengthening his position he will continue to pursue his well-known tactics in Africa, which have all too often served communist aims on that continent.

43. Because of the growing influence of Islam in Africa, Nasser may well turn his efforts to the cultural and religious fields by intensifying his Islamic policy and stepping up the activities of his cultural and religious attachés who, like his military attachés in the past, might well turn out to be involved in subversive activities.

The Pan-African Trade Union Conference of Dakar

44. A Pan-African Trade Union Conference, held at Dakar 9th - 16th January this year, was attended by the representatives of 20 independent African States and of 41 Trade Union organizations. The Conference had been promoted mainly by the trade union representatives of Senegal and Tunisia and by other African workers' delegates attending the ILO Conference at Geneva in June 1961, by way of a reaction to the decisions imposed by the promoters of the previous Trade Union Conference held at Casablanca in May 1961. During this Conference, an All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), dominated by the powers of the Casablanca Group, had been established.

45. The Dakar Conference decided upon the creation of the African Trade Union Confederation - ATUC - ("Confédération Syndicale Africaine") having its Head Office in Dakar. The Tunisian Ahmed Telili was elected President with seven Vice-Presidents (including the Kenyan leader Tom Mboya), one for each of the Trade Union regions into which the whole African continent has been divided. The ATUC appears to be a genuine Pan-African Trade Union seriously interested in trade union affairs and inspired by democratic ideas. The doctrinal report urges the Confederation to combat equally "the capitalist system and the communist system"(1) and to reject "all forms of dictatorship".

(1) The denunciation of the communist system is due to the intervention of the Christian trade unionists G. Pongault and D. Soumah.

46. In line with the attitude taken by AATUF, the ATUC has declared itself independent from any international trade union organization although any single trade union remains free to continue its affiliations with non-African organizations. The difference, however, lies in the fact that in the case of the Dakar Confederation (ATUC) its independence from the ICFTU is effective and real. The AATUF, despite its denial and, indeed, prohibition of external affiliation, is subject to considerable communist and WFTU influence and has a number of extremists in key posts.

47. Judging by the recent session of the permanent Secretariat of the AATUF, the divergencies which hamstringing the intergovernmental organizations belonging to the Casablanca Group likewise affect the pan-African Trade Union Federation, which is an offshoot of it. This meeting of the Secretariat which, coming immediately after the Dakar Conference, was meant to be proof of its vitality, merely culminated, apart from its criticisms of the rival organization, in the creation of an executive committee responsible for the time being for clearing up disagreements and in particular the tricky question of "dual membership" which is forbidden under the Federation's Charter. Guinean and Ghanaian trade unionists advocated the immediate application of the rule, whereas others were in favour of a more liberal approach. A congress of the AATUF is due to settle the matter within the next few months.

Problems of Particular Areas

(i) Ghana

48. During the period under review Government leaders have been labouring to eliminate foreign influence and to bring the various sections of the population into line with the Government's policy of "neutralism". An official White Paper dismissed the strikes of last September as part of a long series of plots by an insignificant minority. At the same time it alleged that there was an international conspiracy against Ghana.

49. To meet the threat of an economic crisis, the Government has chosen solutions which are strongly socialist in character. Despite the theoretical division of the economy into several sectors, its interest has mainly been in the field of public enterprise. Assurances that private foreign investment would be dealt with fairly, and even encouraged, have not been matched with deeds. Instead, government efforts are centred on the implementation of trade and aid agreements signed with Eastern Europe. Fortunately, the decision by Western countries to co-operate in the construction of the Volta River project guarantees an important Western participation in Ghana's foreign relations in the years ahead.

50. The trend in Ghana's foreign affairs has not been any more favourable. The royal visit was a popular success and must have had a restraining influence upon the leftist leaders who surround Nkrumah. However, the Government's desire to become free of the ties which continued to bind it to Britain after independence, and its desire for domestic economic reasons to develop greater trade with the Eastern bloc, both continue to dominate Ghana's foreign policy. There seems to be a growing fear in Ghana that the European Economic Community is a weapon of "neo-colonialism" intended to regain control and influence for Europe in former African colonial territories. Ghana's relations with most Western countries are likely, therefore, to continue to be inhibited by the country's relentless pursuit of its particular brand of anti-colonialism. At the same time, Ghana is becoming increasingly isolated in Africa itself.

51. In keeping with Ghana's ambition to bring about an Africa independent of the colonial powers of yesterday complemented by the establishment of economic relations with "socialist countries", there has been an important expansion of relations with the communist bloc. The trade agreements signed last year have been followed by arrangements for military and other assistance although Ghana continues to accept military assistance from both East and West. Whether Ghana considers that sufficient links with the communist countries have been forged to demonstrate the country's independence of the two major blocs is not clear. There are, however, a few indications that, like Guinea earlier, Ghana may now be coming to recognise the limitations and disadvantages of aid from communist countries. Until these indications become more pronounced, however, the future of Ghana will continue to be of concern to Western Governments.

