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NATO SECRET

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WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised)

# MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

## SECOND REPORT ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

### Note by the Staff Group

Attached are the completed parts of the Second Report on Movement Constraints, submitted for Working Group consideration on 4th July, 1973 by the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints; and revised to take account of amendments subsequently offered by national authorities and to reflect the discussion in the Working Group on 31st July, 1973.

2. The parts concluded are:

Chapter I: Introduction; Chapter II: Possible elimination or mitigation of the increase in the potential threat to the Northern Flank which may arise as a result of MBFR in Central Europe; Chapter III: Idem for the Southern Region; Chapter IV: Movement Constraints and Hungary, and Chapter VII: Factors affecting pre- and post-reduction constraints.

3. Chapters V and VI do need more study by the Sub-Group and in capitals, and are therefore left out of the attached report. Chapter V on the "Zonal System" consists at present only of the Warsaw Pact side of the problem; meanwhile SHAPE will study the NATO side. Chapter VI on "the inclusion of Soviet territory in a Constraints Area", in which the Northern Flank, the Southern Region and the Central Region are dealt with in more detail, gives rise to controversial views still under study in the Sub-Group.

4. The revised report attached will be included in the Agenda of the MBFR Working Group meeting of 28th August, 1973.

5. This document will not be downgraded without a specific downgrading notice from the originator.

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|---|---|
| This document consists of: | 18 pages |
| Annex I of: | 3 pages |
| Annex II of: | 1 page |
| Annex III of: | 1 page |
| Annex IV of: | 1 page |
| Annex V of: | 14 pages |
| Annex VI of: | 1 page |
| Annex VII of: | 1 page |

NATO SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

## SUB-GROUP ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

## DRAFT SECOND REPORT

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In AC/276-WP(72)46 we are tasked to produce a second report on the use of movement constraints so as to provide the Working Group with guidance on the following five issues:

(a) To suggest how any increase in the potential threat to the flanks which may arise as a result of MBFR in Central Europe could be eliminated or mitigated.

(b) To examine the extent, if any, to which constraints already proposed for the NATO Guidelines Area need to be modified if Hungary were included.

(c) To discuss the value of a zonal system of constraints for the Central Region along the general lines proposed in a Canadian paper (AC/276-WP(72)40).

(d) To consider the value to NATO of the inclusion of the territory of the USSR in any Constraints Area, bearing in mind the military implications for NATO of having to include, in return, other Western territories.

(e) To look at the factors which might cause post-reduction movement constraints to differ qualitatively or quantitatively from the pre-reduction movement constraints considered desirable and feasible in AC/276-WP(72)27.

2. As instructed, our second report restricts its studies to ground forces (which we take to include ground forces moved into an area by amphibious force shipping) and their airlift and is set out in such a manner that our studies on each of these five subjects can be produced to the Working Group as they are completed.

3. We use as our starting point the two alternative sets of movement constraints advocated in paragraphs 9 and 10 of AC/276-D(72)4, which are reproduced as Annex I to this report.

### LAY-OUT OF THE REPORT

4. The report is divided into six chapters as under:

Chapter II - Northern Flank: Elimination or Mitigation of Threat arising from MBFR in Central Europe.

## GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

5. We assume for the purposes of this report that:

(a) The Warsaw Pact would decide to launch campaigns as nearly concurrently as possible, against all regions of ACE, since this represents the most difficult situation for NATO.

(b) Movement constraints could if necessary be applied on a regional basis, since NATO's movement requirements would differ widely from one region to another and it would be illogical to describe the move of a brigade in, say, Norway and another one in, say, Turkey as forming part of a two brigade NATO force.

6. When, in this report, the words "brigades" or "regiments" are used, they represent units of a minimum size of 1,500 men and/ or 70 tanks.

## II. NORTHERN FLANK(1)

## ELIMINATION OR MITIGATION OF THREAT ARISING FROM MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE

### Aim

11. The aim of this part of the report is to suggest how any increase in the potential threat to the Northern Flank(2) which may arise as a result of MBFR in Central Europe could be eliminated or mitigated.

### Current NATO and Warsaw Pact Deployments

12. The current peacetime deployment of Norwegian troops in Norway is listed in the NATO Force Planning Data Base. There are no other NATO forces stationed in Norway. A graphic display of current Warsaw Pact forces in Leningrad Military District is shown at Annex III.

13. At Annex V, Appendix 1, an appreciation is given of an illustrative Warsaw Pact Campaign against the Scandinavian Peninsula. It can be deduced from this appreciation that the Warsaw Pact already has available to it in the area for use against Northern Norway as many divisions as can be logistically supported by means of the coastal route, routes through Finland (but not through Sweden) and from the sea.

### Effect of MBFR in Central Europe on Current Deployments

14. Any Soviet forces which were moved as a result of an MBFR agreement out of the Reductions Area in Central Europe and which were retained in the Soviet Order of Battle could in theory be relocated in Leningrad Military District. Alternatively, such forces could be redeployed elsewhere within the USSR to relieve other Soviet forces which could be moved to Leningrad Military District to reinforce the Soviet strength in the North.

15. Because of the deduction referred to in paragraph 13 above, we do not believe that the presence of additional Soviet forces in Leningrad Military District will increase the potential threat to Northern Norway, unless the Warsaw Pact forces make use of routes leading through Sweden. Only, therefore, to meet this latter possibility will collateral measures, designed to eliminate or mitigate the potential threat to Northern Norway arising from MBFR in Central Europe, be necessary.

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(1) Norway is reserving its position on this part of the report pending production of a further paper by the Norwegian Authorities.
(2) For the purpose of this study only, the Northern Flank on the NATO side is restricted to Northern Norway.

## Collateral Measures

16. Since there are no Norwegian units stationed in peacetime in Europe outside their homeland and no other NATO formed units are permitted by the Norwegian Government to be located in peacetime in Norway, NATO strengths in North Norway will not be changed as a direct result of any MBFR agreement in the Centre.

