



# DOCUMENTATION FOR THE CSCE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

## CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

#### Note by the Secretary

Attached is a Note by the United States Delegation for consideration by the Allied negotiators with a view to the discussions on co-operation in the fields of science and technology to be held in Geneva in the framework of the CSCE's Economic Committee.

> (Signed) M. van den BULCKE For the Secretary

NATO, 1110 Brussels.

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#### CSCE

#### RECOMMENDATIONS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

#### Note by the United States Delegation

1. Paragraphs 37 and 38 of the final recommendations of the Helsinki consultations (Chapter 2, point II, 3 of final recommendations of the Helsinki Conference), provide guidelines for negotiating in Phase II of the CSCE the conditions for co-operation in science and technology.

The Government of the United States of America considers 2. that this mandate provides adequately for the realization of Western objectives defined during NATO consultation over the past Substantial agreement was reached on these year and a half. objectives at a meeting of Experts in Brussels on 17th January, As reflected in NATO document C-M(73)17, reference was made 1973. at the Experts' meeting to a sharing of bilateral experience in science and technology co-operation with Warsaw Pact countries; provision was made for removal of obstacles to scientific and technological (science and technology) co-operation and for a linkage with progress in CSCE on "Freer Movement and Contacts" (Point III, 2); reference was made to co-operation between industrial enterprises (implying a linkage to paragraphs 33-36 of the final recommendations); possible post-CSCE use of existing international mechanisms was considered; and views were refined on science and technology topics which might be discussed in an East-West (CSCE) context.

3. Consultation among NATO countries will undoubtedly continue during Stage II discussions in Geneva. There is a need, however, to clarify further certain Western positions and to consider some proposals which have been made by individual NATO countries. With respect to these matters the US Government offers the following comment and suggestions.

Sharing of bilateral experience - Since the NATO 4. consultative process on CSCE began over a year ago the United States has concluded with the USSR a general agreement on scientific and technological co-operation and seven intergovernmental agreements for co-operation in space, health, environment, atomic energy, transportation, oceans and agriculture. Negotiation of these agreements and subsequent efforts to implement them lead us to believe that the USSR is more prepared for co-operation than it was three years ago, but also that, despite limited accomplishments in co-operation, we are still largely in an exploratory "exchanges" phase in our relationship This exploratory phase exists also in with the Soviets. Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In contrast, we are fairly deeply involved with Yugoslavia and Poland, where we have extensive co-operative arrangements utilizing the "excess" currencies we possess in those countries.

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5. Our exploration has confirmed that we still have some distance to go with the USSR and certain East European countries with respect to contacts with working specialists and in working out mutually beneficial areas of co-operation. This is well illustrated in the recently established International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, in which representatives of some of our NATO partners are also involved. While the USSR is very adept in seeking to take on policy and Secretariat functions in the Institute, it is less eager and successful in contributing substantive participation of their scientists. While their representatives with some justification explain this as being the result of a dearth of specialists with interdisciplinary skills, it also clearly results from excessive caution regarding freedom of movement and contact - even among their scientists at home.

6. Our experience to date, therefore, leaves us mildly encouraged, but as much as ever convinced that attention must be given to linkages of CSCE deliberations in the science and technology field with those in freedom of contact and with industrial co-operation, in which the Warsaw Pact countries are greatly interested. It also reinforces our conviction that in any search for post-CSCE institutions for co-operation in science and technology, countries of the West must seek measures which emphasize the freedom of association theme.

7. Relationship to industrial co-operation - US experience to date also reveals that the Soviets press for co-operation in applied science and technology simultaneously in the governmental and private industrial spheres. This raises the problem of co-ordination and touches on a series of problems with respect to the safeguarding of proprietary rights (private and governmental), export licensing, patents and copyrights. The Soviet Union, utilizing its State Committee for Science and Technology, enjoys a monopoly position in directing its science and technology efforts in the West through both governmental and industrial channels. This presents a tactical problem for the Allies. For example, in the United States this process must be co-ordinated among the Departments of State and Commerce, in addition to approximately a dozen US technical agencies.

8. In consideration of the monopoly advantage possessed by the East, we feel that during CSCE discussions, there should be very close co-ordination between the Sub-Committee on Science and Technology and the Sub-Committee on Industrial Co-operation. The latter should set the pace on technological co-operation in the industrial sphere and co-ordinate positions with the Science and Technology Sub-Committee.

