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N A T O S E C R E T

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COMMUNIST AID TO THE THIRD WORLD 1972(1)

The present paper amalgamates the salient findings of the experts' meeting on Communist economic aid to developing countries during 1972 and of five papers submitted by national delegations(2). The task has been complicated by the fact that each paper was developed independently and used different terms of reference: the United Kingdom paper handled economic aid primarily, not military assistance; the French contribution dealt solely with Soviet economic and military aid and trade; one German note was limited to Chinese economic activities in Central and West Africa, the other handled only economic aid. Only the United States paper dealt comprehensively with aggregate Communist aid to LDCs in 1972, both in terms of aid/trade and military assistance.

A. SUMMARY

2. Despite setbacks and a downturn of practically one-third compared with 1971, total new commitments in Communist economic and military aid in 1972 reached over \$2.1 billion (economic aid over \$1.6 billion, military aid extensions \$500 million). The Soviet contribution to this aid in 1972 totalled \$422 million for economic aid and \$310 million in military assistance (see Annex).

3. The Soviets extended large credits to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chile and Syria, and it was clear that in the course of 1972 the Soviets took increasingly economic factors into consideration, irrespective of the political gains which might be achieved in certain Third World countries. This more pragmatic Soviet orientation was shared by the other COMECON members in Eastern Europe which have long been concerned primarily with trade rather than political considerations in the Third World.

4. In 1970, China held the position as the Communist nations' biggest aid donor. This position was short-lived as Peking's aid reflected a sharp decline in 1971. However, the

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- (1) All non-Communist developing countries outside Europe
(2) AC/127-D/433 (France); AC/127-D/440 (United States);
AC/127-D/441, AC/127-D/446 (Germany); AC/127-D/389 (United Kingdom)

This document consists of: 7 pages
Annex I: 4 pages
Annex II: 8 pages

N A T O S E C R E T

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1972 figures show that China rallied with its extensions of around \$560 million of economic aid to 16 LDCs as part of its ongoing policy to extend assistance to any country willing to accept it.

5. The gap widened between aid extensions and drawings (total drawings dropped to around \$620 million, some \$80 million down on 1971). Only just over a third of the world's 90-odd developing countries actually drew on Communist assistance in 1972.

6. The drawers of Soviet bloc aid were largely in the Middle East and Asia, while China focussed primarily on Africa and Asia. Latin America figured as an aid recipient from the GDR, Poland and Bulgaria as well as the USSR, while China's share of total aid to that continent in 1972 (\$331 million) reached \$89 million, still modest, although \$63 million of this went to Chile.

B. ECONOMIC AID

7. The Soviet Union provided a large portion of total economic aid during 1972 (\$422 million out of over \$1.6 billion), underscoring yet again the importance it attaches to its aid programme in extending and consolidating its influence in the LDCs. Evidently, the USSR is becoming much more cost and profit conscious in its assistance allocation programmes, and while both short and medium term political returns are, obviously, desirable, the deciding factor in the bulk of aid extended appears to be the economic feasibility of projects under consideration. Over 70% of Soviet economic aid flowed to the Near East and South Asia, including \$121 million to Afghanistan.

8. The other countries in Eastern Europe donated more than double their annual average undertakings for the previous five years. Of the \$650 million extended in 1972 to 12 LDCs, Iraq received \$200 million and Algeria \$150 million. Peking in 1972 more than rivalled the Soviet level of aid by extending \$558 million to 16 LDCs. Prime targets were the Near East and South Asia (over 45%), and Africa (nearly 40%). Recipients included Afghanistan with \$45 million and Malta also with \$45 million, incidentally that country's first Communist aid.

9. Debt payments for Communist economic aid rose again in 1972 with over \$200 million repaid on debts to the Soviet Union. Approximately 80% of the total paid to the USSR was for principal, the remainder being interest. The repayments burden increased because of the relatively short term of many East European and some Soviet credits compared with Peking's longer repayment and initial grace periods and waiving of interest. Indeed this contrast has become more pronounced as Soviet bloc "commercial credits" linked to machinery exports have increased. The rising level of repayments, together with a relatively stable level of drawings over the last

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decade, has drastically narrowed the net Soviet aid outflow. From a high of \$300 million in 1964, the gap between drawings and repayments dropped to below \$100 million in 1972 (excluding military aid reimbursements). At the end of 1971, the developing countries had repaid nearly a third of their overall debt to Communist donors of over \$5.5 billion. In the case of the largest single recipient at that time, India, where deliveries against Soviet credits have fallen sharply, the flow has become negative since 1970, the Indians sending to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia more goods in repayment than they have drawn in aid. In 1972, India's estimated debt repayments exceeded aid drawings, for example by over \$30 million.