(ii) Guinea

52. Communist relations with Guinea have been clouded by the demand for the recall of the Soviet Ambassador who was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of the country.

53. Guinea's recent disenchantment with Soviet activities should not, however, be interpreted as an indication that the country is veering away from the East and turning to the West. It is doing neither. Leaders like Sekou Touré - and this applies also to other African leaders - are first of all African nationalists, who think in terms of the Guinean and African revolution. He is not pro-West, but neither is he pro-East; he is pro-African. He has only in mind Guinean and African aims. The doctrine of his régime expresses itself in formulae that sound Marxist but have a different emphasis and other aims. It has borrowed many elements from the methodology of communism and

so has the outward appearances of the Communist ideology. In fact, however, one might say that as a revolutionary doctrine the Communist ideology is a rival of the Guinean revolutionary doctrine. The happenings in Guinea are rather symptomatic of this basic rivalry and hostility than - though they are accompanied by friendly gestures towards it - of a new friendship for the West.

Mali

54. The negotiations to put Franco-Mali relations on a normal footing ended on 27th February. They resulted in the signing on 10th March of a set of agreements for co-operation, the main feature of which is a strict reciprocity of advantages.

55. One of these agreements relates to French technical assistants' terms and conditions of service. The cultural agreement and its protocols provide for various forms of educational assistance. The agreement for economic and financial co-operation maintains a free-trade area with France and the Monetary Union of West Africa as the framework for Franco-Mali monetary relations. A commercial protocol is devoted to annual trade. An exchange of letters has defined the French contribution to the development of Mali under its four-year plan.

Angola

56. Since the last meeting of the Experts Committee, the situation in Angola has undergone no perceptible change. The Portuguese authorities continued to maintain law and order, and are actively implementing the measures promulgated in September 1961. The intervention of the armed forces has been restricted to police operations. As all the administrative and population centres have been completely reoccupied, the attacks from the rebels - who freely cross the frontier to escape or to find support - are promptly repelled without any need to resort to large-scale military actions.

57. Those who have sought safety either in the forests or in the ex-Belgian Congo in order to escape massacres by rebels, continued to return in growing numbers (150,000 up to 10th January last, according to the London revue "Congo-Africa" of 8th February, 1962).

58. Differences between rebel leaders have come into the open in recent press declarations by Marcos Kassanga, who calls himself "General Chief of Staff". Having previously belonged before to the UPA, Kassanga is now in the MPLA. He declared the "bandit" Roberto Holden responsible for the killing of 8,000 people although previously both Kassanga and Roberto Holden accused the military forces of the murders.

The Republic of South Africa

59. The most significant recent development in South Africa has been the announcement on 23rd January, 1962, by Prime Minister Verwoerd of the granting of self-government to the Transkei which is to be the first of a number of self-governing Bantu states in South Africa. It is hoped that consideration of the constitution of the new native state will be completed and the system in operation by the first half of 1963.

60. The proposals included the setting up of a Transkei parliament of 129 members, of whom 68 would be chiefs, 26 nominated by the Paramount chiefs, and 35 elected by a franchise of all Transkeian taxpayers, 9 representing Transkeians living in "white" South Africa. The parliament will have control over internal Transkei affairs although the South African Government will continue to control defence and external affairs; internal security, and certain other aspects of justice; posta and telegraphs; transport and immigration; currency, public loans, customs and excise. There will be a cabinet of 16 members of the Assembly, appointed by a Transkeian Prime Minister who will be chairman.

PART II: COMMUNIST PENETRATION

African Communist Parties

61. There is only one known and open Communist party operating in the area. This is the small Communist Party of Lesotho of Basutoland, which was decisively defeated when it sought to dominate the nationalist movement there. Its importance is rather that it is sustained by the prescribed Communist Party of South Africa which is increasingly seeking to operate through Basutoland.

62. There are also indigenous political parties and organizations which follow a policy indistinguishable from that which the Communists seek to encourage. In addition to these identifiable Communist parties, furthermore, there are, of course, individuals with Communist leanings in non-communist political parties.

63. It appears that up to now the Soviets have not encouraged the formation of openly Communist parties in most of black Africa and in their virtual absence, Soviet strategists use other means of propagating their theories. They accept the rule of the "national bourgeoisie" as a fact and for the time being support the nationalist governments which have been formed. They operate through existing political parties, ethnic groups, youth and trades union movements and individuals who have either received Communist training or who seem likely in the future to

achieve power and may thereafter be used for their purposes. The Communist aim is to build up an awareness of differentiations which already exist in so many fields in Africa, to create and stimulate grievances in order to encourage opposition to nationalist governments and their ultimate replacement by those organized and trained to conduct a truly Marxist revolution.

Soviet and Satellite Penetration

General Activities

64. During the last six months, Communist attempts at penetration in African countries south of the Sahara, and particularly to the south-west, have been hampered by certain facts.

65. The unofficial activities of Soviet diplomats in Conakry and the reaction of the Guinean Government to their underhand manoeuvres have opened the eyes of neighbouring governments to the true nature of these diplomatic missions and Communist aid.