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9. <u>Human Contacts</u> - In view of certain evidences of progress, but continuing Soviet and East European hesitancy about bringing their scientists and technological intelligentsia into freer contact with Western counterparts noted in paragraph 4 above, we feel that the approach to be taken by the West in CSCE is a delicate, important one. We suggest the following guidelines in treating this subject in general CSCE discussions:

- (a) That the Western countries seek more specific confirmation of the understanding in paragraph 38 of the final recommendations regarding "obstacles that hinder such co-operation" in line with the Western position contained in NATO document C-M(73)17, pp. 4-5;
- (b) that Science and Technology Sub-Committee deliberations be co-ordinated with progress in the Sub-Committee on Human Contacts, paragraphs 45-51;
- (c) that agreement be sought on certain post-conference institutions which will encourage and, eventually, test Soviet/East European readiness to permit freer movement and association among scientists.

10. <u>Post-Conference Institutions</u> - As a result of their consultations, MATO countries appear satisfied that existing bilateral relations and international organizations provide an adequate framework for an expansion of science and technology co-operation between countries of the East and West.

- (a) In the bilateral sphere there is, as noted in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, a need for increased exchanges of experience in the West to compensate in part for the absence of the close co-ordination which characterizes the relations among countries of the Warsaw Pact. We propose that consideration be given to sharing experience on a continuing basis through experts' meetings under the aegis of the NATO Science Committee, similar to the January 1973 meeting.
- (b) In the multilateral sphere, in addition to a search for science and technology topics of mutual benefit and common interest, there will be a need for programmes in international organizations which will emphasize the free association of scientists of all countries involved. There seems to be a NATO consensus that ECE provides the most appropriate East-West framework for this purpose.

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The US Government believes that certain programmes (1)which have evolved under the aegis of the NATO Science Committee are admirably suited to this These include the advanced study purpose. institutes, which over the past dozen years have brought together more than 10,000 scientists in free association and study of latest developments in specific scientific fields; the NATO Science joint research projects, which provide for joint work on agreed subjects; and the research evaluation conferences, which bear some resemblance to the conferences sponsored by the ECE Senior Science Advisors. Without detracting from the NATO Science Committee's continuing sponsorship of such programmes in its own sphere, similar instrumentalities could be developed in the ECE - with similar efficiency, minimal bureaucracy, and low operation costs. These costs would be shared by the many countries - East, West and Neutral - involved in the CSCE. Α reiteration of this proposal, originally contained in NATO document C-M(72)24, Annex VII, is being pouched.

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- (2) The Federal Republic of Germany has proposed that agreement be reached at the CSCE to establish a non-governmental scientific forum. This institution would organize interdisciplinary scientific congresses and informal working meetings and would issue publications to which the public of all participating states would have free access. While a number of fora and traditional conferences already exist and are available for free association among scientists, the proposed institution could provide an additional, mutually agreed vehicle for interdisciplinary convocations and publications which would further Western objectives of freer contact and exchange of published information. While the forum would be non-governmental, the question of financing and facilities, nonetheless, arises; and this usually narrows down to the generosity of the governments of countries supplying the participants. This is a problem which will require further study, and the US Government is not now in a position to commit itself on any particular financing formula.
- (3) If there is general agreement on the desirability of such a forum, it is recommended that steps be taken to ensure its non-governmental interdisciplinary character.

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11. Possible areas for co-operation - At the 17th January Experts' meeting considerable time was spend discussing science and technology subjects which might be considered at a CSCE. These topics were separated into two categories: (A) subjects in which the West has an interest; and (B) subjects in which the East has a direct interest (Annex to NATO document C-M(73)17). As the note by the Chairman of the Political Committee at senior level dated 8th February, 1973 (Annex to NATO document C-M(73)17) points out, the lists are "of an indicative character only", requiring further study at a later stage.

12. The lists are largely based on US experience with science and technology exchanges and co-operation with the Soviet Union and several East European countries over the past decade. Thev are clearly not definitive in a multilateral sense. Some NATO representatives at the January Experts' meeting object to certain topics, since eliminated, because their countries were already deeply engaged in those fields with the USSR; others because they had advanced proposals in certain fields which had been rejected by the USSR. Additional countries objected in principle to certain topics. The lists, therefore, are rough indicators of possibilities for the rather improbable event that a CSCE might deal with specific topics for co-operation.

13. It is suggested that the topics be used as roughly screened subjects, ad referendum to participating governments should the occasion demand. The usual fundamental criteria should be used in reaching an agreement on appropriate topics such as: security considerations, export controls, and balance in advantage to the parties involved. Until such criteria are employed the lists should be considered as merely illustrative. Moreover, no lists, even eventually agreed lists, should be considered binding in practice on participants, each of which has specific scientific interests to pursue.

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