10. In most areas of project activity, drawings in 1972 on Soviet aid were well below the 1971 peak (\$310 million against \$385 million), mainly because of the decline in operations in Algeria and India. Both Egypt and Iran, however, received around \$70 million each - the largest allocations of Soviet aid. By contrast, Chinese aid deliveries rose in 1972 by 35% to \$220 million, 70% of this aid going to Tanzania and Zambia (railway construction), Chile and Pakistan.

11. An interesting development in the oil sector is the increasing number of aid accords with oil-producing LDCs which provide for repayment in oil. In May, 1972, Libya signed its first agreement to sell oil from the former British Sarir concession, Moscow undertaking to purchase 2 million tons over one year, with an annual renewable option. Again agreements were reached for settlement of most Iraqi aid debts in crude oil which should greatly boost Iraq's trade with the Communist countries. In 1973, oil exports to the Soviet bloc are expected to equal practically 15% of Iraq's total oil exports in 1971. The bulk of oil imported from the Middle East goes initially to the Soviet Union and is then trans-shipped to the other COMECON countries as well as to other Soviet customers, especially Cuba. The repayment situation is different in the case of Iran which is adopting a tougher policy towards the COMECON countries: it has just signed its first agreement for oil sales to a Communist country (Poland) in which payment in part (50%) will be made in a convertible foreign currency.

12. If Communist data are to be believed, by 1980 crude oil and natural gas consumption will considerably exceed projected COMECON production. With the USSR limiting its annual crude oil exports to the other COMECON countries to 100 million metric tons, and the other members of the bloc producing only 22 million tons domestically, some 50 million tons will have to be imported in 1980 from non-socialist sources, primarily from the Near East and Africa. The European part of the USSR and the Ural region account for around 80% of total energy consumption, but these regions produce only about 10% of the primary energy resources. This

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primary energy deficit situation has been considerably exacerbated by the growing needs of COMECON countries for Soviet energy raw materials. Ultimately, the hitherto untapped Siberian reserves may become available and meet COMECON requirements, but exploitation of the presumed vast deposits is a long way off.

C. ECONOMIC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

13. During 1972, there was an approximately 13% boost in the number of Communist economic technicians working in the LDCs. Apparently, the number of Soviet personnel increased only slightly during the year, although US figures (11,000) differ slightly from the French (over 13,500). The boost was mainly due to an input of 3,500 Chinese to work on the Tanzam railway, bringing the total number of Chinese working in the LDCs to around 22,000, i.e. over 55% of all Communist economic personnel in the LDCs. It is noteworthy that about 70% of all Communist technicians were employed in Africa which also received more than 90% of all Chinese personnel in the LDCs. Around 2,300 LDC technicians were sent for training to the Communist countries in 1972 (of which 1,335 went to the USSR). Although the Soviets are keen to keep their own technical experts in the LDCs both for political and prestige reasons (e.g. Soviet advisors are reported to be participating directly in the activities of ministries in Afghanistan: again, close Soviet involvement in India has been indicated through the Joint Economic Commission set up in 1971) it would appear that the trend is for fewer Soviet nationals to be employed, and much greater on-the-spot training to be given at project sites in the LDCs, and to build vocational training centres there. By the end of 1972 an estimated 300,000 persons had received local training from the Soviets, including 80,000 Egyptians and 40,000 Indians.

D. MILITARY AID

14. After two record extensions of military aid in 1970 and 1971 (averaging almost \$1.3 billion), total new Communist military assistance totalled around \$500 million, \$310 million of which was Soviet and \$115 million the other East European countries with China's contribution up by \$10 million on 1972 to reach \$75 million. In addition to termination of some programmes, the rather abrupt decline in military aid commitments may be partially explained by the setback experienced by the USSR through the departure of almost all Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Despite this unfriendly act by Egypt, the country received an estimated \$150 million, of which around \$80 million represented Soviet equipment turned over to the Egyptians by departing Soviet advisors. Irrespective of India's growing irritation over the nature of Communist military aid, that country received \$100 million of new Soviet commitments, at least two-thirds of which will be used to replace losses incurred during the recent war with Pakistan.

15. China committed some \$65 million to Pakistan; the Sudan and Burundi received their first Chinese weapons. The only noticeable East European aid came from Czechoslovakia which provided \$110 million, of which \$80 million went to Iraq, the rest to Egypt, India and Syria. As always, Communist military sales data must remain assessments, as there is ultimately no unequivocal indication of what price the Soviets place on their military equipment, nor of the type and level of discounting applied to military equipment by the USSR (anything up to 50%). Certainly, 1972 was in general only an average year for new military extensions.

E. MILITARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

16. There is no doubt that the number of Communist military technicians declined sharply during 1972, primarily due to the ouster of Soviet technicians from Egypt. While no final figure is available, the number of Soviet advisors and instructors in Egypt as of April, 1973 was still estimated to be well over 500. The Sudan also terminated the Soviet military training programme, although an increase in the number of Soviet military advisors was noted in Syria (1,500) Afghanistan and Iraq (around 600) particularly. Of the 3,200 LDC nationals sent to Communist countries in 1972 for military training (almost triple the 1971 figure), approximately 2,300 went to the USSR. Although Egypt reportedly withdrew the bulk of its trainees from the USSR during 1972, Iraq and Syria are said to have sent large numbers there for a six months missile training course.

F. TRADE

17. During 1971, Communist trade with LDCs attained a new height of almost \$6.2 billion, increasing by around \$285 million over 1970 - an approximately 5% growth rate. The bulk of this increase was carried again by the USSR which accounted for around 45% of Communist-LDC trade, Eastern Europe taking 38% and China 15%. The Near East and South Asia accounted for 60% of total Communist-LDC trade in 1971. Africa constituted around 20% and Latin America another 20%. The bulk of China's trade - approximately 35% - was with Africa. The LDCs accounted for about 10% of total Communist trade in 1971. Conversely, the Communist countries constituted only 5% of total LDC trade, although for certain of those countries, that trade was an important component of their aggregate trade. The USSR registered a trade deficit with imports exceeding exports by over \$30 million, this due primarily to poor commercial Latin America sales (imbalance: over \$100 million), and large-scale purchases of Malay rubber (Malay deficit: around \$85 million).

18. In 1971, some 75% of Soviet-LDC trade was with the Near East and South Asia: within these areas, 70% of Soviet trade was conducted with Egypt, India and Iran, imports from the latter

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country showing the largest rise through an upturn in natural gas deliveries. The recent Soviet-Indian trade pattern of falling Soviet exports and rising imports became more accentuated. East European trade with the LDCs grew only marginally during 1971, due primarily to reduced imports from Near East and South Asian countries.

19. The largest East European-LDC trading partner in 1971 was Czechoslovakia, which together with the GDR and Poland carried approximately 80% of aggregate COMECON (non-Soviet)-LDC trade. The bulk of the Chinese trade with the LDCs was with Africa and Latin America: trade with the Sudan doubled, for example, and there were substantial imports of copper from Chile, and copper and fishmeal from Peru.

20. The rising level of military and economic aid repayments has been a major stimulus in boosting Soviet imports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the LDCs. Moscow is increasingly accepting non-traditional imports to implement these transfers, especially from Soviet-assisted plants. This policy helps recipients to repay debts, but in some cases it creates an export potential that is in excess of current repayment obligations. It appears that Moscow is absorbing an increasing amount of this surplus.

G. TRENDS

21. No Western donor ties its aid so closely as does the USSR to providing its own goods for a carefully selected list of projects - which the Soviet Union maintains should be in the public sector. Moreover, while the West provides technical assistance as grant aid, Moscow charges the cost of such assistance against credits, which have to be repaid. In general, the Soviet area provides far less grant aid than the West, and its loan terms are often harder. Loans given by Western nations, the IDA, etc. are usually on soft terms - containing a "grant" or concessional element of 70%-80%, whereas the grant element in Soviet aid works out at about 30%. Whereas substantial Western non-project aid is available in the form of raw materials, food, spare parts, etc., Communist aid is primarily limited to specified projects. In addition, in recent years, Western aid has included debt relief loans, which have the advantage for the recipient of freeing convertible currency for financing essential imports.

22. India has long been the largest single recipient of Soviet area aid among the non-Communist LDCs. However, because some projects proved too large for the needs of the Indian market, the Soviets are thought to prefer joint schemes in which they take some of the output or arrange for its sale in third countries. The bias of Soviet aid towards building up state-owned heavy industries and power projects may also be modified, since last August, a Soviet economist,

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R. Ulianovskii acknowledged in a Soviet Embassy New Delhi publication that there were "negative consequences" of trying to resolve all the developing countries' problems by concentrating resources on heavy industry.

