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WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(73)16/1

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
WORKING GROUP

CHAPTERS V AND VI OF THE SECOND REPORT ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

Note by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints

Attached are the two missing Chapters of the Second Report on Movement Constraints, which are to be integrated into Working Paper AC/276-WP(73)16(2nd revise).

2. The contents are agreed by the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints ad referendum.

3. The United States Authorities wish to reserve their position on the Second Report, including the attached Chapters.

4. This document will not be downgraded without a specific downgrading notice from the originator.

(Signed) W.M. GOOSSENS
Captain, RNLN

NATO,
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This document consists of: 23 pages

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AC/276-WP(73)16/1V. OBSERVATIONS ON A "ZONAL" CONSTRAINTS APPROACH FOR THE CENTRAL REGION

Military strategic aspects of movements and movement constraints in Central Europe.

A. INTRODUCTION

61. Because of the complexity of the issues, discussion on movement constraints in AC/276-D(72)4 was restricted to one constraints area only in Central Europe, namely the NATO Guidelines Area. The remainder of Central Europe therefore was not included in the constraints area. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the military and strategic advantages of a system of movement constraints under which the whole of Central Europe is sub-divided into several constraints areas or zones. For the purpose of this study, Central Europe is defined as the countries in the NATO Guidelines Area, plus Hungary, and the three USSR Western Military Districts: Baltic, Belo-Russian and Carpathian.

Canadian Study

62. A first initiative to start the discussion on the concept of a "zonal" approach in the context of movement constraints was a Canadian study, AC/276-WP(72)40, 14th September, 1972, "A Suggested Constraints System for MBFR".

In this Study the Constraints Zone Concept is based on the assumption that the importance of Warsaw Pact movements to NATO security is a function of their proximity to the frontiers between NATO and Warsaw Pact territory (demarcation line).

After reasoning that movement constraints, and their attendant verification systems, ought to be increasingly severe the closer one gets to the demarcation line, the authors suggest the establishment of one or more constraints zones within the reduction area, beginning with rather severe restrictions in the immediate area of confrontation, and gradually decreasing the further away one gets from the demarcation line.

The document concludes by considering three Constraints Zones, being:

- (a) Zone I (Static Zone), 50 kilometres wide on each side of the demarcation line between NATO and Warsaw Pact territory in the NATO Guidelines Area.
- (b) Zone II (Limited Movement Zone), 150 kilometres wide extending from the boundary of Zone I back into the respective territory of East and West Alliances in the NGA.

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- (c) Zone III (Limited Entry Zone), including the remainder of the constraints area in the NGA.

SHAPE Requirements(1)

63. It should be kept in mind that any movement constraints system must take into account NATO's need for training and rotation of personnel in normal peacetime conditions and movement of units for occupying GDP positions in times of increased tension.

General

64. Movement constraints can be applied in any chosen area. It is however only logical that the objectives as laid down in AC/276-WP(72)27 are kept in mind. The constraints which should be taken into consideration should therefore at least:

- (a) be instrumental in building confidence;
- (b) reduce the military threat.

In practice, these conditions are interrelated. Reducing the threat will also be an important confidence building measure.

B. GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONSON WARSAW PACT TERRITORY

65. The threat opposite NATO/AFCENT presents itself in various echelons from the demarcation line to the east. The WP forces in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, totalling 55 divisions, could form the first echelon. Further to the east in the three Military Districts of the USSR, 22 combat ready divisions are available to form the second echelon.

66. Finally, all remaining ground forces stationed in the European part of the USSR could be considered as a strategic reserve.

67. As to WP forces in Hungary (4 Soviet and 5 Hungarian divisions), it should be noted that they might be earmarked for operations in Central Europe as well as in Southern Europe. In case of commitment in the Central European Sector they could be used in an initially second echelon rôle, or in case of violation of Austrian neutrality as part of a first echelon(2).

(1) AC/276-WP(73)18, paragraph 26(b)

(2) AC/276-D(73)2, 20th July, 1973

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68. The 35 divisions stationed in the GDR and Western Czechoslovakia (forward area) could be committed in any kind of aggression. As their peacetime locations are not adapted to the needs of operational deployment, they would have to be redeployed in case of operations against AFCENT.