17. The only possible changes, therefore, to force levels in the area as a direct result of MBFR will be those which affect the Warsaw Pact's strength. The only way to deter such a build-up in peace would be through an agreement which limits the Warsaw Pact's force levels in the area to their present levels. The options open appear, therefore, to hinge around the actual area in which such a force limitation agreement should be applied. There are a number of possibilities, but perhaps the most practical would be to limit any such agreement to the Leningrad Military District North of e.g. the 67th Parallel, since this would include within the area the only two Soviet divisions known to be located permanently in the Northern half of the Leningrad Military District.

## Verification Problems

18. If any force limitation agreement was contemplated, a practical method of ensuring effective verification in the geographical conditions which could be encountered (especially in the winter months), could be to position observers at strategic points on the few routes which lead into the Northern parts of the Leningrad Military District and also on the existing airstrips. Whether or not it would be worth NATO's while to try to negotiate such a measure in view of the fact that a force limitation agreement would only be necessary to mitigate a potential threat to Northern Norway via Sweden alone, is for consideration by the appropriate NATO Authorities.

## III. SOUTHERN REGION

## ELIMINATION OR MITIGATION OF THREAT ARISING FROM MBFR IN CENTRAL EUROPE

### Aim

21. The aim of this part of the report is to suggest how any increase in the potential threat to the Southern Region which may arise as a result of MBFR in Central Europe could be eliminated or mitigated.

### Definition of Southern Region

22. As some of the problems arising from MBFR in the Central Region which could affect Northern Italy are discussed in Chapter IV of this report (dealing with Hungary), this part of the report considers the potential threat to the Southern Region as it affects Greece and Turkey only. Central and Southern Italy are not considered in this report as the Sub-Group is of the opinion that any collateral measure which could be adopted to meet an increase in potential ground threat to Greece and Turkey will also produce the same desired effect on these parts of Italy.

### Current NATO and Warsaw Pact Deployments

23. The current peacetime deployments of NATO indigenous and foreign stationed forces in Greece and Turkey are listed in the NATO Force Planning Data Base. Warsaw Pact forces currently deployed in Warsaw Pact territories which either border on Greece or Turkey or the Black Sea are shown at Annex III. It will be noted that some NATO foreign stationed personnel are deployed on a permanent basis in Greece and Turkey, but that there are no Warsaw Pact foreign stationed forces deployed permanently in Bulgaria or Rumania. It should also be noted that there are large NATO naval forces, including ship-based aircraft and amphibious forces, provided by forces not indigenous to the area which are normally located in the Eastern Mediterranean.

24. At Annex V, Appendix 2, an appreciation of an illustrative Warsaw Pact campaign against Greece and Turkey is given. We deduce from this appreciation that:

(a) The Warsaw Pact have in general terms sufficient forces in the area now to ensure - in their estimation - the achievement of their immediate objectives.

(b) The existing land communications in the area are sufficient to enable not only the existing Warsaw Pact forces to be supplied logistically but also several additional divisions to be maintained in each sub-area.

Effect of MBFR in Central Europe on Current Deployments

25. In theory any NATO or Warsaw Pact foreign stationed troops which were removed, as a result of an MBFR agreement, out of the Reductions Area in Central Europe and which were not disbanded, could be relocated in their respective territories somewhere in Southern Europe. Alternatively, such forces could be redeployed outside the Southern Region to relieve other forces which could then be redeployed permanently to the Southern Region.

26. In the context of this paper it is assumed that NATO would not redeploy permanently(1) any of her ground forces from the Central Region to the Southern Region as a result of MBFR.

27. The Soviet Union, however, may well wish to redeploy permanently(1) some or all of her forces withdrawn from the Central Region to the Southern parts of the USSR. Whatever the reason for such Soviet redeployments, they would, if made, result in the potential threat to Greece and Turkey being increased because they could be used offensively, if required, in any Warsaw Pact attack in the area without straining the available road, rail and sea deployment and resupply facilities. (See paragraph 24(b))

Collateral Measures

28. There are no Greek or Turkish units stationed in peacetime in other NATO countries outside their homelands, and there are but few foreign stationed NATO units located in peacetime in these two countries.

29. To mitigate or eliminate the increase to the potential threat mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, it might be necessary to accept a force limitation agreement for the area, provided on the NATO side any agreement applied to the force levels of foreign stationed forces only. Such an agreement should not result in any way in forces being maintained at lower levels than those currently deployed on the NATO side.

30. In deciding the application of such a force limitation agreement the following conflicting factors should be taken into account:

(a) Naval forces are excluded from consideration in MBFR, but army or marine corps units embarked on naval vessels might not be so excluded. NATO has a need, in

(1) "Permanently" in this paper means for a period exceeding 90 days in duration. See Annex I, page 2, footnote 3 (AC/276-D(72)4).

peacetime, to safeguard the freedom to move, manoeuvre and reinforce non-indigenous seaborne forces on the high seas - specifically, in the context of this report, the Mediterranean and Black Seas. It could be argued that army and marine corps elements embarked on such naval forces should be taken into account in any force limitation agreement, on the ground that they constitute an actual or potential addition to the land forces of the Allies in the Southern Region. A force limitation in this context would be to NATO's disadvantage.

(b) On the other hand, there are WP naval, marine and amphibious forces in the Black Sea, which could constitute a threat, by seaborne invasion, to the Turkish territory. Limitation of these forces could be advantageous to NATO.

(c) On the basis of the threat assessment (paragraph 24 above) the Soviets would have no need to reinforce their land forces in immediate proximity to Greece and Turkey until after D-Day, as follow-up forces. A force limitation agreement, unless negotiated at lower than existing levels of Soviet forces, would have no practical military value.

(d) If a reciprocal agreement were demanded for force limitation on Greek or Turkish territory, this too could work to NATO's disadvantage.

31. Judgement as to whether the disadvantages for NATO of a force limitation in this Region would outweigh the advantages is withheld. Such a judgement might be substantially influenced by political factors and by the scale of withdrawals to be effected under MBFR in Central Europe.

