

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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EXEMPLAIRE N°  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
2nd October, 1962

DEFENCE RESEARCH DIRECTORS

QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF SCIENTISTS,  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND ADMINISTRATORS

(AC/137(DR)D/1)  
(AC/74(DR)D/1)

Greek Reply

General

1. A reply to the question asked by NATO Defence Research Directors on the method of formulating the military and strategic policy followed in Greece is given hereunder.

Background

2. As is correctly pointed out in paragraph II(e) of AC/137(DR)D/1 and AC/74(DR)D/1, it is difficult to plan the military and strategic policy of a country from the very beginning due to the continuous effort of adaptation necessitated by the changing factors composing this policy. It is reasonable to say that the military and strategic policy followed in nearly all NATO countries nowadays has originated from the end of 2nd World War and has passed through the following characteristic periods:

- Prior to the establishment of NATO (1945 - 1950)
- Establishment and organization of NATO (1950 up to 1955 approximately)
- Stabilisation and development of NATO (from 1955 approximately up to now).

Meeting the problem in Greece

3. Greece has met its military and strategic problem through the aforesaid characteristic periods under the following special conditions:-

(a) Estimate of the enemy threat

- (1) Greece, bordered by two countries of the Iron Curtain, Bulgaria and Albania, had to follow and take into

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AG/137(DR)D/2/4

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consideration the capabilities of these countries and especially of Bulgaria, the war potential of which continuously increased from a quantitative and qualitative point of view.

It also had to watch the Soviet forces which might intervene through these countries, especially through Bulgaria.

- (2) Another factor, seriously and particularly affecting the Hellenic defence problem, is Internal Communism. This, having recent experience of unorthodox warfare, would be able, if reinforced by the numerous communist ex-bandits behind the Iron Curtain, to support a more general hostile action against the country or to undertake local hostile actions in the form of subversive activities and penetrations for the Soviets, in order to test the cohesion and solidarity of NATO.
- (3) The scientists, military personnel and administrators of the Hellenic Armed Forces co-operate to an extent proportionate to the field under examination and the details desired for estimating this threat. Consequently, the estimation of the enemy threat is the collective work of the above three components.
- (b) Greece, facing the threat of a general or limited war, is obliged for both herself and for NATO to maintain a high defence readiness level enabling her to protect herself against the enemy threat and to fulfill her commitments to NATO.
- To accomplish this mission, Greece requires well-balanced Army, Navy and Air Forces. As is known, these forces are defined as a result of co-operation between the responsible NATO and national authorities, regularly on the basis of the Triennial Review procedure and exceptionally when a need arises.
- The following basic elements are required for the organisation and maintenance of these Forces at the levels commonly agreed:
- (1) Personnel
  - (2) Equipment and Supplies
  - (3) Economic resources
- (c) For identifying these elements in the quantity and quality desired, scientists, military personnel and administrators are invited again to co-operate in order to reach a satisfactory solution of the problem.

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- (1) Scientists offer their technical and special knowledge regarding the quality of personnel (selection, organization) and their knowledge on the technological developments of equipment and supplies for a better utilisation and exploitation of these elements.
- (2) The Military Personnel assisted by experienced scientists, estimate the requirements in forces and means, having always in mind:
  - the enemy threat
  - the mission of the Armed Forces and
  - approximately, the means available.
- (3) Finally the Administrators, taking into consideration the total requirements of the country in all fields (equipment, supplies and mainly in economic resources) contribute to the exact determination of the means which can be made available. Experience of the past has proved that an administrator always has difficulty in limiting the requirements because they are numerous and cannot be satisfied. He himself does not designate the fields to be limited but determines only the financial limits.
- (4) A satisfactory solution of this problem has to be found again with the co-operation of all these three components and has then to be submitted to the government for its approval. Of course there are cases of disagreements, the more common of which arise between military personnel and administrators, the first asking for more funds and the latter not yielding. Then the Government after an estimate of the requirements decides accordingly.
- (5) Another factor, the fourth one, appearing in this phase of the problem and seriously affecting its solution is the Joint United States Military Aid Group which is in Greece as a result of a bilateral Agreement. The mission of this Group is:
  - (i) to estimate the requirements of the Hellenic Armed Forces in equipment and supplies
  - (ii) to make recommendations to the higher echelons for the provision of equipment and supplies
  - (iii) to give advice for the good utilisation and maintenance of the equipment granted.