It should be emphasized, however, that the time needed for their operational and tactical redeployment will be so short that the reaction time available for NATO forces would anyway be insufficient if warning would be dependent on verification of agreed constraints in this area. Therefore, the threat represented by WP ground forces in forward areas is primarily a direct result of their mere presence and will hardly be reduced by restricting their freedom of movement.

69. It is questionable, however, even in the case of a limited aggression in Central Europe, if the WP High Command would consider the 35 divisions presently available in the forward area as being sufficient for this task. Taking into account the present ratio of forces (WP versus NATO) it would be reasonable to expect that the WP would wish to concentrate the majority of their first echelon forces. Such a concentration could involve the first echelon forces deployed in depth (20 divisions in Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia). These would have to be deployed in the forward area pre D-day. If not, setbacks resulting from NATO interdiction of transport and communication lines could result in a loss of impetus of the attack.

70. It therefore follows that deployment of WP ground forces, assumed to be earmarked for first echelon fronts, will have to be completed by forces which will have to be moved from Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia to the West.

71. The concentration of the second echelon fronts which, in case of preparation for general war will be necessary pre D-day, would probably take place in Poland, Slovakia and possibly Hungary. Forces involved will be those moved forward from the Western Military Districts of the USSR and possibly some WP forces now stationed in Hungary could be moved into Slovakia.

72. Although the WP appreciation of their military strategic requirements can only be assumed, it seems logical that the WP command will, at present:

- (a) strive for a maximum freedom of movement in general;
- (b) wish to maintain absolute freedom of action for stationed and indigenous forces in the GDR and CSSR, as they will consider these as the main instrument for defence of WP territory.

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73. With regard to the foregoing, from a NATO point of view, the following sub-conclusions could be drawn:

- (a) Movement constraints for WP forces in GDR and Western Czechoslovakia would merely have a tactical value (tactical warning). They would however be of very limited or no value as a means to attain the following specific objectives (see AC/276-WP(72)27):
- deterrent to covert reinforcement,
 - receiving at an earlier stage more information of intended aggression,
 - mitigation of some of the effects of the WP geographic advantage.
- (b) Movement constraints for WP forces should be focussed on those movements which might result in reinforcement of the first echelon i.e. movements of those units currently deployed in depth in Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia into GDR and Western Czechoslovakia.
- (c) Movement constraints for WP forces, restricting the movements from Western Military Districts into Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and from Hungary into Eastern Czechoslovakia, would harass WP build-up operations (second echelon) related to major aggression.
- (d) For movement constraints purposes four different areas(1) may be distinguished, in each of which the requirements are different:
- (1) a forward area:
approx.: GDR, Western Czechoslovakia
 - (2) a middle area:
approx.: Poland, Eastern Czechoslovakia
 - (3) a rear area:
approx.: Baltic, Belo-Russian and Carpathian Military districts
 - (4) a "multi-purpose" area: Hungary.

In these areas different sets of constraints could be envisaged, in order to:

- adapt the constraints system to the actual military situation,

(1) Not necessarily confined to National boundaries

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- increase flexibility,
- possibly increase negotiability.

ON NATO TERRITORY

74. Whenever the military situation in Western Europe is considered, the defensive requirements of NATO forces are of primary importance. NATO's plans provide for the defence of the NATO area against an existing threat with the forces in place. In the Central Region of Europe, the Alliance's ground forces are to be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany.

75. Defensive operations to counter an attack by the WP should begin as far forward as possible. According to NATO's concept of forward defence and flexible response, all combat ready forces must be available. Reinforcements are only of value if they can be brought to the theatre of operations in time. To NATO it is of importance that its available and combat ready forces can be moved forward into the pre-planned battle areas and brought to full wartime strength as quickly as possible. Measures which would cause delays must be avoided.

76. The Warsaw Pact might advocate that a comparable geographic division of NATO territory to that described in paragraph 73 might be:

- (a) A "forward area" consisting of all areas East of the rivers Ems - Dortmund Ems Canal - Lippe - Rhine.
- (b) A "middle area" - the remainder of FRG together with the Benelux countries.
- (c) A "rear area" - parts of Canada, the UK and US.
- (d) A "multi-purpose area" - Denmark (and France).

C. ESSENTIAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN AND INTO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

77. SACEUR has stated (paragraph 63) that NATO should retain freedom of movement to enable GDP positions to be occupied in times of increased tension. The WP for their part are also likely to demand freedom of movement in their "forward area" to enable them to carry out their own defensive preparations. Thus, movement constraints in the "forward area" should be made as unrestricted as possible to retain the principle of undiminished security.

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ON WP SIDE

78. In the event of aggression against the West, the WP may wish to reinforce their forces at present available in GDR and Western Czechoslovakia. This could be done by units brought forward from Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia and units moved through Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Western Military Districts. Under certain conditions they might choose to deploy forces from Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia to the west in an early stage and delay the forward move of forces from USSR territory until shortly before or even post D-day.

79. This implies that the WP might wish to move the 20 WP divisions located in Poland and Eastern Czechoslovakia (their "middle area") into the GDR and Western Czechoslovakia (their "forward area"), before moving any of the 22 combat ready divisions in the three Western Military Districts (their "rear area") forward.

ON NATO SIDE

80. A set of constraints applied to a Zonal System should not obstruct NATO's ability to implement the necessary Alert measures. This means that in times of increased tension NATO will wish to move the following forces located outside the "forward area" described in paragraph 76(a) to their GDP positions in the "forward area".

- (a) Up to 11 combat brigades which are based in the "middle" area (see paragraph 76(b)).
- (b) Up to 18 combat brigades(1) which are based in the "rear area" (i.e. in the UK and US) - see paragraph 76(c).
- (c) 2 up to 3 combat brigades(1) which are located in Denmark - see paragraph 76(d).

BOTH SIDES

81. Both sides will wish to preserve the right to move forces from one area into another in peacetime for training purposes. They will also wish to retain the right in peace to:

- (1) Rotate individuals (e.g. conscripts at the end of their whole-time service).
- (2) Exchange units at periodic intervals.

D. DEDUCTIONS FROM SECTIONS B AND C

82. Both sides will wish to preserve freedom of movement within the "forward area" for those forces permanently located in it.

(1) See AC/276-D(72)4

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83. The WP is unlikely to attack NATO until their forces in the "forward area" are reinforced by either:

- (a) WP forces located in the "middle area" (20 divisions)
- (b) WP forces located in the "rear area" (22 divisions)
- (c) WP forces located in the "multi-purpose area" (up to 9 divisions)
- (d) All or a combination of (a) to (c) above.

84. A system of constraints under which the movement of WP forces between areas in a westerly direction was deterred would be of advantage to NATO.

85. NATO will wish to preserve the unrestricted right to move all available forces into the "forward area" from outside in a period of tension.

86. Both sides will wish to be able to move some forces and individual personnel between areas in peace for training and rotation purposes.

E. IMPLICATIONS OF A ZONAL SYSTEM OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS

ADVANTAGES TO NATO

87. The main advantage to NATO of a zonal system of movement constraints would be to impose a deterrent to the movement of WP forces in a westerly direction between the four areas described in paragraph 74(d).

88. Should such a zonal system be complemented by a verification system which permitted the establishment of NATO inspection teams in each of the zones, its deterrent value would be much increased and additional warning of any intended WP aggression might be gained.

DISADVANTAGES TO NATO

89. A zonal system of movement constraints would have the following military disadvantages:

- (a) The sub-division of the territories of the FRG and Benelux into a "forward area" and a "middle" area would:
 - (1) jeopardize long-term European defence restructuring.

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- (2) Complicate SACEUR's plans to move his combat ready forces deployed in the Guidelines Area into their GDP positions. In this connection it must be emphasized that NATO's combat ready forces can be moved forward into their defensive positions only in reaction to reliable evidence of WP offensive intents. Furthermore all existing combat ready forces will be required to be in the forward defensive area before D-day to implement NATO's strategy of forward defence and flexible response. Therefore, additional delays to the move forward of these forces, which could be imposed by movement constraints imposed for forces now in the Guidelines Area, could have serious consequences to NATO's security.
- (3) Result in the division of FRG territory into two zones.
- (b) The inclusion of parts of Canada, the UK and US in a "rear area" constraints zone and of Denmark (and France) in a "multi-purpose area" constraints zone would impose restrictions on the move of ground forces in those areas, which would hamper their ability speedily to reinforce the Guidelines Area in periods of suddenly increased tension. It would also hinder the use of such forces to reinforce the flanks of NATO should the need to do so arise. In addition, in the case of Canada, the UK and the US, their freedom to use their ground forces situated in their homeland in connection with non-NATO requirements could be impaired.