32. On the other hand, if for political reasons it is considered desirable to have a force limitation agreement in the Southern Region to counter possible post-MBFR redeployments on both sides, it should make provision for:

No additional NATO foreign stationed ground forces to be located permanently in either Greece or Turkey, provided the Warsaw Pact agrees to deploy permanently no Soviet forces in either Bulgaria or Rumania, and

No additional Soviet forces to be located permanently in that part of the USSR lying south of the 50th Parallel. (This is another way of saying no additional Soviet forces should be located within some 250 miles - or two to three days of road movement - from the Black Sea(1).)

(1) See Annex II

33. An agreement on the lines of paragraph 32 would mean that both sides would be free to move their forces at will within their own territories in peace provided additional forces were not introduced into the area for periods in excess of 90 days, which has been a period mentioned in the Sub-Group's first report.

## Other Types of Collateral Measures

34. Movement constraints(1) of the type proposed in AC/276-D(72)4 are not dealt with in Chapter III, since it is more logical to discuss them in Chapter VI - Inclusion of Parts of the USSR in a Constraints Area.

## Verification

35. Were any force limitation agreement adopted, the most satisfactory method of ensuring effective verification in the Warsaw Pact territories concerned could be to position NATO or international observers within those territories. It is probable, however, that if the Warsaw Pact were to agree to such a demand, they would require, as a quid pro quo, to position their observers in Greece and Turkey to verify that NATO had not introduced additional foreign based forces into those two countries. It is doubtful whether such an exchange of observers would be acceptable politically to either side, but if it was, it could have military advantages to NATO, especially in the intelligence field.

(1) See Annex I

## IV. MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AND HUNGARY

### Aim

41. To examine the extent, if any, to which constraints already proposed for the NATO Guidelines Area (see Annex I) need to be modified if Hungary were included in a Constraints Area.

### Objectives

42. We emphasize that we have assumed in this report that the objectives to be gained by extending movement constraints on Warsaw Pact forces to include those located in Hungary would be similar to those set out in AC/276-D(72)4.

### Scope

43. We examine this problem under three main headings:

(a) Hungary as part of the Guidelines/Reduction Area.

(b) Hungary outside the Guidelines/Reduction Area.

(c) Possible implications to NATO of applying Movement Constraints to Hungary.

### Hungary as part of the Guidelines/Reduction Area

44. At present there are 9 WP divisions in Hungary (4 Soviet and 5 Hungarian) which are considered ready for early commitment(1). These divisions are located so as to be available for Southern Region operations or to reinforce WP actions in the Central Region.

45. Either of the two types of constraints illustrated in Annex I would be suitable for application to Hungary provided she formed part of the NATO Guidelines Area. However, the second type of constraints, if accompanied by effective verification measures, would provide a more meaningful deterrent to military movement as well as serving as a political confidence building measure.

### Hungary outside the Guidelines/Reduction Area

46. If Hungary was outside the Guidelines/Reduction Area, it would be of little value to apply either of the sets of movement constraints listed at Annex I to Hungary since both types of constraint permit free movement anywhere within the constraints area provided notice is given at the start of any

(1) The 6th Hungarian division is considered not ready for early commitment.

movement. The Warsaw Pact would, therefore, be able to redeploy their unreduced forces located in Hungary, to the Reduction Area or forces from the Reduction Area into Hungary, and thereby negate the consequences of MBFR.

47. To impose a similar degree of constraint on movement into and out of Hungary, if she were outside the Guidelines Area, as it is proposed to impose within the Guidelines/Reductions Area, it would be necessary to apply the more stringent constraints on the following lines:

(a) Movement within Hungary. 1 Brigade/Regt or more - notification at start of movement.

(b) Movement from Hungary into the Guidelines/Reductions Area and/or vice versa

(1) No movement permitted for period of 90 days or more.

(2) Movement of forces of the size shown below will be permitted for a period of less than 90 days, subject to advance notification as shown being given(1):

1 to 3 brigades/regiments - notification at start of movement.

More than 3 up to 7 brigades/regiments - notification 3 days in advance.

More than 7 up to 11 brigades/regiments - notification 8 days in advance.

More than 11 brigades/regiments - prohibited.

(c) Movement into Hungary from elsewhere. As for (b) above.

Possible military implications to NATO of applying Movement Constraints to Hungary

48. It is probable that if NATO were to propose that Hungary should be included in any constraints area, the Warsaw Pact would demand a reciprocal arrangement in respect of Northern Italy, which we define as Italy north of the 44th Parallel. The military implications of such a demand would be as discussed below.

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(1) Figures based on NATO requirements

Available NATO forces in Northern Italy

49. The actual strength of NATO assigned/earmarked(1) ground forces located in Northern Italy amounts to:

(a) Indigenous forces: 6 divisions, 9 brigades/regiments and 1 missile brigade.

(b) US forces: 1 Sergeant battalion and 1 AMF(L) airborne battalion(2).

The majority of these forces are already located in the combat zone and may reach their GDP positions within 1 to 2 days. They can be brought to war authorized strength within 4 days.

Movement requirements "within" Northern Italy

50. In peacetime conditions, movements of NATO forces for exercise purposes normally will not extend beyond 3 regiments and 3 million transport A/C, increasing for large exercises to 15 regiments and 15 million transport A/C.

51. At present, for occupying GDP positions in times of increased tension, about 20 regiments have to move about 50 km and some 15 regiments more than 250 km. The authorization for these movements may be given in accordance with the NATO Alert System at various stages of the system, or even prior to the application of the system. At present at least 1 day is required for the move of the 20 regiments and up to 18 days for the remaining 15, if authorization is given to all units simultaneously.

Movement requirements "into" Northern Italy

52. In normal peacetime conditions no external Allied forces beyond 1 brigade size unit enter Northern Italy for participation in exercises.

