CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MF

EXEMPLAIRE Nº 318

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 22nd Nevember, 1972

WORKING PAPER AC/276-WP(71)15/9

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

DRAFT COMPENDIUM OF MBFR MATERIAL

(1.5.1967 - 1.9.1971)

Note by the Staff Group

Attached is a new addendum to the draft Compendium of MBFR material, covering the period 1.8.1971 - 1.9.1971.

2. The following amendments are to be made:

| Old pages to be removed | New pages to be inserted |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
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| III.2-3 | III.2-3, III.2-4 |
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3. This document is automatically downgraded to NATO RESTRICTED upon removal of the enclosure.

(Signed) E.L. ROWNY Lieutenant General, USAR

This document consists of 1 page and an Enclosure of 12 pages.

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| ٧. | THE RISK ASSESSMENT (Static and Dynamic Analyses) |
|-------|---|
| | MBFR in Application to Ground Forces |
| VI. | VERIFICATION |
| VII. | THE BALANCED CEILING CONCEPT |
| | The Common Ceiling Approach Differential Allocation of MBFR between NATO Territories and Forces |
| VIII. | THE STATIONED FORCES CONCEPT |
| IX. | THE PHASED INTEGRATED APPROACH |
| | Building Blocks |
| X. | EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR |
| | CSCE |
| XI. | CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES |
| : | Movement Constraints Collateral Constraints |
| XII. | IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO |
| XIII. | MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT |
| xIV. | NUCLEAR ASPECTS |
| xv. | (Reserve) |
| xvI. | (Reserve) |
| | |

XVII. SUMMARY

A general history of MBFR
 A political appraisal of MBFR

XVIII. INDEX (Chronological)

1.7-3

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CHAPTER I : BACKGROUND (contd)

7. The Communiqué of Lisbon (1971) (conta)

procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions.

Para 16. These Ministers further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives, who would be responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and the other interested Governments and eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations on MBFR.

14.6.1971

PO/71/281. Note by Secretary General Follow-up to the Ministerial Meeting. In the wake of the Lisbon meeting, the International Staff has reviewed the Communiqué and records, and in the light of this review, the Secretary General puts forward a programme for the Council's future studies and consultation as follows:

- East-West negotiations : conform paras 9 and 11
 - of the Communiqué;
- MBFR : conform para 15 of the Communiqué. The SPC and the MBFR WJ were to be instructed to address themselves to those elements in the Progress Report C-M(71)33(Revised) which are relevant to para 15 of the Communiqué. In particular Chapter VI of C-M(71)33(Revised) contains a wide range of subjects for further MBFR studies. Mention was made by some Ministers, of the need to pursue the Alliance's internal work programme, to define the principles to be applied in any MBFR negotiation, and to work out an integral MBFR negotiating programme.
- The Mediterranean: conform para 12 of the Communiqué.

19.7.1971 C-M(71)49. (A revised version appeared 10.9.1971. See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).

9.8.1971

PO/71/389. Note by Acting Secretary General.
Council Discussion on MBFR.
This paper records the main features of the
Council's discussion on 23 July 71
on C-M(71)49. (See Compendium, Chapter III.2).

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II.1-15

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CHAPTER II : STUDIES SINCE 1 JAN 68 (contd)

1. Related Studies (contd)

Note by Ass. Secr. Gen. for Pol. Affairs.
A Record of the Alliance MBFR Studies.

20.8.1971 AC/276-WP(71)17 Note by MBFR WG/Staff Group.
A preliminary view on the United
States Synopsis of MBFR Studies Some assumptions, models and
implications. (At Annex a list of
questions).

23.8.1971 Nr. 5615 Note by Netherlands Delegation.
Netherlands comments on United States
Synopsis of MBFR Studies.

25.8.1971 AC/276-WP(71)18 Note by SHAPE SHAPE Staff comments on the United States Synopsis of MBFR Studies.

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II.4-9

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CHAPTER II : STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

4. The Data Base (contd)

29.7.1971

DRC/N(71)18 Note by Chairman Defence Review Committee and Working Group on Relative Force Capabilities of

NATO and WP.

Data requirements of RFC and MBFR studies and of Defence Review Committee's designated tasks in the follow-on work on the AD 70 study.

31.8.1971

1101/14-4-3/71 Note by SACEUR
Policy on Combat Effectiveness
Reports by SACEUR.