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- (d) After the specification of means, as set forth above, the administrator's role is somehow limited and the rest of the work - i.e. the building-up, organization and training of the Armed Forces and generally their preparation for the accomplishment of their wartime mission - is achieved with the available personnel, equipment, supplies and economic resources, through the co-operation of scientists and military personnel. During this phase scientists offer their knowledge and advice which the military personnel exploit for the organization of the Armed Forces in accord with the requirements and technical developments. Given that Greece, being a small country, does not produce major equipment for its Armed Forces but acquires it through MDAP, it is understandable that the Scientists' role in the field of the initial research on equipment is considerably limited compared with that of his counterpart in a great country capable of producing any kind of equipment. In spite of this he is a necessary and very useful advisor because by research and study he gives information on the developments of equipment in time and continuously advises for the better utilisation and maintenance of this equipment.
- (e) The aforementioned co-operation between the military personnel, scientists, administrators and JUSMAGG's representatives has resulted in the present organization of the Hellenic Armed Forces which has been the result of continuous efforts since the end of the Communist bandit warfare (1949). This also means that whenever in the future one or more factors of the problem change, the result will be adjusted accordingly.

4. A recent example of meeting the military problem in Greece

A recent example of a collective effort made in Greece from March 1962 and continuing up to now is given hereunder. This example gives a clear picture of the way of working out and meeting the Hellenic military problem.

- (a) During the last years the economic requirements of the Hellenic Armed Forces were higher than the Hellenic capabilities. This created a gap which the administrators could not cover from home resources.
- Successive efforts by Hellenic Military personnel and Administrators to fill this gap from Allied sources had failed by the end of 1961. Of course, this gap affected unfavourably the organization and combat readiness of the Hellenic Armed Forces.
- (b) At the beginning of 1962 the Hellenic Government was informed that the annual amount made available for the defensive support of the Hellenic Armed Forces (\$ 18,000,000) would be cut off from the next fiscal year.

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- (c) Both the military personnel and administrators examined jointly the problem and its implications and reached the conclusion that Greece would not be able to cover the new gap without risking her financial stability. Then the military personnel assisted by scientists tried to find out what could be done with the remaining economic resources. So they were obliged to limit, in their studies, the missions of the Armed Forces to an extent permitting the fulfilment of the requirements with the remaining means and proposed that the number of the Armed Forces should be reduced. Of course this would affect seriously the defensive capability of Greece.
- The military submitted their conclusions to the Government and expressed the opinion that the adoption of such a resolution would involve serious psychological dangers in peacetime and real ones in wartime.
- (d) With the consent of the Hellenic Government Chief/HNDGS presented the problem to the NATO Authorities (SACEUR) and asked for their assistance in order to solve this problem and prevent the unfavourable implications which the cutting off of the economic aid would create (March 1962). SACEUR suggested that the problems of organization, requirement and costing of the Hellenic Armed Forces should be studied jointly by the Hellenic and NATO Authorities and JUSMAGG representatives in detail and the result of this study should be submitted to SHAPE for arrival at a satisfactory solution.
- (e) Following these suggestions by SACEUR, the Hellenic Military Authorities considered the problem from the very beginning in co-operation with the NATO Headquarters concerned (AFSOUTH, AFMED, AIRSOUTH, LANDOUTHEAST and SIXTAF) and JUSMAGG as follows:
- (1) First, they determined the minimum of the Combat and Support Forces required for the period 1963 - 1966 on the basis of the maximum acceptable risk. MC 26/4 and SACEUR's supplementary directives were taken into consideration.
  - (2) The second step was the costing for these Forces (total of their requirements) and the determination of the sum which could be obtained from home sources and from the foreign aid programmed.
  - (3) Finally, the additional amount required for maintaining the Forces at the assessed minimum level permitting the accomplishment of their mission, was determined in the study according to SACEUR's suggestions.

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- (4) The intermediate NATO Headquarters expressed their views on this study which was finally presented to SHAPE on 12th May, 1962. SHAPE considered and submitted it to the NATO International Staff with its comments and proposals on the solution of the problem.
- (5) The International Staff acting in conformity with its terms of reference and on the basis of the relevant decisions taken at the Athens Ministerial Meeting (6th May, 1962) is now analysing the conclusion of this study and is going to suggest to the NATO Council the way of meeting the Hellenic Defensive problems.

OTAN/NATO,  
Paris, XVIe.

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