53. In times of increased tension (i.e. during an emergency short of hostilities) the following forces could be moved into Northern Italy:

- UKMF(L): 1 brigade size unit, within 16 days
- AMF(L): 1 brigade size unit, within 13 days
- United States: 1 division (strategic reserve), within 30 days

(1) The classification "M-Day forces" is not used any more (MC 55/2)
(2) As from end 1973

| | |
|---|---|
| - Italian forces from elsewhere in Italy: | NATO earmarked forces: 1 Inf Division, 1 Arm Cavl Regt and 1 Arm Regt, within 13 to 21 days National forces: 1 Para Brigade (M-Day) and 1 Inf Bde could also be moved to Northern Italy. |

Deduction from paragraphs 49 to 53

54. NATO will wish to reserve the right to conduct peacetime exercises of up to 15 regiments in strength involving troops stationed in Northern Italy and to be free to move about 35 regiments within Northern Italy to their GDP positions. NATO will also need to be free in times of increased tension to introduce in Northern Italy external forces totalling some 2 brigades, but over a period of some 16 days. Likewise Italian NATO earmarked forces up to 5 regiments and Italian national forces up to 2 brigades could be moved to the Northern combat zone. This means that the force movement prohibition on entering 11 or more brigades which is mentioned in paragraph 4(b) of Annex I, would meet the requirement for Northern Italy also.

55. As far as Warsaw Pact forces located in the region are concerned, NATO would wish to be informed of the purpose and details of the movement of any Warsaw Pact forces, of regiment size or greater, within Hungary, whether such movement be for exercises or other purpose - if greater mutual confidence is to be established.

56. Verification Implications. AC/276-D(72)4 did not discuss the details of any system which was set up to verify that movement constraints were complied with by both sides. However, we would emphasize that should such a system involve the stationing of observer teams in the respective constraints areas, then the inclusion of Hungary, and therefore - possibly as a quid pro quo - of Northern Italy in the area, could involve both those two countries in the acceptance of foreign observers on their soil.

Conclusions

57. No alterations to the illustrative constraints set out in Annex I would be called for by the mere fact that Hungary forms part of the Guidelines/Reductions Area. Nevertheless, reference is made to AC/276-D(73)2, paragraph 13, from which we conclude that it would be to NATO's advantage if the NATO Guidelines Area (Reduction Area) and Hungary were treated as separate constraints areas in order to prevent the free movement of forces between those territories.

58. If Hungary was excluded from the Guidelines/Reductions Area, it would be to NATO's security advantage to constrain the movement of forces within Hungary, and to constrain the reinforcement of additional forces into Hungary, on the pattern of constraints outlined in paragraph 47 above.

59. Attention is drawn to the fact that the sets of constraints proposed in the first report, AC/276-D(72)4, and in paragraph 47 above, are designed for a pre-MBFR situation. As for the factors affecting a post-MBFR situation, see Chapter VII, paragraph 148.

## VII. FACTORS AFFECTING PRE-AND POST-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

### Aim

141. In this part of the report we look at the factors which might cause post-reduction movement constraints to differ qualitatively or quantitatively from the pre-reduction movement constraints considered desirable and feasible in AC/276-WP(72)27.

### Movement Constraint Objectives

142. Political Objectives: Pre-MBFR. AC/276-WP(72)27 listed the following as possible political objectives for movement constraints enforced prior to MBFR.

(a) They could serve as a test for the readiness of the Warsaw Pact to discuss seriously force reductions and other security problems.

(b) They could be instrumental in building confidence and could contribute to the improvement of relations and the spirit of détente.

(c) They would be a means of making certain that basic problems related to MBFR, such as redeployment capabilities, would be addressed prior to or together with reductions.

143. Military Objectives: Pre-MBFR. The following possible military objectives for movement constraints enforced prior to MBFR are listed in AC/276-WP(72)27:

(a) They could be a deterrent to covert reinforcement and redeployment.

(b) They could provide a means of receiving at an earlier stage more information of intended aggression.

(c) They could act as a yardstick for correct and timely interpretation by NATO of military measures taken by the Warsaw Pact.

(d) They could create a mitigation of the effects of the Warsaw Pact geographic advantage.

(e) They could provide a means of reducing to a certain degree the military advantage of the Warsaw Pact with regards to the flanks.

144. Political and Military Objectives: Post-MBFR. The political and military objectives for movement constraints for a pre-MBFR situation, outlined in paragraphs 142 and 143 above, would remain valid post-MBFR. However, the following additional objectives would apply in such a period:

(a) They should facilitate verification of agreements on reductions in and withdrawals from the Reductions Area.

(b) They should provide an effective political deterrent to military movement, into the Reductions Area.

(c) They should help to confirm the observance of any de facto or de jure force limitation agreement instituted as a result of an MBFR convention.

Applicability of Currently Agreed Pre-MBFR Movement Constraint Measures

145. The additional political and military objectives for a post-MBFR situation stated above create a requirement for movement constraints to be more stringent in character than pre-MBFR. Accordingly the second set of constraints described in paragraph 4 of Annex I would meet these additional requirements better than would the set discussed in paragraph 3 of that Annex, for this second set renders illegal the introduction on a permanent basis of additional combat forces from outside the constraints area and prohibits the temporary reinforcement of the constraints area by more than eleven brigades. However neither of the two sets of movement constraints would physically restrain the Warsaw Pact from breaching an MBFR agreement nor would they affect physically the Pact's capability to mobilize, reinforce or redeploy forces should they so desire to break any agreement - but then no constraints measures envisaged as yet can claim to achieve such physical results.

146. One consequence of an MBFR agreement which would affect the quantitative details of the more stringent set of movement constraints listed in paragraph 4 of Annex I, would be the requirement to increase the prohibited temporary reinforcement total (currently 11 brigades) to take account of the requirement for training and for redeployment in periods of tension of those NATO brigades withdrawn under MBFR from the Reductions Area.

Conclusion

147. It is concluded that the factors which might cause post-MBFR constraints to differ from those listed in AC/276-WP(72)27 and reproduced at Annex I are:

(a) Qualitatively the need for such constraints to be more stringent so as to attain the additional political and military objectives listed in paragraph 144 above.

(b) Quantitatively the need to take account of the additional training and reinforcement requirements of NATO brigades withdrawn from the Reduction Area when assessing the total above which temporary reinforcement of the constraints area would be prohibited.