66. Furthermore, the international recognition of the Congolese Central Government, the Soviet attitude to the Government, the exploitation of Gizenga by the Communists and the United Nations debates on Congolese affairs, have enabled Africans to form a better idea of the Soviet Union's efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo.

67. The fact that the Soviet Union resumed nuclear tests, while at the same time deploring all such tests, and experimented with the 50 megaton bomb has made a strong impression in Africa.

68. Generally speaking, it can be said that, whereas the Communist bloc has so far carried off significant successes in the field of pure propoganda, thanks to such catch-phrases as "anti-imperialist", "anti-colonialist" and the like, which immediately strike a responsive chord in the heart of Africans, the amount of practical and concrete assistance Communists have been able to furnish has, in the event, been quite limited.

69. One must, however, refrain from drawing more general conclusions since the Soviets have often given proof of the necessary tactical flexibility to adapt to new circumstances. It is characteristic that the slogan "neo-colonialism" has already replaced that of "colonialism" and seems to be gaining much ground among the newly independent countries.

70. Furthermore, the Communist bloc's efforts in recent months have tended to be concentrated on East Africa. It may be too early to assess the results achieved, but the special problems of this area may make it particularly vulnerable to Communist penetration.

Diplomatic Relations

71. Soviet bloc régimes have been quick to recognise newly independent African States, and at the end of 1961 there were more than 60 bloc missions of various kinds established in these countries. These comprise 13 USSR Embassies, including one recently opened in Tanganyika, and another shortly to be opened in Sierra Leone. Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Somalia are areas of major bloc concentration. Despite resistance on the part of some African States, the USSR by insisting on exaggerated staffs often manages to bring in more personnel than would be required for strictly diplomatic purposes.

72. Other bloc countries are also increasing their representation in Africa. Bulgaria has accredited Ambassadors to Morocco and Ghana, and raised its mission in Ethiopia to Ambassadorial level. Czechoslovakia has accredited an Ambassador to Somalia; has a chargé d'affaires in Nigeria and hopes to open shortly in Tanganyika. Ghana is the only African country to have established diplomatic relations and appointed Ambassadors in every bloc country.

73. Bloc missions were expelled from the Congo in September 1960. Their subsequent open support for the Gizenga régime left them in a predicament when Adoula's Central Government was formed in August 1961. With the exception of the East German and Communist Chinese missions, they have all been re-accredited to Léopoldville.

Arms Deliveries and Personnel Training

74. Guinea has for the last three years been the main recipient of arms from the Soviet bloc and recently has been receiving excess supplies for transshipment to Portuguese Africa and Mali.

75. The main sources of supply of arms and ammunition to Africa are the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. The arms delivered by these countries are transported by sea to Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Ghana (Takoradi). From some or all of these places arms have been distributed to Angola and other places in Africa. Dead rebels in Angola have been found with Czech weapons; in a few cases, arms of allied makes have been found, possibly bought by Yugoslavia and re-exported. Very recently the Russian ship "Urxik" discharged at Conakry 2 patrol boats, 10 tanks, 20 cannon and about 700 tons of ammunition for light and medium arms.

76. Moscow has also assisted in the training of personnel. 63 Ghanaian officer cadets are at present undergoing a 3½ years' training course at Moscow Military Academy, and Soviet military delegations have visited Ethiopia and Ghana. Russian advisers are also employed in Guinea at police and military schools.

Training of Angolan terrorists has been conducted in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, Communist China, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea and in the Congo (Léopoldville). It is also reported that certain North African countries and Poland are planning to send officers to train and command Angolan rebels.

Aid and Trade

77. The economic and technical activity of the Soviet bloc during the last few months suggests that the USSR and its satellites continue ready to strike at targets of opportunity as they appear. While Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia appear to be favoured children in many respects, aid has also been offered to countries of such differing tendencies as Nigeria, Tunisia, the Niger, the Congo and Morocco. Trade agreements are now in existence with at least ten African countries without much discrimination as to their adherence to any particular group or policy. Thus there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is especially obsessed with ideological niceties in choosing its objectives.

78. The Soviet Union and its satellites drum up maximum publicity for minimum outlay. Considerable advantage accrues to the bloc from its selective tactics and its ability to expend resources, without fear of domestic criticism, on projects with political impact regardless of their real value.

79. Although bloc credits offered since 1954 to the seven African countries with aid agreements total some \$600,000,000, the amount thus far drawn down does not approach 6% of this total. On the other hand, during the three years from 1957 to 1960, Western aid to Africa totalled approximately \$1,650,000,000, much of it in non-repayable grants. Thus Soviet figures and fanfare should not conceal the fact that bloc aid is only a small fraction of Western aid and that it has not made any real dent on the long-term problems of newly independent states. There are signs that the unhappy experience of Guinea in this respect has not passed unnoticed.