DEDUCTION

90. It would be to NATO's military advantage if a zonal system of movement constraints could be applied to Warsaw Pact territory as a measure to help mitigate the Soviet geographical advantage in terms of overland reinforcement compared to those NATO reinforcements which have to be seaborne or airborne. However, this advantage would be outweighed in the event that the Warsaw Pact demanded a reciprocal zonal system of movement constraints to NATO territory.

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VI. INCLUSION OF PARTS OF THE USSR TERRITORY IN A CONSTRAINTS AREAAim

101. In this part of the report we consider the value to NATO of the inclusion of the territory of the USSR in any constraints area, bearing in mind the military implications for NATO of having to include, in return, Western territories outside the NATO Guidelines Area.

Purpose of Constraints

102. Movement constraints could be imposed on USSR territory for one or more of the following purposes:

- (a) To promote greater mutual political confidence between the USSR and the NATO nations whose territory adjoins that country.
- (b) To provide a political deterrent to military movement within, into and out of that part of the USSR territory subjected to movement constraints.
- (c) To mitigate the Soviet geographical advantage in terms of overland reinforcement compared to those NATO reinforcements which have to be seaborne or airborne.
- (d) If accompanied by an agreement to station NATO inspection teams on Soviet soil, to:
 - (1) facilitate verification that Soviet redeployment out of the NSWP countries has been carried out as agreed.
 - (2) Provide a means of receiving at an earlier stage more information of Soviet movements towards and across her international borders.
 - (3) Provide a possible additional source of intelligence.

103. Movement constraints imposed on Soviet territory could form part of an agreement and be applied before, concurrently with or subsequently to reductions.

Lay-out

104. We examine this problem in three separate sections to see how the interests of the NATO regions - Northern, Central and Southern - could be affected, but we would draw the attention of the Working Group to the assumption made at paragraph 5(b) of our report.

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SECTION 1 - NORTHERN REGIONNATO Requirements

105. The only NATO country in the Northern region whose territory borders with the USSR is Norway. As was discussed in Chapter II, Norway faced potential invasion from Soviet land forces via Finnmark, Finland or Sweden. All such Soviet land forces would have to emanate from or transit through the Leningrad Military District. The purposes, therefore, of any movement constraints measures which NATO might wish to see imposed on forces located in Leningrad Military District are those set out in paragraph 102 above.

106. The requirements of Denmark in the movement constraints field would be covered by the proposals made in AC/276-WP(72)27 which include the GDR and Poland in a movement constraints zone apropos the Central Region.

Possible Implication to NATO of applying Movement Constraints to the Leningrad Military District

107. It is probable that if the Soviets were to agree to subject the whole or parts of the Leningrad Military District to movement constraints, they would demand, in return, that parts of Norwegian territory should be subjected to similar arrangements. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it is assumed that any movement constraints agreement for the Northern region should be confined to the following geographical area(1):

- (a) On the USSR side, that part of the Leningrad Military District known as Murmansk Oblast, since that area contains the two Soviet divisions now located in that District which provide the immediate potential threat to Norwegian territory.
- (b) On the Norwegian side, that part of Norway known as the County of Finnmark

108. In the subsequent paragraphs of this section we discuss the movement requirements of NATO forces in this geographical area, the applicability of the Movement Constraint options listed in AC/276-WP(72)27, the verification measures that might be needed, the applicability of these options to the Warsaw Pact and conclude with some general deductions about the value of these measures to NATO.

(1) See also Annex 6

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Movement Requirements of External NATO Forces "into" Finnmark

113. Allied ground forces are not allowed to take part in peacetime exercises on the territory of Finnmark(1). In times of increased tension, the Norwegian Government could decide to permit the introduction of Allied ground forces up to one Brigade(+) size as an alternative to introducing Norwegian units into Finnmark.