148. Both sets of constraints proposed in the first report, AC/276-D(72)4, are designed for a pre-MBFR situation. They are illustrative and take account of the scale of reinforcements which NATO would require to move into Central Europe in a time of tension. Since the scale of such reinforcement might well be changed post-MBFR, the movement constraints which should be applied post-MBFR should be related to the reductions and scale of residual forces. The movement constraints cannot, therefore, be developed, except on an illustrative basis, until the reduction options are themselves defined.

PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS IN FIRST REPORT

1. As a guidance for the continued study and for reasons of comparison, the constraints as proposed for the NATO Guidelines Area(1) are listed below.

2. In the first report we are confronted with two sets of constraints, based on the minimum movement requirements of NATO forces in times of tension.

3. In the first set of proposed constraints, no limitation is placed on the duration of stay at their destination of units moving within the constraints area, or entering that area from outside. These constraints would deter sudden force movements by the Warsaw Pact, and could facilitate a more up-to-date and timely interpretation by NATO of Warsaw Pact movements into the constraints area. These constraints are:

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area

1 Brigade/Regiment(2) or more - notification at start of movement(3)

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area

1 up to 3 Brigades/Regiments - notification at start of movement

More than 3 up to 7 Brigades/Regiments - notification 3 days in advance(4)

More than 7 up to 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification 8 days in advance(4)

More than 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification 30 days in advance(4)

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(1) AC/276-D(72)4
(2) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks.
(3) SACEUR had indicated that notification without advance warning (i.e. simultaneous with movement) is essential to enable him to move formes, available in the constraints area, without delay to GDP positions.
(4) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area

This means that when 3 brigades/regiments have already been introduced into the constraints area, each brigade/regiment entering subsequently from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 3 brigades/regiments and ought to be notified 3 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement amounts to 7 brigades/regiments, each brigade/ regiment entering subsequently must be notified 8 days in advance; and from 11 brigades/regiments, 30 days in advance.

4. The second set of constraints would produce the same results as the first set (paragraph 3) - in that a more current and timely interpretation by NATO of Warsaw Pact movements into the constraints area could be facilitated, and the Warsaw Pact would be deterred from sudden force movements. In addition, however, this second set of constraints would render illegal the introduction on a permanent basis of additional combat units from outside the area.

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area

1 Brigade/Regiment(1) or more - notification at start of movement(2)

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area

Units entering the constraints area from the outside should remain there only temporarily(3), or must be counterbalanced by a notified and verified withdrawal or an equivalent force.

Temporary Reinforcement of:

1 up to 3 Brigades/Regiments - notification at start of movement

More than 3 up to 7 Brigades/Regiments - notification 3 days in advance(4)

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(1) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks.
(2) SACEUR had indicated that notification without advance warning (i.e. simultaneous with movement) is essential to enable him to move forces, available in the constraints area, without delay to GDP positions.
(3) Temporarily should be interpreted in this context to mean for the transitory purpose of taking part in a specific short-term training requirement, pre-planned and limited in duration. A reasonable duration would not exceed 90 days.
(4) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area.

More than 7 up to 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification 8 days in advance(1)

More than 11 Brigades/Regiments - prohibited

The explanation at sub-paragraph 3(b) about the introduction of units into the constraints area applies equally to paragraph 4(b).

5. Constraints in which the number of brigades/regiments was increased and/or the times of advance notice were decreased would be acceptable to NATO, but not conversely. This is important if NATO is to remain capable of reinforcing the constraints area, should an increased threat develop.

(1) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area

ANNEX II to
AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised)




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ANNEX III to
AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised)

**WP Ready Forces**




NATO SECRET
ENCLOSURE to
AC/276-WP(73)

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Movements of NATO forces for exercises in peacetime conditions

| | Small exercises | | Large exercises | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Movements within: | Ground Forces | Transport A/C | Ground Forces | Transport A/C |
| North Norway | 1 bde | 3 | 3 bdes | 10 |
| Denmark | 1 bde | 3 | 3 bdes | 9 |
| West Germany | 3 bdes | 9 | 10 bdes | 30 |
| Netherlands | 1 bde | 3 | 3 bdes | 9 |
| Belgium | 1 bde | 3 | 3 bdes | 9 |
| Luxembourg | 1 comp | - | 1 batt | - |
| Italy | 1 regt | 3 | 15 regts | 15 |
| Greece | 1 regt | 3 | 8 regts | 24 |
| Turkey | 3 bdes | 9 | 24 bdes | 18 |

/MILSTAM(INT)-70-73/

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MBFR SUB-GROUP ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

(ATTENTION: CAPT. GOOSSENS)

SUBJECT: Possible Movements Directed against the Flanks

References: (a) MC 161/73(Final), 17th May, 1973
(b) SGMC Chairman's Note, 13th October, 1972
(c) MILSTAM(INT)-121-72, 25th October, 1972

1. In accordance with the request of the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints as noted in reference (b), for an Intelligence Division, IMS, assessment of possible Warsaw Pact movements directed against the flanks, enclosures 1 and 2 are forwarded.

2. These two enclosures, which deal with possible movements against the Northern and Southern flanks, respectively, represent Intelligence Division's extraction of pertinent information and illustrative examples found in MC 161/73 (reference (a)), and supersedes therefore, reference (c).

3. The illustrative nature of the examples given should be especially stressed. Certain other introductory remarks from Part IV of MC 161/73, "Illustrative Concepts for the Deployment of Soviet bloc Forces in the Early Stages of a War with NATO (mid-1973-mid-1974)" are quoted here in order to provide background for the two regional examples, and to make clear the assumptions on which the examples are based:

(a) "This Part illustrates the threat by presenting in brief form major military operations which the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies might undertake in a war with NATO during the period mid-1973-mid-1974. Although the Soviet leaders almost certainly consider the deliberate initiation of war an unsound course of action, for purposes of this part IT IS ASSUMED that the bloc initiates war during the period mid-1973-mid-1974."