80. Trade figures for the Soviet bloc vary considerably from year to year and from country to country, with some decline registered for the first six months of 1961. On the whole the Soviet bloc's share of African trade continues low, an average of about 2½%, for instance, in 1960, reaching however 5.5% in Ghana and 33% in Guinea.

81. The numbers of bloc technicians in Africa during 1961, and of African technical students trained in the bloc from 1956 through 1961, suggest that the favoured targets are Guinea, Ghana, and Mali in that order.

82. One recent advance in an especially sensitive technical field is the assistance rendered by the Soviet bloc to national airlines, as in Ghana, Guinea and Mali.

Trade Union Activities

83. Communist subversion in the trade union movement - a special target for the Soviets - is carried out on two different fronts. First, through the activities of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and secondly through direct contacts, that is to say, trade union groups from Communist countries send delegations, donate gifts, supply advisers and run special courses and schools for Africans. East Germany and Czechoslovakia are the spearhead of this manoeuvre. For example, the trade union school for Africans at Bernau now claims to be training 100 Africans and Asians at its present session.

84. Communist policy towards the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) is at present one of qualified support. The aim could be, eventually, to engulf AATUF within WFTU. The recent constitution of the ATUC might be a serious obstacle to Communist penetration in Africa.

Cultural Relations

85. Wherever they have been able to, Eastern countries have signed cultural agreements with African States. Agreements of this kind have been drawn up with Guinea, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria and very recently the Niger. In this way, Soviet bloc countries can send to Africa "teams" who are not bent on fostering artistic and sporting relations alone, and can invite back African delegations in order to feed their minds on Marxist propaganda. Bloc countries also take advantage of these cultural agreements to spread quantities of Communist literature throughout Africa, thereby often helping to create the desired climate of subversion.

86. At the same time Eastern countries make a point of training the maximum number of young Africans to become active Communist agents in Africa. Two complementary methods are used. To begin with, a large number of scholarships are made available for those wishing to visit Iron Curtain countries. But they are granted in particular to those who seem most receptive to Marxist ideology, so that many members of opposition parties in different African countries (members of the UPC in the Cameroon, followers of Dgibbo Sakary in the Niger) are known to have gone there secretly. Specially equipped universities receive them in Moscow. There are 3,000 black students at present living in the USSR or in satellite countries. Some of these students have returned home disappointed.

87. The Soviets are also doing their utmost to send as many Communist teachers and instructors as possible to African schools. At present they are most numerous in Guinea.

88. Then, too, the "Soviet-African Friendship Association" increases this range of means of cultural penetration in Africa. It celebrates in Moscow the national days of the different African countries. Furthermore, the Association has set up two Committees: a "Committee on Woman" and a "Committee for the study of African Literature and Art". Two associations of the same kind were recently set up, one in East Germany, the other in Poland.

Front Organizations

89. For the International Communist Front Organizations, the latter months of 1961 and early 1962 appear to have been mainly devoted to consolidating positions gained in African organizations rather than to stimulating fresh activity.

90. Eighty-one African guests attended the 5th Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) held in Moscow 4th-15th December, 1961, of whom several represented the national trade union federations of the "Casablanca Group".

91. The World Peace Council (WPC) continues to make little impact upon Africa although Guinea was represented at the Council meeting in Stockholm in December 1961. The Accra World Peace Assembly now scheduled for June 1962 may indicate the strength of this front organization in Africa.

92. A so-called "enlarged bureau meeting" of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) was held in Bamako from 19th-23rd January, 1962. Representatives from 12 African States attended, prominent among them being the delegations from Guinea, Ghana and Mali.

93. The International Union of Students (IUS) continues to grant scholarships to Africans for study in Communist countries. At the last Executive Committee meeting the following student organizations from Sierra Leone, Portuguese territories in Africa and Nigeria and the Congo were admitted to full membership. A number of Africans are serving on the Preparatory Committee for the 8th World Youth Festival in Helsinki.

94. African representation at the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) executive meeting in Havana in January 1962, was restricted to observers from the Maghreb States and Ghana and to Mamadon Gologo and Doudou Gueye as delegates from Mali, who were the prime organizers behind the inaugural session of the Pan-African Journalists' Union (PAJU) in Bamako in May 1961.

Propaganda

95. Printed propaganda in the form of books, magazines, pamphlets and newspapers, is being sent into Africa in increasing quantities. Bloc material is of varying quality - sometimes good - contains features of interest to Africans and is sufficiently cheap to incite vendors to greater promotional efforts. Some African governments, however, have recently imposed restrictions on the influx of communist literature.

96. Communist bloc broadcasts in languages other than Arabic to Africa south of the Sahara, have increased from 134 hours a week in November 1961, to 167 hours 25 minutes in March 1962. The chief feature of the increase of bloc broadcasting has been the expansion of Moscow's Swahili Service (17½ hours per week) and the introduction by Moscow of broadcasts in Hausa (7 hours per week) and Somali (7 hours per week). Thus the trend towards the use of African languages continues while the chief target area for Moscow's broadcasts would seem to be East Africa and the Horn.