23. Several Soviet aid recipients in Africa such as Guinea and Somalia have also had problems, because their leaders tried to impose Soviet-type development patterns, and because of uneconomic prestige projects. For example, none of the projects started in Somalia in 1961, after the USSR had granted a \$35 million loan, were finished on time, and all exceeded the cost estimate.

24. The Soviets have concentrated assistance on a small number of LDCs appearing to offer dividends in political or strategic terms. This has tended to obscure the fact, for example, that in 1972, only around 33% of the approximately 90 LDCs in fact drew on Communist assistance. Some indication of the relatively minuscule extent of Soviet aid to the developing countries can be gained by a comparison with the US flow of resources to the LDCs (net disbursements) as a percentage of GNP: USSR: 0.06%; USA: 0.32%.


25. Although this paper does not deal with intra-COMECON aid, a recent unusual event which could form an important precedent for the Third World, took place when five agreements were signed between the USSR and Cuba in December, 1972, which offer immediate relief from the burden of debts due to be repaid between 1973 and 1985. Repayments have now been postponed to the 25 years following 1986, and the USSR has agreed to pay, moreover, new standard prices to Cuba for her sugar and nickel. In return for the postponement of Cuba's debt burden, the Cuban economy will doubtless be tied closely to that of the USSR well into the next century, and since the repayments of both old and new credits will be made in Cuban goods and services, Cuba will depend on Soviet markets for other products as well as sugar as they become available for export.

26. Of course, Cuba has long been the chief consumer of Communist economic assistance - by the end of 1971, the USSR's trade surplus with Cuba had reached a cumulative \$2 billion since 1960. Nevertheless, the apparent willingness by Moscow to reassess the terms of aid in view of a recipient's problems has set important precedents, and LDCs with mounting indebtedness to the Soviet area will doubtless wonder about their own chances of debt-rescheduling - Egypt for example might well appreciate a long-term standard price for her cotton fibre exports to the USSR (33% of the total) to help repay the \$1 billion owed to the Communist states for economic aid. Yet while it is to be hoped that overall COMECON aid will become more flexible - applying the Cuba formula - the Soviet area's lack of convertible currency is likely to remain a major hurdle.

**COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND ACTIVITY
IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**
**L'AIDE ECONOMIQUE ET LES ACTIVITES COMMERCIALES COMMUNISTES
DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPEMENT**


**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
TECHNICIANS IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**
**TECHNICIENS EMPLOYES
DANS LES SECTEURS
ECONOMIQUES ET MILITAIRES
DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE
DE DEVELOPEMENT**

Thousand Technicians - *Milliers de Techniciens*




**ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EXTENDED
AIDE ECONOMIQUE ACCORDEE**

Million US \$



**MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXTENDED
AIDE MILITAIRE ACCORDEE**

Million US \$




NOTE : The above figures represent an annual average.
Les chiffres mentionnés ci-dessus représentent des moyennes annuelles.

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**COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**
**L'AIDE ECONOMIQUE COMMUNISTE
AUX PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT**


**SHARE OF TOTAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE EXTENDED
BY DONOR**

**DECOMPOSITION EN % DU TOTAL
DE L'AIDE ECONOMIQUE ACCORDEE
PAR LE PAYS DONATEUR**





**SHARE OF TOTAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE EXTENDED
BY RECIPIENT**

**DECOMPOSITION EN % DU TOTAL
DE L'AIDE ECONOMIQUE ACCORDEE
PAR LE PAYS BENEFICIAIRE**





**COMMUNIST EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
EXPORTATIONS ET IMPORTATIONS DES PAYS COMMUNISTES
CONCERNANT LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPEMENT**

**VALUE OF TRADE, 1967-1971
VALEUR DES ECHANGES 1967-1971**



* Including trade of Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam
* Echanges avec l'Albanie, Cuba, la Mongolie, la Corée du Nord et le Nord Vietnam compris

**PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, 1971
REPARTITION EN POURCENTAGE EN 1971**




TOTAL EXPORTS
TOTAL DES EXPORTATIONS \$ 3,320 Million


TOTAL IMPORTS
TOTAL DES IMPORTATIONS \$ 2,869 Million

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URSS : FOREIGN TRADE
URSS : COMMERCE EXTERIEUR



SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
DRAWINGS AND REPAYMENTS
AIDE ECONOMIQUE DE L'URSS AUY PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT;
TIRAGES ET REMBOURSEMENTS



STATISTICAL TABLES
TABLEAUX STATISTIQUES

Table 1 - Tableau 1

Communist Economic Aid Extended to Less Developed Countries 1972
Aide économique accordée par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés
1972