Deduction from paragraphs 105 to 113:

114. The right to conduct peacetime exercises involving the movement of 2 Norwegian Battalions within Finnmark should be retained. In this connection the possibility of moving one Brigade(+) from Southern Norway over a period of 6 days should be kept open. In a period of increasing tension the possibility of introducing Allied external forces of 1 Brigade(+) size over the same period of time should be kept open as an alternative to introducing Norwegian forces.

115. As far as Soviet forces located in the region are concerned, NATO would wish to be informed of the purpose and details of the movement of any Soviet forces, of regiment size or greater, within the Northern part of the Leningrad Military District (i.e. Murmansk Oblast) - whether such movement be for exercise or other purposes - if greater mutual confidence is to be established.

Movement Constraint Options

116. It will be seen from paragraphs 114 and 115 that the requirements of NATO could be obtained by either of the sets of constraints listed in Annex 1, but due to the smaller force levels available in the region to NATO, we could accept constraints which would limit the build-up in Finnmark to a total of 2 Brigades (One Bde(-) will be mobilized within the area, the other Bde(+) - either National or Allied - will be introduced from outside).

117. The Sub-Group is of the opinion that the second set of constraints would be preferable for the Northern Flank because they restrict the introduction of units from outside the constraints area on a permanent basis without a compensating withdrawal of equivalent units. In the light of the unfavourable military situation at present, such a restriction could be to NATO's advantage.

(1) For similar reasons of the National self-imposed constraints in peacetime, no Allied military aircraft and naval ships operating to and from Norwegian territory are allowed East of the 24°E longitude

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be: The constraints proposed for the Northern Flank could

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area
(Finnmark and Murmansk Oblast)

- 1 Brigade/Regiment(1) or more - Notification at start of movement
- Military transport A/C - No limitations

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area
(Finnmark and Murmansk Oblast)

Units entering the Constraints Area from the outside should remain there only temporarily(2) or must be counter-balanced by a notified and verified withdrawal of an equivalent force.

Temporary reinforcement of:

- Up to 1 Brigade/Regt. - Notification at start of movement
- More than 1 up to 2 Bdes/Regts. - Notification 6 days in advance(3)
- More than 2 Bdes/Regts. - Prohibited
- Military transport A/C - No limitations

This means that when 1 Brigade/Regiment has already been introduced into the Constraints Area, each unit entering subsequently from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 1 Bde/Regt. and ought to be notified 6 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement has already reached the amount of 2 Bdes/Regts. each unit entering subsequently will be regarded as a violation of the Agreement.

118. Constraints in which the number of Brigades/Regiments were increased slightly and/or the times of advance notice were decreased marginally, would not hinder NATO's operational plans. This is important if NATO is to remain capable of reinforcing the Constraints Area, should an increased threat develop.

119. Alternatively it should be possible to construe a system of more stringent movement constraints in an area approximately 100 km deep on both sides of the Norwegian-Soviet border, and to adopt the measures outlined in paragraph 117 for the remainder of the area.

- (1) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks. (A Norwegian brigade numbers 5,000 men)
- (2) Temporarily should be interpreted in this context to mean for the transitory purpose of taking part in a specific short-term training requirement, pre-planned and limited in duration, the length of which still has to be decided
- (3) The number of days before entering the Constraints Area

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Acceptability of Options to the Warsaw Pact

120. Soviet exercises in Murmansk Oblast during recent years have involved relatively small forces. This could be an indication that the USSR might, for purely military reasons, be willing to accept constraints of the types listed in paragraphs 117 and 119 for Murmansk Oblast.

Verification Measures

121. As explained in Chapter II, paragraph 18, the geographical conditions (especially in the winter months) are such, that besides Air Reconnaissance an effective way of verifying constraints would be to locate observers at strategic points.

Conclusion: Value to NATO of Movement Constraints in the Northern Region

122.