(b) "It is not the intention of this Part to lay down authoritative assessments of the detailed threats in every NATO region. It is believed, however, that the main objectives of the campaigns planned would be the same even though the forces initially committed might differ. The illustrative campaigns in this Part are therefore described within the range of assessed maximum and minimum Warsaw Pact build-up. No allowance is made for damage caused by the effects of Allied military action. The operations presented do not consider any assistance which the bloc forces might receive from subversive elements located outside the Soviet bloc."

(c) "When appropriate, indications are given of limited hostilities that might precede general war. Intelligence evidence is inadequate to permit detailed development of this theme."

4. The aim and assumptions of Part IV, Section 4, "Operations Designed to Control the Eurasian Land Mass" include:

(a) "The aim of this section is to illustrate, by considering possible campaigns, Warsaw Pact (WP) capabilities within the range of the two assumptions given (see preceding paragraph). It is emphasized that the campaigns illustrated are only a guide to what is generally and logistically possible, and must not be taken necessarily to indicate what is considered to be the most likely operation. The direction of effort and the timing given ... are in each case only examples. There are many possible variations."

(b) "The following assumptions are made:

(1) That the Warsaw Pact decides to launch campaigns as nearly concurrently as possible against Western Continental Europe, Scandinavian Peninsula, Southern Europe, Eastern Turkey and Iran.

(2) The Warsaw Pact ground forces are projected against countries facing their peacetime locations.

(3) That any limited military engagements which could have taken place prior to the initiation of general war are not of such a scale as to cause major modification of Soviet military planning."

(c) "A minimum build-up situation could be one in which only the bringing forward of the essential minimum of logistic units, not held forward in peacetime, and possibly some limited number of personnel reinforcements to bring units towards full strength takes place. The full reinforcing forces would be brought forward as soon as possible but would not be in the optimum battle position to support the initial assault. Essentially therefore the initial threat (in terms of ground forces) lies between:

(a) In a minimum build-up situation those forces which can be deployed with little or no indication of their movement, therefore without jeopardising strategic surprise.

(b) In an attack after maximum build-up all those forces which would probably be moved to a particular area."

(d) "The actual WP battle disposition at the time of the initial assault will depend on their assessment of the forces they will need to ensure success against NATO forces opposing them."

5. This document may not be downgraded without a specific downgrading notice from the originator.

(Signed) G. POSER
Rear Admiral, German Navy
Assistant Director
Intelligence Division

2 Enclosures

1. Illustrative Campaigns Against the Scandinavian Peninsula.

2. Illustrative Campaigns Against Southern Europe, Western Turkey, Eastern Turkey and Iran.

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ILLUSTRATIVE WARSAW PACT CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE SCANDINAVIAN PENINSULA

(From Part IV, Section 4, of MC 161/73(Final))

Objectives

1. Bloc objectives (not necessarily in order of priority) in operations against the Scandinavian Peninsula would be to:

(a) establish advanced bases on the coast of Norway;

(b) deny NATO the use of bases and facilities in the area;

(c) extend the Soviet early warning and air defence systems;

(d) provide protection of access routes of the Northern Fleet.

Size and Composition of Forces

Ground Combat Forces

2. Forces available in North Western USSR consist of 9 divisions, of which 5 are ready for early commitment. Additional forces might be available from the Baltic MD.

Naval Forces

3. Such an operation would certainly receive amphibious support from the naval infantry of the Northern Fleet, probably reinforced by ground force units trained in the amphibious rôle. Units of the Northern Fleet would provide direct support to operations and the Soviet navy's involvement in offensive operations in the Norwegian Sea could severely hamper NATO's resupply and reinforcement to Northern Norway.

Air Forces

4. Frontal aviation of the Leningrad MD would be used in operations against the Scandinavian Peninsula. Since this might be considered insufficient, reinforcing units might be drawn from other MDs.

## Logistic Considerations

5. It is estimated that a maximum of two motorized rifle divisions could be maintained in an advance direct from the USSR along the coastal route in Northern Norway, while routes through Finland into Northern Norway are adequate to support six divisions. In addition, a seaborne force of one division could be landed through ports in Northern Norway. Soviet shipping available in the area is sufficient for maintaining several divisions by sea transport. However, between Narvik and Bodoe, the land route is logistically capable of maintaining a maximum of two divisions, subject to the availability of adequate and suitable craft to operate two ferry crossings. South of Bodoe, the railway could support a further three divisions if their logistic support came by sea through Bodoe.

6. Additionally, if Sweden were to grant the USSR right of free passage for Soviet troops, 20 divisions could be supported by road and rail routes from the USSR frontier through Finland to the border area of Northern Sweden. From there up to 9 divisions could be maintained forward by the Bodoe-Narvik railway and the balance by road routes through Northern Norway.

7. Roads in the north, however, are subject to periods of severe adverse climatic conditions, such as heavy snowfall, autumn rains and spring thaw, the effect of which varies from complete closure to restricted use, and thereby severely reduces the amount of resupply that could be moved forward during these periods.

8. Logistic considerations would not greatly limit the number of Soviet divisions likely to be required in Southern Scandinavia.

## Method of Employment

9. Campaigns against Norway could be mounted from the following directions:

(a) Into Northern Norway, both directly from North Western USSR and through Finland.

(b) Through Jutland and the Baltic exits at a later stage.

(c) Through Sweden.

The initial campaign, (the only one which could begin early in the setting of surprise) is that into Northern Norway and/or Finland. An attack in this direction could be initiated in the form of a direct attack across the Soviet-Norwegian border, supported by airborne assault and amphibious landings. Forces moving through Finland could also arrive at the Norwegian border within a short period.

10. If the USSR were to apply sufficient pressure, Finland probably would be forced to allow the movement of Soviet forces across her territory for an attack on Norway. Even if Finland should try to resist, her forces in Northern Finland are too weak to impose any significant delay on the Soviet advance. However, guerilla warfare against Soviet forces crossing the country is possible. The Soviet Union undoubtedly would anticipate this contingency and would plan to use a portion of its forces to protect lines of communications.