Million Current US \$¹
Millions d'US \$ courants¹

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe - Europe de l'Est							
			Total	Bul- garia	Czecho- slovakia	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Romania	PRC
Total	1,630.8 ²	422.5	650.3	14.5	134.6	20.0	90.0	148.2	243.0	558.0
<u>Africa</u>	423.9	...	214.1	4.5	59.6	150.0	209.8
Algeria	150.0	...	150.0	...	50.0	100.0	...
Burundi	20.0	20.0
Dahomey	44.0	44.0
Malagasy Republic	9.0	9.0
Mauritius	33.8	33.8
Rwanda	22.0	22.0
Somalia	1.5	...	1.5	1.5
Tanzania	12.6	...	12.6	3.0	9.6
Togo	45.0	45.0
Tunisia	36.0	36.0
Zambia	50.0	...	50.0	50.0	...
<u>Latin America</u>	331.2	144.0	98.2	20.0	30.0	48.2	...	89.0
Bolivia	0.2	...	0.2	0.2
Chile	227.0	144.0	20.0	20.0	63.0
Guyana	26.0	26.0
Peru	78.0	...	78.0	30.0	48.0
<u>Near East and South</u>										
<u>Asia</u>	1,033.7	436.5	338.0	10.0	75.0	...	60.0	100.0	93.0	259.2
Afghanistan	166.0	121.0	45.0
Bangladesh	98.5 ³	73.5	25.0	...	25.0
Iran	10.0	...	10.0	10.0
Iraq	200.0	...	200.0	...	50.0	...	50.0	100.0
Malta	45.0	45.0
Nepal	35.0	35.0
Sri Lanka	55.8	...	10.0	10.0	45.8
Syria	222.0	84.0	93.0	93.0	45.0
Yemen (Aden)	22.2	N.A.	22.2
Yemen (San'a)	21.2	21.2

¹ Credits extended in pounds sterling were converted at 1972's average rate of \$ 2.50 per pound.

² Including grants made by the PRC of \$ 35 million to Nepal and \$ 1.2 million to the Malagasy Republic and Soviet grants of \$ 17.5 million to Bangladesh.

³ Excluding all aid reallocated to Bangladesh from former credits to Pakistan.

¹ Les crédits accordés en livres sterling ont été convertis au taux moyen de 1972, soit \$ 2,50 par livre.

² Y compris les dons de la République populaire de Chine (PRC) au Népal (\$ 35 millions) et à la République malgache (\$ 1,2 million), et ceux de l'URSS au Bangladesh (\$ 17,4 millions).

³ A l'exclusion de toute aide réallouée au Bangladesh, aux dépens de crédits précédemment accordés au Pakistan.

Table 2 - Tableau 2

Communist Economic Credits and Grants to Less Developed Countries, Extended and Drawn 1954-1972
Crédits et dons accordés par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés au titre de l'aide économique -
Montants totaux et tirages
1954-1972

Million current US \$
Millions d'US \$ courants

	Extended - Montants totaux				Drawn - Tirages			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	14,728	7,745	4,162	2,821	6,269	4,025	1,234	1,010
<u>Africa</u>	3,506	1,300	800	1,406	1,031	462	131	438
Algeria	763	425	246	92	197	142	20	35
Burundi	20	20
Cameroon	8	8	1	1
Central African Republic	6	2	...	4	6	2	...	4
Chad	2	2	...	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	...	Negl.
Congo	59	9	5	45	18	5	Negl.	13
Dahomey	44	44
Equatorial Guinea	25	1	...	24	1	1
Ethiopia	203	102	17	84	26	18	8	...
Ghana	239	93	104	42	62	31	26	5
Guinea	299	200	30	69	175	90	28	57
Kenya	67	49	...	18	7	4	...	3
Malagasy Republic	9	9
Mali	137	64	23	50	93	49	7	37
Mauritania	28	3	...	25	3	1	...	2
Mauritius	39	5	...	34	1	1
Morocco	123	88	35	...	26	20	6	...
Nigeria	45	7	38	...	2	2
Rwanda	22	22
Senegal	7	7	2	2
Sierra Leone	68	28	...	40	4	2	...	2
Somalia	203	66	5	132	51	39	3	9
Sudan	300	65	152	82	29	25	2	2
Tanzania	296	20	20	256	204	1	3	200
Togo	45	45
Tunisia	144	34	74	36	45	17	28	...
Uganda	31	16	...	15	12	8	...	4
Zambia	274	6	50	218	66	1	...	65
<u>East Asia</u>	715	154	338	223	457	141	167	149
Burma	127	14	29	84	53	14	6	33
Cambodia	134	25	17	92	90	16	5	69
Indonesia	454	115	292	47	314	111	156	47
<u>Latin America</u>	1,185	457	597	131	238	66	156	16
Argentina	56	44	12	...	41	34	7	...
Bolivia	55	30	25	...	2	2	Negl.	...
Brazil	331	90	241	...	139	18	121	...
Chile	418	235	120	63	34	8	12	14
Colombia	18	2	16	...	3	3	Negl.	...
Costa Rica	10	10
Ecuador	15	Negl.	15	...	6	Negl.	6	...
Guyana	26	26
Peru	205	26	137	42	7	1	4	2
Uruguay	41	20	21	...	6	...	6	...
Venezuela	10	...	10