This paper contains a proposal, that would result in the Combat Effectiveness Report being published 2 months earlier than at present.

III.2-3

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CHAPTER III : GUIDANCE (contd)

- 2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)
 - Qualitative and quantitative criteria for measuring force capabilities (yardsticks).
 - The nature and scope of reductions.
 - Symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions.
 Unequal percentages.
 Asymmetrical mixes of forces.
 Auclear vs conventional forces.
 Verification.
 - Annex I Preliminary military views on the draft Council report on the study of BFR / MCM-90-697.
 - Annex II The Soviet attitude to the idea of BFR.

19.7.1971 C-M(71)49 Report by

Report by Chairman SPC Preparation for the High Level meeting on MBFR.

- I. Introduction: In accordance with instructions issued by the Council on 16 June 71, this report was prepared by the SPC at a series of meetings between 17 June and 16 July 71.
- II. Agenda for the High Level meeting.

III. An Explorer.

IV. MBFR Principles.

V. Negotiating Fora.

Annex I. List of statements on MBFR supported by Ministers of Allied Countries participating in NATO's Integrated Defence Programme.

Annex II. Illustrative Negotiating Approaches.

(A revised version appeared 10.9.1971 and the 2nd revise on 24.9.1971).

9.8.1971

PO/71/389

Note by Acting Secretary General. Council Discussion on MBFR.

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This paper records the main features of the Council's discussion on C-M(71)49 at meeting 23 July 71.

A general consensus emerged, that there should be only one Explorer, who should be appointed after a common Alliance exploratory position has been established. On the remainder of the paper a variety of viewpoints emerged, generally confirming the differences expressed in C-M(71)49 (where parentheses and optional passages were included). Additional considerations and new wordings were also suggested.

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CHAPTER VI : VERIFICATION (contd)

23.7.1971

Nr _ - .

United States study on MBFR. Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.

This document is a synopsis of general MBFR studies.

Section X: Monitoring and verifying MBFR. Verification of an MBFR agreement requires collection of information on the location, characteristics and activities of Warsaw Pact forces in the area covered by the agreement in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency to allow political judgements about the adherence of the other side to the agreement.

The intelligence agencies of the NATO member states are constantly engaged in collecting such information in order to satisfy their requirements for warning and order-of-battle intelligence.

Thus two central verification issues posed

by MBFR are the following:
- what, if any, additional requirements for information would be imposed by any agreement? and

- what are the capabilities of the present, programmed and feasible collection systems available to NATO or its member states to satisfy these additional requirements ? These problems are elaborated in the following

sections:

A. The verification process.

B. Current capability to monitor Warsaw Pact forces.

C. Capability to verify detailed MBFR agreements. D. The effect of MBFR on warning intelligence.

E. Possible features of an MBFR agreement which could enhance warning.

| 18.8.1971 5.8.1971 6.8.1971 5.8.1971 5.8.1971 6.8.1971 | AC/276-WP(71)4/1 AC/276-WP(71)4/2 AC/276-WP(71)4/3 AC/276-WP(71)4/4 AC/276-WP(71)4/5 AC/276-WP(71)4/6 AC/276-WP(71)4/7 | Belgian German Netherlands Danish SACEUR's United Kingdom Canadian | of inspection |
|---|--|--|----------------|
| | | - | |
| 22.10.1971 | AC/276-WP(71)4/8 | United States | to NATO. |
| 28.10.1971 | AC/276-WP(71)4/9 | Summary of Nati | ional replies. |

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AC/276-WP(71)15/9

CHAPTER IX: THE PHASED INTEGRAL APPROACH (contd) (Building Blocks)

19.7.1971

C-M(71)49

(A revised version appeared 10.9.1971. See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971)

24.8.1971 20-02-5/2843/71 VSV German Delegation Working Paper.

MBFR: Movement Constraints for

NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces.

This paper is meant as a supplement to AC/276-WP(71)11, dated 1.4.71 on Building blocks of future MBFR negotiating options.
(See further Compendium, chapter XI).

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AC/276-WP(71)15/9

CHAPTER X : EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

2.7.1971 Nr. 10-00-1

Note by German Delegation.
Conversation between Germany Deputy
Ambassador in Sofia and the Head of
Planning Division of the Bulgarian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Minchev, about the Lisbon
Communiqué.

Bulgaria distinguishes between the following three groups:

- countries opposed to a CES, such as the United States and the United Kingdom;

- countries which strongly advocated a CES, such as France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries;

- countries who had not yet taken any clear position.