11. In connection with the offensive in Western Europe, the Soviet Union might aim to attack Southern Norway through Denmark, the prime objective being control of the southern coastline and thereby adjacent sea areas (the Skagerrak and North Sea). Whilst a major attack on Southern Norway is unlikely without Soviet control of the Baltic Straits, vulnerable areas of military importance on the Norwegian south and north coast might be captured by landing forces deployed at sea prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Such areas would be limited and success of the operation depends on surprise.

12. An attack through Sweden would require sizeable land, air and missile forces. Such forces would not be available immediately in the initial phase of a general conflict. The Soviets might also try to obtain the right of free passage of their troops through Sweden. An attack through Sweden is not developed in this document but some relevant logistical information is given in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.

## Support Operations

13. Raiding parties could be landed by sea or by air to facilitate Soviet troop movements, to secure forward areas for naval support facilities and to sabotage communications and installations.

## Further Developments

14. As a follow-up to the operations mentioned in paragraphs 9(a), (b) and (c) above, the Soviet Union might aim to capture the rest of Norway or the whole Scandinavian Peninsula.

# ILLUSTRATIVE WARSAW PACT CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SOUTHERN EUROPE, WESTERN TURKEY, EASTERN TURKEY AND IRAN

(From Part IV, Section 4 of MC 161/73)

## PART I

## SOUTHERN EUROPE AND WESTERN TURKEY

### Objectives

1. In these campaigns, the objectives of the Soviet bloc (not necessarily in order of priority) would be to:

(a) Secure the exits from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and obtain advanced bases from which to operate in the Mediterranean.

(b) Seize key areas and advanced bases in Northern Italy in order to facilitate further operations.

### Size and Composition of Forces(1)

### Ground Forces

2. In Hungary there are 4 Soviet and 6 Hungarian divisions all ready for early commitment except for one Hungarian division. If used in operations against the Southern Region it is assessed they would be directed against Italy through Yugoslavia and/or Austria. WP Fronts would probably be formed in Bulgaria (13 divisions) and Rumania (10 divisions) for operations against Greece and Turkey, supported by 6 Soviet divisions from Odessa MD, of these one Bulgarian division, one Rumanian division and 2 Soviet divisions are not ready for early commitment. The Soviet divisions in Kiev MD (10), Moscow MD (5), Ural MD (3) and Volga MD (3), in total 21 divisions of which 10 are ready for early commitment, are considered as strategic reserve for employment in either Northern, Central or Southern Europe. Four of the Kiev MD divisions probably are earmarked for operations against Northern Italy.

(1) Excluding Yugoslav and Albanian forces

## Naval Forces

3. The Black Sea fleet and the Rumanian and Bulgarian navies, including amphibious and naval aviation forces, would provide support to operations in the Black Sea and Mediterranean. SOVMEDRON supported from their available facilities in the Middle East and North Africa can provide combat support to operations against Southern Europe from the south.

## Air Forces

4. Soviet frontal aviation in Hungary and in the Odessa MD, as well as national air forces based in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, would be used in these operations, augmented possibly by units drawn from the Kiev MD which might be employed in either Central or Southern Europe. Additional air reinforcements could be provided from other military districts and support could be furnished by the DA in the USSR. Either nuclear or non-nuclear support would be provided by the DA medium bombers in the Western USSR.

## Logistic Considerations

5. The level of stocks available in Bulgaria probably is sufficient for operations of limited duration. Once these stocks were exhausted, all Warsaw Pact forces employed against Greece and Western Turkey would have to be maintained from Rumania or South Western USSR. After a period of troop build-up and organization of several road-to-rail and rail-to-road transloading operations, combined use of present roads and railways could supply a force of about 30 divisions through Bulgaria.

6. Within a total of 30 divisions, up to 18 could be supported in operations directed against either Turkish Thrace or Greece. If routes through Yugoslavia (Monastir Gap and Vardar Valley) also became available, optimum combined use of roads and railways could support up to a maximum of 19 additional divisions against Greece, even if 30 divisions were being supported simultaneously from the USSR southward through Bulgaria. If sufficient port and landing facilities were captured, up to 10 divisions, lightly equipped but nevertheless including some tanks and armoured vehicles, could be landed in Turkish Thrace and Western Anatolia. However, the use of roads in this area to move such forces and their resupply inland would correspondingly reduce the overland resupply mentioned above. The Soviet control over the Black Sea and furthermore the port facilities available in that area should be considered as another favourable factor for the WP for the sustaining logistical support of the operations.

7. Combat supplies for forces directed against Northern Italy could be drawn initially from Hungarian and Soviet depots in Hungary and from national depots in Yugoslavia, but additional logistic support would have to come from the USSR through Yugoslavia and/or Austria. After a period of troop build-up and the organization of several road-to-rail and rail-to-road transloading operations, the combined use of present roads and railways could supply a force of about 40 divisions against Northern Italy. More than 40 divisions could be resupplied against Northern Italy, but this would reduce support of those divisions resupplied through Czechoslovakia and Rumania and facing Central Europe, Greece and Western Turkey respectively. If Austria's neutrality were respected, approximately 30 divisions could be resupplied through Yugoslavia.

Method of Employment

8.
(a) Bulgaria could launch a surprise attack, but in its later stages, or before any large scale attack, the Bulgarian army would require Soviet logistic and combat support and might also receive Rumanian support. The Soviet Union probably would not rely on being able to conceal such preparations or the movement of Soviet divisions into Bulgaria. However, should the Soviet Union accept the risk of jeopardising surprise, a few divisions (one of which might be airborne) could be brought into Bulgaria concurrently with a maximum build-up in Central Europe. They could deploy air forces of sufficient strength to support an operation of this scale. Bulgarian forces alone could not carry out a sustained offensive against neighbouring Greek and/or Turkish regions simultaneously with a Warsaw Pact surprise attack towards Western Europe.

(b) A land campaign against Northern Italy could only be undertaken passing through Yugoslavia and/or Austria. Therefore, to initiate operations against Italy the planned WP ground forces would have to be deployed, at least partially, alongside the North Eastern Italian border.