- (a) An uninspected agreement might have some political value as a confidence building measure, but would have no real military significance.
- (b) An inspected movement constraints agreement could have military as well as political significance to NATO, since the Warsaw Pact capability to reinforce the forces within Murmansk Oblast by surreptitious movement is so much greater than NATO's. On the other hand such an agreement would involve the location of observers appointed by the other side on the territory of both Norway and the USSR. Because of the nature of the environment in both areas, it is possible that such observers could be confined to very restricted areas and still achieve a meaningful purpose.
- (c) The constraints as listed in paragraph 117 are based on the minimum that is acceptable in order not to interfere with NATO's movement requirements, however, those mentioned in paragraph 119 would also be possible.

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AC/276-WP(73)16/1SECTION 2 - SOUTHERN REGIONNATO Requirements

123. Turkey and the USSR share a common land frontier, while both Greece and Turkey share a common land frontier with Bulgaria whose forces could be reinforced by Soviet land forces transited through Romania from the Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev Military Districts. The purpose, therefore, of any movement constraints measures which NATO might wish to see imposed on forces located in Southern USSR are those set out in paragraph 102 above.

The Implications to NATO of Applying Movement Constraints to Southern USSR

124. The Sub-Group recognize, as already stated in Chapter III, paragraph 27, that Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe as a result of MBFR, if redeployed in Soviet territories adjacent to Greece and Turkey, would constitute an additional threat to these NATO countries, while on the other hand MBFR will not affect NATO forces in the Southern region.

Therefore, to mitigate this unilateral increase to the potential threat, there would be a military advantage in seeking Soviet agreement to be subjected to unilateral constraints in the Southern region.

However, it is possible that if the Soviets were to agree to subject the whole or parts of Southern USSR to movement constraints, they would demand, in return, that Greece and Turkey should be subjected to similar arrangements.

125. In the subsequent paragraphs of this section we discuss the movement requirements of NATO forces in Greece and Turkey, the applicability of the movement constraint options listed in Annex 1, the verification measures that might be needed, the applicability of these options to the Warsaw Pact and conclude with some general deductions about the value of these measures to NATO. We assume that the constraints area in the Southern region would include all Greece and Turkey and all the USSR(1) south of the 50th parallel (see map at Annex 2). It is unlikely that the arguments used in these paragraphs would differ much if the chosen parallel in the USSR was altered.

Movement Requirements of Indigenous NATO Forces "within" the area

126. The Greek and Turkish Authorities made it clear that there must be freedom of movements for their own forces. This means that the proposed constraints of Annex 1, paragraphs 3(a) and 4(a) are unacceptable to Greece and Turkey.

(1) All Soviet territory west of the URALS

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Movement Requirements of External NATO Forces "into" the area

127. In peacetime conditions for exercise purposes and in times of increased tension external forces up to 4 brigades(1) might under current plans be deployed into the area as follows:

up to 4 brigades(1)(2), movement completed within 23 days.

Deductions from paragraphs 123 through 127

128. There must be freedom of movement for Greek and Turkish indigenous forces. NATO will wish to be free to introduce external forces into Greece and Turkey up to 4 brigades in peacetime or in a period of increased tension.

129. As far as Soviet forces located in the region are concerned, NATO would wish to be informed of the purpose and details of movements of any Soviet forces of brigade size or greater within the proposed constraints area described in paragraph 125 above. It should, however, be kept in mind that reciprocity in this aspect is unacceptable to Greece and Turkey.

Movement Constraints Options

130. Most of the Soviet forces which are likely to be used initially in any attack on Greece or Turkey are already located in the proposed constraints area in Southern USSR. The aims of any movement constraints agreement for this region should be, therefore, to deter the movement of USSR forces from other parts of the USSR into the area south of the 50th parallel and to deter the move of forces already in that constrained area out of the USSR in a southerly direction. Either of the sets of movement constraints illustrated in Annex 1 (suitably modified to cater for the decreased number of external NATO forces involved in this region) would secure the first of these aims but neither would meet the second requirement.

131. It is also suggested that movement constraints of the type illustrated in Annex 1 put fewer constraints on forces with no aggressive intentions, which are located within a constraints area, than they do on forces located outside the area but which have need to enter it for legitimate reasons. It could be of advantage, therefore, to Greece and to Turkey to include the whole rather than part of their territories in any constraints area, should one be considered for the region. However, measures which would involve the concurrent notification of Greek and Turkish ground force movements made within their national territories, is said to be unacceptable by these two countries.