Mr. Minchev outlined the Eastern concept of a successful and realistic sequence of events at a CES:

- At first, the conclusion of agreements about which a consensus could be achieved within a short time, such as force renunciation:

- in addition, agreements on economic, industrial, scientific-technical and cultural co-operation among the European countries;

- creation of a permanent body which would be able to prepare substantive and procedural questions so that

they could be decided at later conferences.

19.7.1971 C-M(71)49

(A revised version appeared 10.9.1971. See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).

20.7.1971 POLADS(71)45

Memorandum by Chairman Pol. Committee. MBFR: Diplomatic talks during the period from 30/3 to 30/6/1971.

10.8.1971 POLADS(71)57

Memo by Chairman Pol. Committee. The situation in Yugoslavia.

10.8.1971 Nr.___

Note by United States Delegation. Gromyko on Force Reductions.

During a general survey with Ambassador Beam on July 28, Gromyko said he wished to emphasize that the Soviet Government was against approaching the problem on a bloc-to-bloc basis.

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CHAPTER XI : CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)

Movement Constraints, Collateral Constraints, etc.

to their intended effect :

- Measures which actually impede/constrain Pact mobilisation and reinforcement.

- Measures which enhance our ability to verify an MBFR

agreement.

- Measures which enable us to receive earlier, less ambiguous indications of Pact mobilisation and reinforcement.

Selection of a constraint or set of constraints from these classifications to accompany an MBFR agreement would be made on the basis of what NATO is likely to gain in relation to its attendant cost and disadvantages vis-à-vis the current NATO/Pact force balance. Further, it is possible that the greater the number of restrictions placed on residual forces, the greater the possibility of inadvertant or minor "frictional" violations leading to increases in tension or worsening of relations.

In the following sections the above mentioned subjects are elaborated :

- 1. Measures which constrain mobilisation and reinforcement.
- 2. Measures which enhance verification capability and warning.

24.8.1971 20-02-5/2843/71 VSV German Delegation Working Paper. MBFR: Movement Constraints for NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces.

In this paper, initial considerations are formulated concerning agreements on the constraint of troop movements through prior notifications, authorisation requirements or abstentions. They cover troop movements of a certain size, concentrated in a particular area at a given time. Distinction is made between movements within and into the area covered by an agreement.

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| DATE | . JUMBFR | CLAS | ORIGINATOR | TITLE OF DOCUMENT | TER |
| 29 .7.71 | DRC/N(71)18 RFC(WG)N(71)1 | чС | Def.Rev.Comm RFC.WG | Data requirements of RFC and MBFR studies | II.3 II.4 |
| 5.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)4/2 | ₩C | MBFR WG | German reply to Verification questionnaire | VI |
| 5.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)4/4 | NC | MBFR WG | Danish reply to Verification questionnaire | VI |
| 5.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)4/5 | ns | MBFR WG | SHAPE's reply to Verification questionnaire | VI |
| 6.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)4/3 | NC | MBFR WG | Neth.reply to Verification questionnaire | VI |
| €.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)4/6 | ns | MBFR WG | UK reply to Verification questionnaire | VI |
| 9.8.71 | P0/71/389 | NC | Act.Secr. Gen. | Council discussion on MBFR (Record 23/7/71) | I.7 III.2 |
| 10.8.71 | POLADS(71)57 | ИС | Political Comm. | The situation in Yugoslavia | Х |
| 10.8.71 | N r. | ns | US Delegation | Gromyko on Force reductions | х |
| 18.8.71 | DPA/71/207 | NS | Ass.Secr. Gen. | A record of the Alliance MBFR studies | II.1 |
| 20.8.71 | AC/276-WP(71)17 | NS | MBFR WG | Preliminary view on US synopsis of MBFR studies | II.1 |
| 23.8.71 | 5615 | NS | Neth. Delegation | Neth. comments on US synopsis paper | II.1 |
| 24.8.71 | 20-02-5/2843/71 VSV | NC | German Del. | Movement const. for NATO and WP Forces | XI |

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| 25.8.71 | AC/27(-WP(71)18 | NS | MBFR WG | SHAPE Staff comments on US Synopsis | II.1 |
| 31.8.71 | 1101/14-4-3/71 | иC | SACEUR | Policy on Combat effectiveness Reports | II.4 |

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