Operations Against Turkish Thrace and Western Anatolia

9. The purpose of a main attack against Turkish Thrace and Western Anatolia almost certainly would be to capture the Turkish Straits that control the exit from the Black Sea and to

secure additional air facilities for the support of SOVMEDRON. During an advance into Turkish Thrace, an attack could be launched by Soviet airborne and/or amphibious troops against the Bosphorus area in support of the overland offensive. Subsequent operations could be to seize a bridgehead in Western Anatolia which could be extended east and south until sufficient depth had been gained to help secure a passage from the Black Sea for naval forces. The attack against Western Anatolia could be spearheaded by an airborne assault provided the airlift was made available.

## Operations Against Greece

10. The purpose of a main attack on Greece would almost certainly be to extend the offensive throughout the whole of the Greek mainland and the necessary Greek islands, including Crete, to secure free passage through the Agean Sea to the Mediterranean and to secure additional facilities for the support of SOVMEDRON. If the Warsaw Pact forces were able to move through Yugoslavia, either by consent or by force of arms, they might also attack Greece through the Monastir Gap and Vardar Valley; access to this area also would permit the Warsaw Pact command to alter the pattern of allocation of forces supported through Bulgaria and direct a greater proportion of these forces against the Greek mainland.

## Operations Against Italy

11. All operations against Northern Italy should be considered in close association with those in the Central Region. The purpose of a Soviet attack on Northern Italy almost certainly would be to extend the entire offensive along the Mediterranean seaboard and to obtain advanced bases and neutralize NATO forces in Northern Italy. This scale of operations would require substantial deployment from forces from the strategic reserve (Kiev MD 4 divisions), as well as the 4 Soviet and 6 Hungarian divisions in Hungary, and would require use of Yugoslav and/or Austrian territory. If Yugoslavia were to align with the Warsaw Pact, it would increase considerably the threat to Italy by augmenting the strength of attacking forces and facilitating movement of the Soviet forces through the Yugoslav territory, and their subsequent deployment against Northern Italy. If Yugoslav territory were to be used, it is probable that the Soviet thrust in this area would be delivered through North Western Yugoslavia via the Ljubljana Gap while other forces might use the Austrian passes. NATO forces in Italy will obviously have the same warning time as other NATO forces. However, although air contact would come without delay,

physical contact with the bulk of Warsaw Pact land forces would be delayed because of Italy's geographical position. The Yugoslav reaction would also affect the timing of the campaign.

Further Developments

12. The Warsaw Pact might aim subsequently to:

(a) Occupy Southern Italy and the Mediterranean islands.

(b) Link up with forces advancing into Eastern Turkey.

## PART II

## EASTERN TURKEY AND IRAN

### Objectives

13. The objectives of this campaign (not necessarily in order of priority) would be to:

(a) Destroy or neutralize NATO forces in Eastern Turkey.

(b) Protect the Southern Flank of the bloc.

(c) Seize key areas in Iran in order to facilitate further operations.

### Size and Composition of Forces

### Ground Forces

14. For operations against Eastern Turkey and the North West portion of Iran, Soviet ground forces would come from the Caucasus. Although 17 divisions are stationed in this area only 9 are ready for early commitment. Soviet ground forces in Turkestan MD (5 divisions, of which one is ready for early commitment) face Eastern Iran and Afghanistan.

### Naval Forces

15. The Black Sea fleet and Caspian Sea flotilla, including naval aviation and amphibious forces support the operations along the coast.

### Air Forces

16. Frontal aviation based in the Turkestan and Transcaucasus MDs could support operations. Additional tactical air reinforcement could be provided by FA units from other MDs. Either nuclear or non-nuclear support would be provided by the DA medium bombers in the Western USSR.

### Logistic Considerations

17. Road and rail routes through the Transcaucasus and Turkestan to a line north of the Turkish and Iran borders are capable of resupplying large enemy forces. However, through the respective frontier areas the roads are poor and the rail connections are restricted to AKhuryan and Dzhulfa. These factors would limit the forces which could be maintained south of the borders to some 25 divisions.

18. Forces could be maintained through the separate border areas, mentioned in paragraph 17 as follows:

(a) From the Transcaucasus into Eastern Anatolia - 13 divisions, with little non-divisional support, of which 4 would have to be maintained by rail along the Leninakan - Kars - Erzurum railway. However, there may be difficulty in maintaining this amount through the transloading station at AKhuryan where facilities would be very restricted in the initial phase. The road routes through this area could not be improved significantly in the short term.

(b) From the Transcaucasus into Iran - 9 divisions of which 2 would have to be maintained by rail through Dzhulfa. This figure assumes full use of Jolfa (Iran) the transloading facilities necessitated by the change of rail gauge.

(c) From Turkestan into Iran - 3 divisions, all by road, the border area here does not have a further restrictive effect as in the Transcaucasus.

19. In a sealift, a maximum of 10 divisions could be transported across the Black Sea by use of the merchant fleet under various loading conditions. However, it is estimated that discharge and clearance through the ports of Samsum and Trabzon are capable of supporting only 5 divisions. The capacity of the roads from Trabzon to Erzurum is able to support 3 divisions.

Method of Employment

20. The forces available would advance from the USSR on Eastern Turkey in an effort to destroy the NATO forces. Concurrently attacks would be launched from the Transcaucasus and Turkestan MDs into Iran, initially to seize the airfields in the Teheran area, to control principal passes in the Zagros mountains and to threaten Turkey. In both cases the Soviet Union might expect to achieve surprise if attacks were initiated by forces currently in the border area. Operations could be reinforced with forces from the strategic reserve, if necessary.

Support Operations

21. Small, lightly armed forces could be landed on the coast of North Eastern Turkey as early as the Soviet Union might choose; the Soviet Union might attempt to incite neighbouring countries to threaten and even to attack Turkey and Iran with the object of diverting their forces from the main Soviet attack.

Further Developments

22. The Soviet Union might aim to extend this campaign to:

(a) Reach the Mediterranean near Iskenderun.

(b) Seize or deny to the Allies the Middle East oilfields.

(c) Seize the land bridge into Africa.

(d) Link up with the forces advancing in Southern Europe and Western Turkey.

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


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


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