97. The bloc has also made the fullest possible use of its news agencies to place articles free of charge in the local press. Films with a special appeal to Africans are also being made.

98. Soviet African studies have been particularly effective in serving propaganda purposes, and may have some impact on the forthcoming First Congress of Africanists scheduled to take place at Accra in December 1962.

99. In January, a "Congo solidarity week" was organized in all Communist countries. References were made to the memory of Patrice Lumumba, "the victim of Western and American imperialism". The "myth" of the former prime minister is carefully fostered by all Communist organizations.

Communist China

100. The activity of Communist China in Africa is less extensive and somewhat more selective than that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is efficient and well directed, and there is reason to believe that it may make considerable progress, especially if Peking decides to intensify the exploitation of the advantages which its racial and political distance from Europe offer to it.

101. Peking maintains diplomatic relations with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Somalia and Tanganyika. The People's Republic has manifested a special interest in the opposition elements of East Africa and the Cameroons, and its relationships in these areas are somewhat analagous to those she has entertained with the FLN in Algeria. Technical and economic aid has been given or offered to

the Governments of Ghana, Mali, Somalia and particularly to Guinea. There are considerable exchanges of visitors and programmes for students from selected areas such as Guinea, Somalia and the Cameroons. In her commercial and cultural relations with Africa, China is somewhat less selective.

102. African propaganda themes have been carefully orchestrated in Peking, which has put to good use the facilities of its radio and the New China News Agency, with offices in Cairo, Rabat, Accra, Conakry and Tunis.

103. While Chinese propaganda is more militant than that of the Soviet Union with respect to colonialism, Western (and especially American) "imperialism" and the United Nations in Africa, it is difficult to detect any significant projection of existing ideological differences with Moscow on the African scene. This is not to say that Africa may not eventually become an arena for Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Yugoslavia

104. In a comparatively short space of time Yugoslavia has acquired a high reputation among African leaders who look to her both as a source of political inspiration and of practical aid. This Yugoslav success might be explained by the following factors:

- (a) being herself a backward country, she is considered as an example of a speedy economic development;
- (b) she has an undisputed anti-colonial record;
- (c) her policy of non-alignment is attractive to the African countries and she acquired much prestige during the Belgrade Conference;
- (d) the visits of President Tito to various African countries have been very successful.

105. Moreover, Yugoslavia has entered into a number of trade agreements and while bloc aid is only too often slow to materialise, Yugoslavia has sent comparatively large numbers of experts, especially teachers and doctors, to Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco and Ethiopia. She is building hydro-electric power stations in Guinea, Togo and Ethiopia, and small factories in Liberia, Morocco and Guinea. She has also, for example, reconstructed the Ethiopian Red Sea port of Assab which was formally opened in December 1964.

106. Yugoslavia has not restricted her efforts to the states of the Casablanca Group but has also been active in moderate African states like Liberia, Togo and Tunisia.

PART III: WESTERN ACTIONHarmonisation of Western Action

107. The co-ordination of Western action remains of the highest importance in meeting the challenge of the Sino-Soviet bloc in Africa and in preserving from among existing Western positions in Africa those best suited to meet this challenge in an era where the problems of "colonialism" are rapidly giving way to those of newly independent states.

108. We may recognise at once that on certain matters - particularly in the political sphere - NATO nations, while sharing common objectives in Africa, have differed noticeably in their choice of means. Consequently they have spoken with evident variations of voice in the United Nations or in other world forums. While this entails obvious disadvantages one must always consider that Africans are more likely to be favourably disposed to the West if we take care to refrain from creating an image of NATO as a monolith, presenting a united front against their interests.

109. At the same time it must be recognised that demonstrations of basic Western unity in the face of the Soviet threat are not only desirable but essential. There is still room for closer consultation and co-ordination - bilateral and multilateral - among NATO countries at home, in the African capitals, and in international forums. Moves in this direction, which should remain discreet, such as the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Africa, meetings of experts such as the present one, and bilateral exchanges in the capitals concerned, should be intensified.

110. Moves toward the co-ordination of Western economic, technical and cultural assistance, have tended to increase recently and it is to be hoped that NATO countries will encourage this trend both bilaterally and within existing international economic organizations. This is particularly important in a period of decolonisation and the alteration of old relationships. At such times it is important to avoid leaving gaps which may be exploited by the Communist bloc and, on the other hand, to avoid leaving the Africans with the impression that obstacles are being put in the way of their efforts to address themselves to new sources of help.

Diplomatic Representation in Africa

111. Western representation in African countries has been increased in recent months and in sum far exceeds representation of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, while the latter have very little representation indeed in Eastern and Southern Africa,

Western representation fully covers the continent. This situation will, however, change to the extent that territories which are at present dependent often accept Sino-Soviet representation on becoming independent - as Tanganyika has done.

112. African territories, moreover, may be increasingly reluctant to accept multiple accreditations of Ambassadors, and may refuse to continue such arrangements when the present Ambassadors leave. In this event certain countries which are now represented practically everywhere in Africa may find it impossible to continue this in future. In these circumstances, it might be useful for NATO countries to consider together how the African field can best be covered diplomatically.