Table 2 (Continued) - Tableau 2 (suite)

Communist Economic Credits and Grants to Less Developed Countries, Extended and Drawn 1954-1972
Crédits et dons accordés par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés au titre de l'aide économique -
Montants totaux et tirages
1954-1972

Million current US \$
Millions d'US \$ courants

	Extended - Montants totaux				Drawn - Tirages			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	9,322	5,834	2,427	1,061	4,543	3,356	760	407
Afghanistan	911	826	12	73	630	594	11	25
Bangladesh	218	160	47	11	80	61	8	11
Egypt	1,986	1,205	675	106	1,082	795	249	38
India	1,979	1,612	367	...	1,217	1,001	216	...
Iran	1,039	601	438	..	473	379	94	...
Iraq	1,039	554	440	45	247	170	77	...
Malta	45	45	5	5
Nepal	124	21	...	103	85	20	...	65
Pakistan	781	389	51	341	182	51	15	116
Sri Lanka	231	38	62	131	120	23	17	80
Syria	651	317	283	51	282	190	80	12
Yemen (Aden)	130	13	40	77	14	7	1	6
Yemen (San'a)	188	98	12	78	126	65	12	49

Table 3 - Tableau 3

Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less Developed Countries, by Communist Area and Country
Crédits et dons accordés par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés au titre de l'aide économique - Répartition par région ou pays communiste

Million Current US \$
Millions d'US \$ courants

Table 4 - Tableau 4

Communist Economic Credits and Grants Drawn by Less Developed Countries, by Communist Area and Country
Tirages sur les crédits et dons accordés par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés - Répartition par région ou pays communiste

Million Current US \$
Millions d'US \$ courants

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC		Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	14,728	8,002	3,905	2,821	Total	6,269	4,053	1,206	1,010
1954-1962	3,965	2,701	964	265	1954-1962	1,078	793	208	95
1963	348	220	19	89	1963	410	336	48	20
1964	1,491	805	302	311	1964	545	366	115	65
1965	746	331	452	71	1965	515	346	85	80
1966	1,551	1,216	274	151	1966	485	325	75	80
1967	502	270	111	50	1967	480	287	110	80
1968	638	359	184	55	1968	427	286	115	70
1969	657	470	385	13	1969	480	311	100	70
1970	1,104	179	158	727	1970	510	326	120	65
1971	1,937	891	446	540	1971	690	376	145	165
1972	1,789	560	620	558	1972	601	301	85	220

Table 5 - Tableau 5

Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries 1972
Techniciens de l'économie mis en place par le monde communiste dans les pays insuffisamment développés -
Situation en 1972

	Total	USSR	Persons Eastern Europe	Nombre de personnes PRC
Total	39,105	11,010	5,920	22,165
<u>Africa</u>	27,840	3,760	3,805	20,275
Algeria	3,080	1,480	1,100	500
Burundi	25	15	...	10
Cameroon	5	5
Central African Republic	50	40	10	...
Chad	70	70
Congo	490	150	30	310
Equatorial Guinea	35	35
Ethiopia	170	75	90	5
Ghana	130	45	80	5
Guinea	1,460	640	220	600
Kenya	130	15	115	...
Libya	950	10	940	...
Mali	455	120	40	295
Mauritania	215	15	...	200
Morocco	545	330	215	...
Nigeria	250	100	150	...
Senegal	5	5
Sierra Leone	60	15	...	45
Somalia	1,215	200	15	1,000
Sudan	275	70	70	135
Tanzania	15,640	165	75	15,400
Tunisia	665	45	620	...
Uganda	70	70
Zaire	25	...	25	...
Zambia	1,825	80	10	1,735
<u>East Asia</u>	75	25	20	30
Burma	55	25	...	30
Indonesia	15	...	15	...
Thailand	5	...	5	...
<u>Latin America</u>	350	190	130	30
Argentina	5	...	5	...
Bolivia	20	15	5	...
Brazil	55	5	50	...
Chile	190	140	50	...
Colombia	15	5	10	...
Guyana	25	25
Peru	40	25	10	5
<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	10,840	7,045	5,965	1,830
Afghanistan	1,265	1,025	100	140
Bangladesh	60	60
Egypt	1,065	550	510	5
India	1,210	850	360	...
Iran	2,250	2,000	250	...
Iraq	880	685	195	...
Kuwait	35	15	20	...
Lebanon	25	...	25	...
Malta	15	15
Nepal	575	80	...	495
Pakistan	160	105	25	30
Sri Lanka	555	95	90	370
Syria	1,560	1,300	200	60
Turkey	190	180	10	...
Yemen (Aden)	765	200	80	485
Yemen (San'a)	420	80	110	230