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- (1) One AMF(L) bde, one UK bde, one UKJATFOR bde, and one US bde
 (2) The Strategic Reserve (14 brigades, movement completed within 60 days) is not considered in this context

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132. The Sub-Group is of the opinion that the second set of constraints listed in paragraph 10 of the report AC/276-D(72)4(1) would be preferable for the Southern region because they restrict the introduction of units from outside the constraints area on a permanent basis without a compensating withdrawal of equivalent units. In the light of paragraphs 126 through 131, the constraints proposed for the Southern region based on present NATO requirements (see paragraph 127) and allowing for possible future developments, could be:

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area

(Greece, Turkey, USSR south of 50th parallel).
No limitations

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area

(Greece, Turkey, USSR south of 50th parallel).

Temporary reinforcement of:

up to 1 Brigade/Regt.	- Notification at start of movement
more than 1 up to 6 Bdes/Regts.	- Notification 3 days in advance(2)
more than 6 Bdes/Regts. military transport A/C	- Prohibited
	- No limitations.

This means that when 1 Brigade/Regiment has already been introduced into the constraints area, each unit entering subsequently from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 1 Bde/Regt. and ought to be notified 3 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement has reached the amount of 6 Bdes/Regts., no more units are allowed to enter the area.

(c) Movements out of the Constraints Area into Romania and Bulgaria

(Greece, Turkey, USSR south of 50th parallel).
Prohibited.

Verification Measures

133. As explained in Chapter III, paragraph 35, the use of observers in the constraints area could have military advantages to NATO.

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- (1) See Annex 1, paragraph 4
(2) Independently of the actual time needed for the activation and transportation of all units concerned, the time of notification is fixed at 3 days before the first elements of these units will enter the constraints area

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Conclusion: Value to NATO of Movement Constraints
in the Southern Region

134. Constraints measures as listed in paragraph 132 could help serve the purposes described in paragraph 102. An inspected movement constraints agreement - which could have military as well as political significance to NATO - seems unacceptable to the countries concerned.

An uninspected agreement might have some political value as a confidence building measure, but would have no real military significance.

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AC/276-WP(73)16/1SECTION 3 - CENTRAL REGIONNATO Requirements: Movement Constraints

135. Movement constraints of the type illustrated in Annex 1 or discussed in Chapter V, which are applied to the territories of the GDR, CSSR and Poland on the Warsaw Pact side and to the FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on NATO's side, should deter the movement of additional Soviet forces and of additional French, UK and US forces into the Guidelines Area. Such measures would, therefore, meet the movement constraint objectives for imposition on the Soviet forces based in the USSR, which are listed in paragraph 102(a), (b) and (c). These measures, as indicated in paragraph 103, could be imposed pre-, post-, or concurrently with the implementation of an MBFR agreement. On the other hand the objectives at paragraph 102(b) and (c) would not be met should the Baltic, Belo-Russian and Carpathian Military Districts (hereafter indicated as the 3 WMDs) be included within the same constraints area as the NSWP countries, if unrestricted movement is to be allowed for forces located permanently within such a constraints area. The reasoning behind this assertion is explained in paragraph 140.

136. The main value, therefore, to be gained from subjecting the three Western Military Districts to movement constraints would be:

- (a) To deter the move of forces stationed in these three districts to other parts of the USSR, where they could constitute a threat to NATO's flanks.
- (b) To obtain the intelligence benefits described in paragraph 102(d) above.

137. The NATO requirement at paragraph 136(a), above would, however, be met by movement constraints applied to Soviet forces, based in the Leningrad Military District and in Southern USSR, discussed already in Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter, albeit at a later stage in their movement.

138. The real purpose, therefore, of attempting to include the 3 WMDs in a movement constraints agreement would be to obtain the intelligence benefits listed in paragraph 102(d). However, these intelligence benefits would only be obtained if the movement constraints agreement permitted the stationing of NATO inspection teams, with proper facilities to move around their areas, within the 3 WMDs.