United Nations and Specialised Agencies

113. It has been encouraging to note, at recent sessions of the United Nations, that the voting record of the African States has shown that even on colonial issues they have not blindly followed Soviet leads. It has also been apparent that African States have been disinclined to become involved in issues dividing the West and East.

114. It therefore continues to be of importance that the Africans should not doubt Western sympathy and understanding for their own reasonable and justifiable aspirations. This does not mean that the West could or should always encourage or support African proposals, but it should continue to be forthcoming and understanding when questions of particular interest to Africa are under discussion.

115. The Africans' desire for increased participation in the United Nations should continue to be encouraged by the West by supporting, where appropriate, a reasonable enlargement in United Nations organs. It might also be to the West's advantage to point out to the Africans that the major cause for failure to achieve this has been the USSR's obstinacy in refusing to contemplate at present any enlargement of those United Nations organs established under the Charter.

116. It should perhaps be noted that at its last session the Economic Commission for Africa recommended that ECOSOC should alter the Commission's terms of reference to relegate certain NATO Powers which are at present full members, to associate membership. NATO consultation on this question before the 34th session of ECOSOC in July would no doubt be desirable.

117. It cannot be expected that all United Nations actions will always be satisfactory to all NATO countries, nor that all United Nations actions will satisfy African aspirations. It continues, therefore, to be important that Western policies should be carefully and honestly explained to Africans so that they will have no cause to believe that only the Soviet bloc is supporting and defending their interests.

Congo

118. The experts welcome the fact that conversations are at this time in progress between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. They see in such talks the only way in which an acceptable and lasting solution can be found to the problems which divided the Congolese Central Government and the Provincial Government of Katanga. They hope that the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of its Charter, will do everything in its power to encourage a peaceful solution of the differences now dividing the Congolese, bearing in mind that the United Nations' Mandate, while authorising all appropriate measures to prevent civil war, specifically enjoined it not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo or to be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict. They recommend that members of NATO use all their influence to give effect to this solution.

119. The experts hope that if agreement is reached between Adoula and Tshombe the United Nations and its specialised agencies will devote their resources and energies to the rebuilding of the administration and of the economy, making full use without any discrimination of the services of those countries best placed to assist, and to ensuring that the Central Government has the means at its disposal to maintain law and order. They recall that this latter was the task originally entrusted to the United Nations so that the Central Government should have at its disposal the means of effectively maintaining law and order throughout the Congo.

Ruanda-Urundi

120. The experts have noted the gratifying results of political consultation in the Ad Hoc Committee on Africa which was set up at the initiative of the Belgian Government. In particular, this consultation resulted in NATO solidarity in the United Nations when the question of Ruanda-Urundi was discussed. It is hoped there will be similar consultation on other issues.

Arms deliveries

121. The problem of trans-shipment of arms originating in communist or other countries to subversive organizations in Africa is extremely complex. The volume, the routes and the real destination are difficult to assess. It would be well to follow this problem closely, to exchange information among the member countries and to keep a careful watch on such shipments in the light of their possible misuse or diversion.

122. Even where arms delivered remain in the hands of the governments to which they are supplied serious problems arise. Relatively small shipments of arms can easily upset the balance of strength among countries hitherto lightly equipped and dependent on exterior arrangements for their defence. States of moderate tendency naturally manifest uneasiness with respect to deliveries

to such states as Guinea and inevitably formulate demands to which some Western response is necessary. Thus the potential for an arms race in Africa is already present. NATO member governments might well watch for opportunities to promote moves on the part of African leaders looking toward regional arms limitation. In the context of the cold war, however, such a move would produce results only if it were clearly African in character.

123. The High Command of the Casablanca States, which has now been established in Accra, is an instrument which might serve the purposes of communist influence, but its orientation and efficiency cannot be judged at this time.

Economic Aid and Commercial Policies

124. Given that Western resources are not unlimited the question arises whether most assistance should go to governments whose policies are most to the liking of the West, to those leaning most dangerously towards the East, to those intrinsically most important in terms of, for example, size or geographic location, or to those capable of using aid to the greatest economic advantage, etc. It seems advisable to adopt an empirical approach to these and other criteria, bearing in mind (to the extent that public opinion in donor countries will permit):-

- (a) the risk of leaving our friends with the feeling that we are unsatisfactory associates;
- (b) the desirability of maintaining contact at the largest number of points;
- (c) the danger of highly favoured governments being represented as subservient to the West, and overthrown;
- (d) the risk that curtailing aid for disciplinary reasons may drive a government with pro-Soviet sympathies all the way.

125. The favouring of a few African states by Communist bloc countries has created considerable distrust and resentment among other African states to the detriment of the Soviet position in Africa, while, on the other hand, the inclusion of some radical African states in the aid programmes of Western countries has helped to keep them on a more neutral line. Western aid offers should therefore be co-ordinated with this in mind.