Table 6 - Tableau 6

Military Aid Extended by Communist Countries to Less Developed Countries ¹
Aide militaire accordée par les pays communistes aux pays insuffisamment développés ¹

Million Current US \$
Millions d'US \$ courants

Year	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	9,915	8,470	1,000	445
1955-1960	1,780	1,285	460	35
1961	850	830	20	...
1962	415	415
1963	390	385	5	...
1964	890	870	15	5
1965	385	260	45	80
1966	515	450	15	50
1967	645	515	75	55
1968	525	460	45	20
1969	425	335	85	5
1970	1,075	985	35	55
1971	1,520	1,370	85	65
1972	500	310	115	75

¹ Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

¹ Chiffres arrondis au multiple de 5 le plus proche.

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Table 7 - Tableau 7

Communist Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, Extended and Drawn ¹
1955-1972Aide militaire accordée par le monde communiste aux pays insuffisamment développés - Montants totaux et tirages ¹
1955-1972Million Current US \$
Millions de US \$ courants

	Extended - Offres				Drawn - Tirages			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	9,915	8,470	1,000	445	8,325	7,120	840	365
<u>Africa</u>	705	605	35	65	570	480	30	60
Algeria	405	395	Negl.	10	305	290	Negl.	15
Burundi	Negl.	Negl.	...	Negl.
Congo	20	15	...	5	10	5	...	5
Equatorial Guinea	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Ghana	10	10	...	Negl.	10	10
Guinea	30	25	Negl.	5	25	25	Negl.	Negl.
Mali	5	5	...	Negl.	5	5	...	Negl.
Morocco	30	10	20	...	35	15	20	...
Nigeria	10	10	10	10
Sierra Leone	Negl.	Negl.	...	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Somalia	55	55	50	50
Sudan ²	80	65	10	5	70	60	5	5
Tanzania	45	5	Negl.	40	40	5	Negl.	35
Uganda	15	10	5	Negl.	10	5	5	...
Zambia	Negl.	Negl.	...	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
<u>East Asia</u>	1,335	1,100	200	35	1,090	865	190	35
Burma	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Cambodia ²	25	10	Negl.	15	25	10	...	15
Indonesia ²	1,310	1,090	200	20	1,065	855	190	20
<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	7,875	6,765	765	345	6,665	5,775	620	270
Afghanistan	475	455	20	...	315	295	20	...
Bangladesh	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Cyprus	25	25	Negl.	...	20	20	Negl.	...
Egypt	3,015	2,685	330	...	2,975	2,645	330	...
India	1,340	1,235	105	...	1,015	905	110	...
Iran	480	480	335	335
Iraq	1,175	1,000	175	Negl.	805	750	55	...
Lebanon	5	5	5	5
Maldives	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Pakistan ²	400	65	...	335	280	20	...	260
Sri Lanka	10	5	...	5	10	5	...	5
Syria	815	710	100	5	770	695	70	5
Yemen (Aden)	30	25	5	...	30	25	5	...
Yemen (San'a)	105	75	30	...	105	75	30	...

¹ Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.² In Cambodia and Indonesia, both Soviet and Chinese aid programs are inactive. In Cyprus and Sudan the Soviet program is inactive - further deliveries are unlikely. In Pakistan the Soviets have stopped delivery of weaponry although they are providing support-type equipment - particularly vehicles.¹ Chiffres arrondis au multiple de 5 le plus proche.² Au Cambodge et en Indonésie, les programmes d'assistance soviétique et chinois sont tous deux en sommeil. A Chypre et au Soudan, le programme d'assistance soviétique est en sommeil; de nouvelles livraisons y sont peu probables. Au Pakistan, l'Union soviétique a cessé les livraisons d'armes mais continue à fournir du matériel militaire de soutien, notamment des véhicules.