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NATO Requirements: Other Forms of Constraints

139. One of the consequences of an MBFR agreement will be the redeployment of Soviet forces from the Guidelines Area into the USSR. NATO will wish to ensure that effective constraints are applied to these withdrawn forces to deter their overt or clandestine return into the Guidelines Area. As discussed in paragraphs 135-138, movement constraints would provide one form of deterrent to such movement. Another deterrent would be to include the 3 WMDs in a "Force Limitation Agreement" or subject them to a "non-Circumvention Clause" on the grounds that only by the implementation of such a measure would the Soviet geographical advantages in terms of overland reinforcements be mitigated to a reasonable extent. Either of these measures would ensure that Soviet forces, reduced as a result of a reduction agreement covering the NATO Guidelines Area, would not be allowed to be stationed in the 3 WMDs and that substitute Soviet forces from other parts of Warsaw Pact territory would not be allowed to enter these districts and thereby raise the current overall level of forces in them. Obviously the benefits to be gained by NATO through such a measure would be increased should it be accompanied by an agreement to station NATO inspection teams within the 3 WMDs.

Possible effects from including both the NGA and the 3 Soviet WMDs in the same Constraints Area

140. Expanding the constraints area to include both the NATO Guidelines Area and the 3 WMDs in the same constraints area and thereby create one large constraints area, might weaken NATO's security for the following reasons:

- (a) the total area in which Warsaw Pact forces may move at will would be enlarged;
- (b) the force-in-being stationed in the 3 WMDs could be used for a build-up in the NATO Guidelines Area within the terms of an agreement unless ruled out by specific measures.

Different constraints measures for the NGA and for the 3 Soviet WMDs

141. Movement constraints measures imposed on ground forces stationed in the 3 WMDs, which were different in scope to those imposed in the Guidelines Area, could have the following characteristics:

- (a) Constraints to be applied would not have to be identical with the constraints applied in the NATO Guidelines Area.

- (b) Constraints would have to be applied to movement between the two areas to prevent the forces located in the 3 WMDs from being used to build up the forces in the Guidelines Area without breaching an agreement.
- (c) Constraints would have to be designed to require the pre-announcement of substantial movements of Soviet forces within and into the 3 WMDs from elsewhere in the USSR.

142. These movement constraints would have the effect of a "de facto" ceiling on the 3 WMDs. In addition the measure mentioned in paragraph 141(c) could be conceived as agreed pre-announcement of movements without limitations placed on the duration of stay of forces and without rendering illegal the introduction on a permanent basis of additional combat forces from outside the area.

Conclusion: Value to NATO of constraints in the 3 WMDs

143. The imposition of a separate "de facto" ceiling on the WMDs would:

- (a) be of military advantage to NATO;
- (b) make a possible build-up of Soviet forces against NATO Central region more difficult;
- (c) mitigate to some extent geographical asymmetries and disparities in redeployment capability.

It is probable that - in the case of Warsaw Pact acceptance of such measures - the USSR would demand application of equivalent constraints to one or more NATO countries located outside the Guidelines Area. Such proposals would therefore have to be examined with regard to their political and military implications for NATO and would introduce factors outside the competence of the Sub-Group to consider.

They could on the negative side in case of reciprocity:

- (d) extend the application of a "de facto" ceiling on NATO territories outside the NATO Guidelines Area;
- (e) jeopardize movement and defence capability which is necessary for NATO;
- (f) involve the problem of the Forward Based System (FBS).

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144. We see at the least considerable advantages in a combination of an arrangement to assure the non-stationing of withdrawn Soviet forces in the 3 WMDs with agreed pre-announcements of major movements of Soviet forces into and within the 3 WMDs.

Such a solution would:

- (a) avoid the difficulties of a ceiling-type arrangement;
- (b) try to mitigate redeployment disparities in MBFR;
- (c) require Soviet force movements into the 3 WMDs to be pre-announced and include some degree of extra warning should this measure be accompanied by an agreement which permitted NATO inspection teams to be stationed in the 3 WMDs;
- (d) be in line with NATO movement necessities should the WP ask for equivalent pre-announcements of NATO movements outside the NATO Guidelines Area;
- (e) help to counteract efforts towards the creation of a special geographically confined armament zone in Central Europe.

145. Redeployment of non-reduced Soviet units into the WMDs would under such an agreement continue to be possible. Movements of larger units into the WMDs would, however, tend to indicate a change in the overall political situation.