126. As far as technical assistance is concerned the Eastern countries enjoy an advantage over the West in that they can order any number of technical experts to any place in Africa they consider politically useful, while the West, with its industrial boom and full employment, meets with great difficulties in its attempts to find qualified persons for this purpose. The Western governments should, therefore, consider measures for the procurement and training of experts within the framework of their technical assistance programmes.

127. African countries' requirements in all fields are so enormous that resources on a really gigantic scale would be needed in order to meet only a small fraction of them. The entire resources of Western countries would probably not be sufficient to organize Africa straight away. A fortiori, the resources of the Soviet Union and Communist China are inadequate since, despite decades of toil, their economy is still characterised by scarcity. Some African governments feel a psychological need to "balance" Eastern against Western aid. To the extent that the East meets real needs, the eventual African gain may be more beneficial to our cause than the accruing Communist advantage is detrimental.

128. An important purpose of aid should be to promote a national feeling within the African states. Most of the young African countries are suffering from tribalism and lack of unity, a fact which is being exploited by communist propaganda in order to maintain the existing rifts. Road construction and development of communications, for instance, will be the best means of building up national unity. Similarly, aid given on a regional basis would tend to overcome artificial divisions and promote the economic integration of Africa.

129. NATO countries already play an overwhelming part in the provision of aid of all kinds by Western-oriented countries. It is, therefore, desirable that member countries should do what they can to encourage investment by, and bilateral assistance both technical and economic from, non-NATO members such as Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Of these, Japan is likely to be the most forthcoming in the economic and technical fields. South Africa too, could play an important rôle in certain neighbouring areas.

Education and Scholarships

130. The secondary and technical education of young Africans is given almost exclusively in Africa even in establishments where the staff, for lack of enough local teachers, are mainly recruited abroad. Western countries must continue to ensure that they themselves provide these teachers.

131. The problem then is to find the necessary staff. Leaving aside those who are already on the spot, teachers should preferably be recruited among the youngest members of the profession in western countries who are, moreover, the most adaptable. The success of such a recruiting drive largely depends on the provision of incentives in the form of salaries and career advantages. The importance of the western rôle in education in Africa should lead the competent authorities in western countries to grant teachers, if need be, additional allowances and to safeguard continuity between their service in Africa and their future service in their country of origin.

132. The number of African students attending universities and technical colleges in western countries is increasing. This phenomenon is due to the desire for education among young Africans and to the requirements of an independent Africa. Effective collaboration with African governments is already a feature of this development which can, doubtless, be shaped to still greater advantage if African leaders and western governments are imbued with a mutual concern to satisfy requirements exactly, both as regards quantity and quality. In this connection, it is desirable that African students be urged not to neglect careers as technicians which will allow them to play a positive rôle in the new administrations and enterprises in their country. Due attention must be paid, however, to the fact that an élite developed heedlessly may increase the number of "unemployed intellectuals". They are always dangerous. For the same reason, African scholarship-holders should be selected in such a way as to cut down the number of failures to a minimum.

133. The academic success of young Africans in a western country is determined first and foremost by the quality of the welcome they receive there and the human relations that develop. In this field, particular care must be taken in shaping the bodies responsible for looking after these young students at the universities.

Trade Union Activities

134. The outcome of the recent African Trade Union Conference of Dakar was promising and very positive from the Western point of view. In effect the establishment of the African Trade Union Confederation - ATUC - is an important confirmation of the policy of moderation adopted by the countries of the "Monrovia Group". It is to be hoped that ATUC will first succeed in strengthening its own organization and that this will enable it to expand its activities, thereby attracting to itself the support of unions which at present do not belong to it.

135. Recent developments in Africa have also shown that the Soviet bloc attributes an ever-increasing importance to trade union activities for the reason that labour organizations often represent an important if not the sole basis for an organized opposition to present governments in Africa. Therefore, an intensification of Western efforts in this field must have a high priority; the training of African trade union leaders either in Western countries or in Africa itself should be intensified; assistance should be given to strengthen the organization of ATUC; and a continued interest should also be given to a policy of assistance in favour of those African trade unions which have shown themselves to be genuinely interested in labour matters and not merely in political propaganda. Such assistance, for obvious reasons, must be given very discreetly.

Public Relations

136. In their relations with African countries, Western governments and Western public opinion should not be too much hindered by a partly communist imposed guilt-complex because of their colonial past. This can only lead to a half-hearted and hesitating attitude. The West should keep in mind that the Western colonial record is certainly not only negative but has its decidedly positive sides, among them important Western contributions to the development and ultimately to the independence of most of the African countries.

137. In its public relations with the African countries the West should explain that Western colonialism is fast becoming a thing of the past but that Soviet colonialism is a thing of the present. Africans should be reminded that the latter manifests itself covertly in communist endeavours to take over Western positions in former Western territories and overtly by the existence of a Soviet colonial empire.