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Table 8 - Tableau 8

Communist Military Technicians in Less Developed Countries
Techniciens militaires mis en place par le monde communiste en poste dans les pays insuffisamment développés

Persons
Nombre de personnes

	1971			1972		
	Total	USSR and Eastern Europe	PRC	Total	USSR and Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	10,260	9,450	810	10,550	9,660	890
Afghanistan	160	160	...	200	200	...
Algeria	1,000	1,000	...	1,000	1,000	...
Congo	60	30	30	60	30	30
Egypt	5,500	5,500	...	5,500	5,500	...
Equatorial Guinea	10	10	...	10	10	...
Guinea	80	80	...	110	110	...
India	150	150	...	220	220	...
Iran	30	30	...	30	30	...
Iraq	400	400	...	500	500	...
Libya	20	20	...	20	20	...
Mali	20	15	5	20	10	10
Nigeria	70	70	...	70	70	...
Pakistan	25	...	25	25	...	25
Sierra Leone	10	...	10
Somalia	300	300	...	400	400	...
Sri Lanka	85	85	...	35	5	30
Sudan	500	500	...	180	100	80
Syria	800	800	...	1,140	1,140	...
Tanzania	745	10	735	705	...	705
Uganda	10	10	...	5	5	...
Yemen (Aden)	195	180	15	210	210	...
Yemen (San'a)	100	100	...	100	100	...

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Table 9 - Tableau 9

Percentage Share of the Communist Countries in the Trade of Selected Less Developed Countries
Part (en. %) des pays communistes dans le commerce extérieur de certains pays insuffisamment développés

	Exports to Communist Countries - Expor- tations vers les pays communistes		Imports from Communist Countries - Impor- tations en provenance des pays communistes	
	1970	1971	1970	1971
<u>Africa</u>				
Algeria	8.0	10.5	5.5	5.7
Angola	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.1
Cameroon	3.7	2.3	2.1	2.0
Chad	1.9	1.5
Ethiopia	1.2	3.1	5.5	4.7 ¹
Ghana	10.6	5.9	7.5	6.6 ¹
Ivory Coast	0.8	3.1	1.5	0.8
Kenya	2.7	3.6 ¹	3.0	3.5 ¹
Libya	0.1	0.1 ¹	6.9	12.0 ¹
Malagasy Republic	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.1
Mali	1.8	2.8	20.9	19.5
Morocco	9.6	13.4	11.5	10.2
Nigeria	2.9	3.1	5.8	5.2
Senegal	0.2	0.2	2.8	4.3 ¹
Sierra Leone	0.3	Negl.	10.7	9.7 ¹
Sudan	28.9	32.0	17.7	23.5
Tanzania	5.3	6.1	15.5	26.7
Togo	5.8	13.5	6.6	6.1
Tunisia	9.8	11.9	6.7	6.3
Uganda	7.4	3.0	4.2	3.8
<u>Europe</u>				
Portugal	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.2
Spain	2.9	3.2	1.4	1.9
<u>East Asia</u>				
Burma	19.2 ¹
Indonesia	1.9	0.7	0.6	1.2
Malaysia	8.3	6.7	5.7	5.4
Singapore	6.6	4.5	6.3	5.7
Thailand	0.4	1.0	1.4	0.8
<u>Latin America</u>				
Argentina	4.3	4.3	1.3	1.2
Brazil	4.6	...	2.1	...
Chile	0.6	...	0.1	...
Colombia	...	3.0 ¹	4.3	2.4 ¹
Ecuador	4.1	6.0	2.8	1.2
Mexico	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Peru	3.1	9.0	0.7	0.6
Uruguay	12.2	4.8	3.7	2.1
<u>Near East and South Asia</u>				
Cyprus	10.4	10.0 ¹	6.6	7.0 ¹
Egypt	59.1	58.7 ¹	31.3	30.9 ¹
India	20.3	20.7	14.9	11.5
Iran	4.6	4.2	11.9	13.3
Iraq	2.0	1.4	26.2	31.0
Israel	2.6	1.8	2.3	1.8
Jordan	4.5	1.8	11.6	6.2
Kuwait	0.1	...	8.0	8.1
Malta	0.5	0.8	5.2	6.1
Pakistan	17.5	17.7	9.8	12.4 ¹
Saudi Arabia	2.6	2.5 ¹
Sri Lanka	20.8	18.5	19.1	15.3 ¹
Syria	25.8	35.6	23.8	27.6 ¹

¹ Based on partial year data.¹ Extrapolation des chiffres se rapportant à une partie de l'année.

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