138. It is encouraging that during the period under review some disenchantment with Soviet activities appeared in several African countries. The Western Powers have no cause for complacency, however, and every effort must be made to step up anti-communist propoganda and to increase positive information about the Western way of life. The experts again draw attention to the importance in this field of the provision of material for indigenous African broadcasting stations. Moreover, consideration should be given to a joint Western effort to support television in suitable areas of Africa which might have an impact out of all proportion to the cost and wrest the initiative from the Russians.

139. In its public relations the West should take into account the specifically African character of the revolutionary movements in that continent. It must avoid regarding as "communist inspired" every action by the new African states that may appear to jeopardise Western interests or to violate Western values. It should also refrain from efforts to impose on Africans the Western way of thinking. The West should understand the problems of the African states in African terms and try to influence the independent African way of thinking in its development, on the one hand, by endeavouring to make sure that the Africans understand the Western approach, on the other hand, by endeavouring to open their eyes to the real character and dangers of the Soviet ideology and system. Visits of African leaders to Berlin, for instance, have proved very useful in this respect,

140. Anti-Soviet propoganda should be carried out very subtly and without putting a Western label on it. It is important to apply methods consonant with African mentality and adapted to local situations.

141. A strong fresh Soviet subversive assault on Africa may well be based upon the promised visit of Mr. Khrushchev to the continent. The experts recommend that special efforts be made in advance of such an eventuality to consider what steps NATO countries can take separately, but in co-operation with one another:

- (a) to reduce the impact of such a visit;
- (b) to mount a campaign in advance to demonstrate clearly the nature of Soviet Communism;
- (c) to show up the relative insignificance of Soviet assistance in real terms as compared with Western help;
- (d) to expose the form which Soviet intervention in the Congo has taken;
- (e) to draw attention discreetly to examples of Khrushchev's bad behaviour on his previous Asian tours; and
- (f) to draw attention to the presence of strong-arm Soviet guards surrounding Mr. Khrushchev and to contrast this with measures to protect Western visitors.

East Africa

142. With the attainment of independence by almost all the countries of West Africa the tide of battle in the colonial field has flowed to East and Southern Africa. Interest centres principally on the likelihood of the British East African territories attaining independence and if so, in what form. Unless something unforeseen intervenes, it seems likely that Kenya and Zanzibar will follow Uganda into independence in the course of 1962/63. It may well be that these countries, together with Tanganyika will form some kind of a Federal organization making use of the existing East African Common Services organization. From the point of view of economy and efficiency there would be much to commend this.

143. It is less certain that in the next two years any progress will be made in the proposition agreed at the PAFMECSA meeting in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia and Somalia should participate in such a Federation. Certainly such participation seems very difficult unless agreement is reached, acceptable to all concerned, on the problem posed by Somalia minorities in Kenya and boundary problems.

144. The most difficult problem of all exists in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The United Kingdom are already under strong attack in this context in the United Nations 17-nation Committee. It is impossible to say what will be the outcome, but the three territories concerned might come to independence separately.

145. This shift of emphasis in the anti-colonial campaign to the area of East Africa has been accompanied by an increase in the subversive activities in the area of both the UAR and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Following the setbacks to their policy in West Africa, the Communists are turning their attention increasingly to the tempting targets appearing in East Africa.

146. The experts recommend that the closest attention be paid to this situation and that there should be continuing close consultations amongst the NATO nations to counter it.

BLOC ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN AFRICA
JULY-DECEMBER 1961

<u>Country</u>	Persons			
	<u>Total Bloc</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>European Satellites</u>	<u>Communist China</u>
Ethiopia	100	70	30	0
Ghana	250	185	65	0
Guinea	1,445	695	590	160(1)
Mali	125	85	40	0
Morocco	10	5	5	0
Somali Republic	15	15	0	0
Sudan	15	15	0	0
Tunisia	<u>45</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>0</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,005</u>	<u>1,070</u>	<u>775</u>	<u>160</u>

(1) Including 10 technicians from North Vietnam.

ACADEMIC STUDENTS FROM AFRICA TRAINED IN THE BLOC
JANUARY 1956-DECEMBER 1961

<u>Country</u>	<u>Persons</u>			
	<u>Total Bloc</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>European Satellites</u>	<u>Communist China</u>
Cameroon	55	10	15	30
Congo	25	10	15	0
Ethiopia	45	15	30	0
Ghana	225	160	60	5
Guinea	430	210	200	20
Kenya	5	0	5	0
Madagascar	5	0	5	0
Mali	30	0	30	0
Morocco	60	45	15	0
Nigeria	25	15	10	0
Sierra Leone	25	25	0	0
Somali Republic	270	145	95	30
Sudan	195	50	145	0
Tunisia	30	15	15	0
Togo	45	15	30	0
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,470</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>670</u>	<u>85</u>

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TECHNICAL STUDENTS FROM AFRICA
TRAINED IN THE BLOC
JANUARY 1956-DECEMBER 1961

<u>Country</u>	Persons			
	<u>Total Bloc</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>European Satellites</u>	<u>Communist China</u>
Ghana	200	130	70	0
Guinea	225	115	110	0
Mali	<u>65</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>0</u>